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EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Chapter I 
PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES IN THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA 
1, Latin America: development with sharp contrasts 
In order to analyse Latin America's role in the world economy and 
its relations with the major"developed areas it is necessary to draw 
attention to some of the fundamental features of Latin American development 
which are of particular importance in weighing up the problems posed in 
those relations and the strategies and policies"the countries of the region 
can adopt to overcome them. This is not to suggest that there are not 
many differences in development levels, problems and policies among the 
countriés of the'region. The features singled out here are the most 
striking, and correspond roughly to a regional average. 
Latin American development has contradictory features, in Which 
great transformations (development of light industry, progress in labour 
training and éducation, emergence of middle incomé strata, beginning 
stages of exports of manufactures) are accompanied by the persistence of 
backward areas and fundamental problems (high proportion of the labour 
force suffering from open and disguised unemployment, a large sector of 
the population living in a state of critical poverty, backwardness in 
the development of basic and high-technology industries, external bottleneck). 
The stage of import substitution, carried out exclusively on the basis of 
individual domestic markets with high, indiscriminate protection, caused 
foreign trade to decline in comparison with domestic output; in the period 
1950-1965, imports grew by 0.4% for every 1% growth of the product. During 
this period imports were not only substituted but strongly held down. 
The mid-1960s markéd the beginning of a new stage, in which an attempt 
was made to combine industrialization aimed at satisfying domestic demand 




in this stage, in which protection is rationalized and reduced, and kept 
within limits in which industrial development can continue while allowing 
greater possibilities than before 1965 of competing in international 
markets. At the same time non-traditional exports were promoted. After 
1965, imports rose by 1.4% for every 1% of growth of the product.1/ This 
average performance is made up of cases where the import coefficient 
continued to be reduced and others where the proportion of imported goods 
grew as a result of lower protection and greater openness of the economy 
towards the exterior. Exports were diversified and their rate of growth 
improved. 
The most important features of current Latin American development 
from the standpoint of the region's relations with the main developed 
areas are outlined below in the remainder of the chapter, 
(a) Asymmetrical trade structure 
The structure of Latin American foreign trade is heavily unbalanced: 
the composition of imports and exports is very different, unlike what 
occurs in the developed economies. Raw materials and fuels still represent 
about 85% of the region's total exports (see table 1). Even in the case 
of Argentina and Brazil this figure is almost 75%, and a little lower in 
Mexico, due to the reexport of assembled products. World demand for and 
trade in commodities are growing much more slowly than for manufactures; 
between 1950 and 1975 the share of raw materials and food in total world 
trade dropped steadily from 46.4% to 19.0%, while during the same period 
the share of manufactures rose from 43.7 to 60.4%, and that of fuels from 
9.9 to 18.6%, above all due to higher prices. Thus it is not surprising 
that Latin America has clearly lost ground in world trade. 
1/ This import elasticity is similar to what would occur if a 
coefficient of imported supply were held constant for the goods 
produced in each and every sector of the economy. 
/Table 1 
• Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN OF EXPORTS 
AT CURRENT PRICES . . 








66.8 64.7 66.0 64.8 47.0 
30.1 32.0 20.6 24.0 39.4 
3.1 3.3 5.4 9.1 13.6 




Total 8 . 6 
Source: The economic relations of Latin America with Europe (CEPAL/CID/ 
Preliminary version/175), 1978. 
Although manufactures still represent a small proportion of exports, 
they are certainly the most dynamic element in them, as shown by the 
significant growth in their share over the last ten years. Some countries 
are already in a position:to export competitively not only non-duráble 
consumer goods but also durable consumer goods and capital goods involving 
intermediate technology¿ and even entire plants "key in hand"; and this 
is one of the reasons why such countries can be considered semi-industrialized. 
The cases of exports of this kind have arisen where progress has been made 
in the process of industrialization, particularly light industry, which 
has gone on from production for domestic consumption to win external markets. 
The countries in this stage of exporting manufactures already have an 
industrial scene characterized by the existence of external economies, 
diversified industry producing quite complex products, and a long experience 
in the operation of productive and marketing processes. 
/The share 
The share of manufacturing in the total product of the region rose 
from 18% in 1950 to 24% in 1975, when it represented 26.6 of the total 
product in the case of the larger, more.industrialized countries. 
Significant although still insufficient progress was made in the adaptation 
of technology, leading to the introduction of many small innovations aimed 
at making productive process better suited to resource endowment, and the 
products better suited to the particular use made of them in developing 
countries. All this has naturally increased the competitiveness of 
Latin America. 
However, it may still be said that the region is far from having 
a sufficiently active attitude towards technology. The Latin American 
industrialization process was promoted by policies which, broadly speaking, 
did not take full account of the need to develop the national capacity 
to carry out technological innovation; it progressed without the support 
of suitable government policies, and largely without the mechanisms and 
institutions necessary for technological progress. The examples of such 
progress which have occurred in the industrial field have generally not 
been connected with government policies and have often taken place through 
transnational enterprises, whose importance has been constantly increasing 
in the more dynamic activities of the manufacturing sector. 
Latin American possesses skilled, experienced manpower with quite 
a high general level of education, although the situation of broad sectors 
of the population presents a glaring contrast. In about 1970, persons in 
the middle and high urban occupational strata (professionals and semi-
professionals , managers, own-account workers and owners of commercial 
establishments, representing a skilled, specialized and managerial group) 
represented in five countries - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and 
Venezuela - roughly one-fifth of the labour force, and this proportion was 
growing rapidly. In addition to these, there are skilled workers and 
employees with appreciable educational and income levels. 
/The imports 
The imports of the region consist mainly of capital goods , intermediate 
manufactures and fuels, these imports reflect the unbalanced growth of 
the Latin American industrial structure characterized by the high growth 
of light industry but very slow growth in the production of more complex 
capital goods and some intermediate products. 
To summarize, Latin America export above all raw materials and to a 
lesser extent products of light industry, and imports complex capital goods. 
This has created a pattern of intersectoral rather than intra-sectoral 
specialization as in the case of the developed economies which export 
and import goods of a similar nature and thus reconcile specialization 
with a diversified trade structure. For example, exports of non-electrical 
machinery are 2.4 times higher than imports of such products in the 
United, States, and 1.8 times higher in the European Economic Community. 
These industrialized economies specialize in some branches of non-electrical 
machinery and import others, with the result that exports of the sector 
as a whole are greater than imports (see table 2). In contrast, in 
Latin America exports of non-electrical machinery are barely one-tenth of 
the region's imports of such products. 
In the case of traditional industries the situation is quite different: 
Latin American exports amply exceed imports, whereas in the developed 
economies exports and imports of these products are much the same (see 
table 2). In the case of commodities, the availability of natural resources 
greatly influences the productive potential of each country or region. 
Since world demand for and trade in commodities are growing slowly (as is 
also true of traditional industries, although to a lesser extent), whereas 
the demand for capital goods and manufactured inputs is growing rapidly, 
the asymmetrical structure of Latin American foreign trade inevitable leads . 
to a systematic deficit on the trade account and in the balance of payments 
which, as we shall see below, is the basis of the region's chronic external 
bottleneck. Latin America's relations with the developed areas and the . 
division of labour between the two must be changed in such a way as to 
/gradually overcome 
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gradually overcome the present asymmetrical structure of the region's 
trade which places it in a dependent situation with regard to the 
industrialized countries; although of course a fixed or standard period 
of time cannot be established for all countries to rectify it. It should 
again be stressed that the countries of Latin America have differing 
features, sizes and degrees of development and industrialization; the 
combination of industrialization aimed at the domestic market and the 
export of manufactures must be adapted to each country's needs. In 
addition, primary commodities must also play an important role in exports, 
above all by stimulating their growth by means of suitable policies. 
Table 2 








Japan Latin America 
a/ 
Commodities 1.3 0.7 0.2 2.4 
Food 1.7 0.7 0.1 2.9 
Agricultural raw materials 1.2 0.9 0.2 1.5 
Minerals 0.6 0.5 0.2 1.9 
Fuels 0.2 0.2 0.01 1.5 
Manufactures 1.1 1.5 4.6 0.2 
Non-electrical machinery 2.4 1.8 2.9 0.1 
Electrical machinery 1.2 1.5 7.1 0.2 
Transport equipment 1.0 2.2 14.4 0.2 
Chemicals 2.2 1.5 1.7 0.2 
Other manufactures 0.6 1.2 4.1 0.3 
Source: "The economic relations of Latin America with Europe" (CEPAL/CID/ 
Preliminary version/175), 1978. 
a/ Excluding Cuba, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Panama.. 
/Intra-regional 
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Intra-regional trade has grown more rapidly than the total and its 
breakdown is different. The proportion of exports destined to the Latin 
American market has grown, particularly in the years when the Latin American 
economy was hardest hit by the external crisis, and in that trade the amount 
of goods with greater manufacturing value added and more advanced technology 
is proportionally greater than in sales outside Latin America. In other 
words, trade within the région has steadily increased its relative importance 
within the total, has played a particularly important role as a dynamic 
element when the recession was having an unfavourable effect on the Latin 
American economy, and is contributing more than extra-regional exports to the 
growth of the more advanced industries towards foreign markets. Ihtra-zonal 
trade will be examined below at greater length in the chapter on regional 
economic co-operation. 
The external trade policy of many Latin American countries has undergone 
important changes since the mid-1960s, as part of the process of opening 
up their economies. The aim has been to combine exports of manufactures with 
production for the domestic market, and make domestic industry more efficient. 
There has been a tendency to transform foreign exchange; policy, reduce and 
rationalize protection and establish export promotion policies, accompanied 
by significant changes in industrial, fiscal, price, monetary and financial 
policies. In foreign exchange policy, the value of local currencies has been 
fixed more realistically against foreign currencies, and in a number of 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile," Peru and Uruguay, among others) a system 
of frequent mini-devaluations' has been adopted to prevent inflation from 
undermining and disrupting the purchasing power of export earnings and thus 
discouraging export activities. 
Protection was very high and rather undiscriminating in many countries 
of Latin America until the mid-1960s; nominal tariffs were frequently above 
200%, and in addition were accompanied by non-tariff barriers and prohibitions. 
Since then, however, there has been a tendency for non-tariff barriers to 
decline, and tariffs have been cut and rationalized (although this trend has 
not been uniform in all countries) and in some cases protection has been 
/reduced to 
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reduced to such an extent that it has affected the development of large 
industries. Argentina cut tariffs from an average of 151% in 1960 to a 
recent nominal average of 40% s with a maximum of 80%. Brazil cut its tariffs 
from an average 54 to 39% between 1966 and 1967, but subsequently raised 
them again to an average of 49% in 1973. The five countries of the Andean 
Group agreed to a reduction from an average of 40% in 1971 to 28% in 1976, 
with a maximum of 60%; the dead-line for carrying out these tariff cuts has 
been extended and there are important exceptions. Chile has decided to cut 
tariffs to a uniform rate of 10%, to be reached by mid-1979, except in the 
case of the motor-vehicle industry. 
As the countries of the region acquired greater experience, systems of 
export promotion were designed or improved which made use of fiscal, financial 
and institutional elements and a great variety of instruments such as tax 
refunds or exemption, export credits, exchange facilities, favourable 
conditions for imports and so forth. Export promotion institutions and 
instruments have been modified frequently to increase their effectiveness 
and reduce their fiscal cost. 
(b) Effect of the external sector on the problems of unemployment and poverty 
The external sector seriously limits development possibilities as well 
as hindering the solution of some of the more serious internal problems. In 
contrast with aspects in which considerable progress has been made, the 
region continues to suffer from a shortage of productive employment and from 
widespread critical poverty. Thus open unemployment, partial unemployment 
and employment in activities of very low productivity account for a high 
proportion of the labour force, with the resulting failure to use the 
equivalent of the productive capacity of one person in four, while one-third 
of the population have incomes which do not cover their basic needs. 
It is estimated that the active labour force will continue to grow at 
a very high rate until the end of the century, although the population growth 
rate will decline moderately, since most of those who will enter the labour 
market during that period have already been bora; structural unemployment 
/will therefore 
- 9 -
will therefore continue to be a serious problem. In addition to these 
serious difficulties facing the population shutoff from employment and 
consumption, there, are the problems of a large part of the strata incorporated 
in the market whose standard of living is very low, and whose productivity 
and income must therefore also be improved. 
To solve these problems, changes must be made in the style of development 
and at the same time there must bè a higher rate of growth. The striking 
features of the present style of development are: very high and diversified 
consumption of the top income strata, imitating the consumption patterns of 
the developed countries; insufficient saving and capital formation; and high 
import needs stemming from that conspicuous consumption. 
In addition to changing this style of development, it is essential to 
achieve a higher growth rate of the gross product. It has been calculated 
that a sustained rate of growth of about B% per annum is necessary if the 
problems of unemployment are to be solved. A changed style of development 
and higher growth would attribute a central role to the manufacturing 
sector without overlooking the major importance of increasing agricultural 
output to stimulate the development process. The growth of productive 
services is in turn linked to the growth of goods-producing activities. The 
economically active urban population will continue to grow at a faster 
rate than the total population until the' end of the century, so that persons 
seeking employment in industry or sérvices will in'future represent a still 
greater proportion than in 1975. Thus a development pattern based on 
exports of commodities is no longer viable for the future of Latin America 
as it was in the past. It is essential that manufactures play a leading 
role in exports, although commodities will continue to be important. In 
particular, exports must include an increasingly high proportion of manufactures 
produced with skilled labour, in order to provide employment for the vast 
numbers of specialized workers already available in the countries, and for 
those who are incorporated in productive activities each year. 
A higher growth rate is not feasible without substantial changes in the 
present performance of thé region's external sëctor and in particular the 
correction Of the asymmetry in external trade described above. 
/(c) Balance-
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(c) Balance-of-payments deficit 
The region's serious balance-of-payments deficit in recent years, and 
the considerable growth of its external debt, which have occurred despite 
the very modest growth rates of the economy, are a clear sign of an external 
bottleneck. The balance-of-payments deficit on current account of the 
non-oil-exporting Latin American countries increased in both absolute and 
relative terms, reaching a high proportion of their exports in 1975. Although 
in 1977 the deficit dropped in relation to exports, returning to levels 
resembling those of 1966-1969, this reduction occurred at the expense of a 
significant drop in the growth rate of the economy: the region's gross 
product rose by only 4.4% in 1977 after an annual average of 6% in the 
period 1966-1969. In 1978 the deficit again increased in relative terms, 
even though the economy recorded a mediocre growth rate. 
The world recession has affected the growth rate of Latin American 
exports. Two options are open to the countries to. tackle this situation: 
to adjust the growth rate of the economy by holding it down to the lower 
levels warranted by the capacity to import, or to resort to heavier external 
borrowing. In practice, they have chosen to combine these-two solutions. 
The balance-of-payments deficit on current account and the ensuing external 
indebtedness of the Latin American countries have helped to prevent the 
critical problems of unemployment and poverty in the region from growing 
worse. At the same time» the Latin American countries have thereby helped 
to avert an even more serious decline in the growth rate of world trade 
and have thus helped to place the developed countries - from whom they buy 
most of their imports - in a better position to tackle their balance of 
payments, unemployment and recessionary problems. 
(d) External financing and debt 
In the external financing obtained by Latin America, public sources 
have rapidly been losing ground. With a few exceptions, the countries of the 
region, even including those with intermediate or low levels of development, 
have tended to be excluded from concessionary financing and their share of 
non-concessionary official financing has dropped considerably. On the 
/other hand, 
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other hand, the*proportion of funds from private sources, particularly banks, 
has grown steadily. The terms and conditions of external financing have 
hardened: repayment periods have grown shorter and interests rates have 
risen.2/ 
The external debt of the non-oil-exporting Latin American countries 
has grown considerably. The guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt amounted to 
90,000 million dollars in 1977, and passed the 100,000 million dollar mark 
in 1978. This growth, together with the deteriorating conditions in which 
loans have been obtained, have increased debt servicing as a proportion of 
exports for many Latin American countries. Nevertheless, debt service 
payments have been made possible, despite their adverse effect on the growth 
rate, thanks to the relatively rapid growth of exports until recent years. 
However, if the trend is confirmed for the latter to grow more slowly, 
service payments will have an even more serious effect on imports and the 
unfavourable'consequences of the debt on the growth of many countries of the 
region will grow worse. 
Two important points emerge from the above. The first is that since 
much of their external financing stems from private sources, some Latin 
American countries are very sensitive to any deterioration in their credit 
worthiness; at the same time, some countries attach high priority to the 
possibility of gaining access to private madeium- and long-term capital 
markets, and particularly the issue of securities. Before the Second World 
"War many Latin American countries had effective access to those markets and 
regularly issued their securities; subsequently they lost this possibility, 
until in recent years a few countries began to issue securities with some 
success, although still on a limited scale. 
The second point is that to overcome these problems posed by external 
restrictions, steady and dynamic growth of exports is vital. Commodities 
must have stable, remunerative prices, and adequate access to the markets of 
the developed countries. The fundamental growth element in export will 
continue to be the sale of manufactures, which must also be diversified 
2/ See below, chapter IV oh external financing and monetary problems. 
/and increasingly 
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and increasingly include mechanical products, particularly bearing in mind 
the growing protectionism of the industrialized countries with respect to the 
more traditional manufactures. This growth of exports must be accompanied 
by the rapid development of the capital goods industry for the domestic 
market and also for export, as a means of ensuring that a too rapid growth 
of import requirements does not cause insurmountable balance-of-payments 
problems. 
Size of the domestic market 
While some of the population have systematically remained excluded from 
the market, a considerable proportion has progressively been incorporated 
in it as a result of the industrial development process, and currently 
represents a large amount of purchasing power for manufactures. No less 
than 40% of the population of Latin America, or 130 million people, can 
currently purchase manufactures, and they constitute one of the largest 
markets in the world, quite probably larger than those of the other 
developing areas. In addition, if the currently marginal sectors could be 
incorporated in the market, and given the high population growth rate in 
Latin America, by the end of the century an economic area of about 
600 million persons would be formed, which would compare favourably in 
size with any other area Qf the world. 
In Latin America the top 5% of the population have a very high per 
capita income. Numbering slightly over 15 million, they have a very 
diversified consumption pattern, and are very demanding from the standpoint 
of the quality and renewal of their goods; being divided into small national 
groups, their consumption habits encourage a great diversification of the 
productive structure, small, uneconomic scales of production and a high 
propensity to import. It is consequently in the middle strata, where 
incomes are lower than in the preceding group, and in the low-income strata 
joining the market that most of the demand will arise to encourage the 
large-scale production of manufactures. 
The size of this domestic market provides Latin America with great 
potential bargaining power (only partially used hitherto) to obtain better 
treatment in the trade policies of the developed countries and more suitable 
conditions for the operations of transnational enterprises. 
/2. Priorities 
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2. Priorities and concerns arising from Latin 
America's economic situation 
The trends, problems and possibilities outlined in preceding paragraphs 
highlight some of the priorities and concerns of the Latin American countries 
with regard to their external relations and the definition of a new 
international economic order, some of the most important of which are 
presented below. 
As a result of the unbalanced development of Latin America today, which 
affects eyen the relatively more industrialized, countries of the region, much 
external co-operation is called for. The relative emphasis on trade and 
financing, and within the latter on concessionary and non-concessionary 
financing, has changed to some extent, but the need for external co-operation 
remains as great as in any previous period. Furthermore, except in the case 
of a few larger, more developed countries, the region's needs continue to be 
much the same as those of the rest of the developing world. 
In order to be suitably competitive, Latin American industry must 
develop in conditions very similar to international ones, while bearing in 
mind differences between countries and sectors and also the need to progress 
with the transformation of the industrial structure. Hence the concern of 
many Latin American countries to combine the development of new industries 
with the export of manufactures. 
Since the bulk of their exports still consists of commodities, the 
Latin American countries continue to have an interest in price stabilization 
policies, the achievement of adequate real purchasing power and greater 
domestic processing of commodities, as well as better access to the developed 
markets. Hence the UNCTAD Integrated Programme for Commodities, and especially 
the Common Fund, are of particular importance for the countries of the 
region. 
Manufactures are the most dynamic element in the growth of exports and 
their growth is vital to keep the external bottleneck within tolerable limits, 
stimulate the growth of the economy and have any chance of success in tackling 
the serious internal problems of structural unemployment and poverty. 
/It is 
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It is therefore easy to explain the high priority attached by Latin 
American countries to questions relating to the exports of manufactures, 
and particularly; (i) the problems of. access to the markets of developed 
countries; (ii) the trade policies of the developed countries, particularly 
protectionism and the generalized system of preferences; <iii) the policies 
to restructure industries in developed areas, which affect the development 
possibilities of specific export industries in Latin America; (iv) the rules 
of international trade and changes made, in them, .in the course of multilateral 
trade negotiations (codes of conduct, multilateral safeguards, subsidies 
and countervailing duties, customs valuations, •State purchases, technical 
standards and rules and licensing arrangements) as well as reforms in the 
legal framework of GATT, particularly the introduction of obligatory special, 
differential treatment in favour of the developing cpuntries; (v) the 
practices of transnational enterprises, the agreement on a binding code.of 
conduct for them, the establishment of an information network among 
countries .on the most important practical aspects of the operations of. such 
enterprises, -the introduction of a modus operandi, in keeping with th£ present 
degree of Latin America industrial development, with the new Latin American 
strategies which emphasize the export of manufactures, and with the stage 
reached in their internal development process; (vi) in addition, the 
definition of a binding code of conduct for the transfer of technology is 
closely linked with the objectives of,the export of manufactures, and the 
reconciliation of that transfer with the promotion of the capacity of the 
Latin American countries to create technology or adapt it to their own 
conditions. 
The development of capital and intermediate goods-producing industries 
which function efficiently will not only relieve the pressure on the balance 
of payments but is vital in the present stage of technological and industrial 
development in Latin America. This problem, together with the transformation 
of the structure of manufacturing exports, is a source of concern to the 
region since they are factors which affect the international division of 
labour. The diversification of exports, which will make it possible better to 
tackle the problems of access to other markets, is in keeping with the degree 
of industrial development and the training of labour achieved in the region. 
/The persistent 
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The persistent balance-of-payments deficit oblige the countries of 
the region to seek external financing. Of particular importance in that 
financing are loan periods adapted to the needs of developing countries, 
including semi-industrialized ones, as well as access to concessionary 
credits; access to medium- and long-term private capital is equally important, 
as reflected in the care with which countries seek to preserve the 
appearance of their credit worthiness. Latin- America is also concerned at 
the growing tendency in international circles, when deciding on the 
distribution of official development.assistance, to use simplistic criteria 
which only take into account the per capita income of countries and.do not 
consider other equally important aspects. Also of great interest to 
Latin America is the role which the real integration of the region's economy 
could play in periods of external difficulties, and this warrants a search 
for forms of co-operation between countries of the region and with other 
developing countries with a view to stronger co-operation better suited to 
development needs. 
Some of the questions outlined above, of particular importance in the 
present international dialogue, have been singled out for more detailed 




PROTECTIONISM IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES . 
1. Latin America's place in world trade 
(a) Trends in Latin American exports 
The protectionism of the developed countries Should be viewed in the 
light of the long-term evolution of Latin America's place in world trade. 
Latin America 3/ suffered an appreciable drop in its share of world 
trade between 1950 and 1975» a period in which its share of world exports 
fell from 10.4% to 3.9%, thereafter rising a little to 4.4% in 1977, partly 
thanks to high prices of a number of its main exports products from 1976 
onwards (see table 3). 
The slow growth of Latin American exports has been due to problems of 
both demand and supply. 
One of the main factors on the demand side is that the conditions of 
access to the markets of the industrialized countries have grown more 
difficult, which reflects the growth of their output as a result of 
technological progress and support policies for producers (such-as the 
common agricultural policy of the European Economic Community). Thus in 
some cases the developed countries seek to import complementary rather than 
competitive amounts of raw materials in order to maintain employment levels 
and benefit from the value added in processing them, and they have increased 
their share not only of exports of manufactures but also of world exports 
of commodities, as may be seen in tables 3 and 4. 
The share of the developed countries in food and agricultural raw 
materials increased sharply, while that of the developing countries declined5 
in the second group, the relative importance of Latin America also declined 
in comparison with the other developing countries. 
3/ Excluding Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, as oil-exporting countries. 
/Table 3 
Table 3 
EVOLUTION OF WORLD TRADE BY MAJOR AREAS 
Exports FOB Imports CIF 
Share of total 
(percentages) 
Average annual growth 
rate over period 
Share of total 
(percentages) 
Average annual growth 
rate over period 
1950 1975 1976 1977 1950- 1976- 1977- 1950 1975 1976 1977 1950-
H cu tr H <t> 
1976- 1977-
Developed rgarket-econony 
— • L ^ O 
countries G0.2 66O5 64.9 64.5 11.7 11.2 13.7 65.0 66g3 67.4 67a n.4 16.3 13.6 
United States 16.6 12o2 11.5 10.5 9.9 6.8 - 5.0 14.6 10.7 11.8 12.8 10.0 25.5 23.2 
Canada h,7 3.7 3.9 3.7 10.1 18.8 8.3 4.6 3.5 3.5 3.3 10.2 10.3 5.8 
EEC (9 countries) a/ 26.5 33.9 32.9 33.6 12.3 10.1 16.5 31.7 33.1 33.7 33.1 11.5 17.0 12.1 
EFIA (8 countries) b/ 5.6 6.1 5.9 5.8 11.7 10.3 11.8 6.1 7.0 6.8 6.8 11.9 2.5 15.0 
Japan 1.5 6.4 6.8 7.1 18.4 20.6 23.4 1.6 5.9 5.8 5.6 17.2 13.7 11.0 
Others 5.6 3.8 4.0 • 3.9 9-5 14.0 13.3 5.9 6.1 5.8 5.5 11.0 30.0 7.9 
Countries with centrally-
planned economies 9.8 9.3 9«5 12.1 8.9 16.5 7.9 10.4 9.5 9.2 12.5 3^4 10.0 
Eastern-Europe 6.0 9.0 8.5 8.7 12.5 8.7. 17.2 6.3 9.4 8.8 8.4 13.1 5.0 9.7 
Asia 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 9.3 10.7 9.7 1.6 1.0 0.7 0.7 9.0 -13.4 15.1 
Developing countries 51.7 25.9 25.7 25.8 IO.Q 20.9 14.4 27A1 22.6 22.2 22.7 10.5 9.4 16^5 
Oil-exporting countries 7.5 13.4 14.5 13.6 13.9 21.0 7.2 4.2 6.5 7.0 7.4 13.3 14.1 21.3 
Hon-oil-exporting countries . 24.4 10.5 11.2 12.2 7.6 20.9 23.5 22.9 16.1 14.8 15.3 9.7 4.7 11.5 
Africa 4.0 1.8 1.6 1.6 7.7 10.1 12.9 4.4 2.7 2.6 2.7 9.1 0.4 I6.5 
Latin America 10.4 3.9 4.0 4.4 6.8 11=8 23.3 9.0 5.7 5.2 4.9 8.2 3.2 7.9 
Asia 9.1 4.3 5.1 5.4 . 7.9 54.3 20.0 8.3 5.7 5.6 5.7 9.6 9.7 16.I 
Middle East 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 7.8 13.9 -2.4 1.0 1.7 1.8 1.7 13.8 -0.6 7.9 
•P Sources; United nations, Ye^booj: ??. JfoAeAnAfo-°-nAl-- and ifonthly Bulletin of Statistics; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
a/ European Economic Conmunity. 




GROWTH INDEX OF SHARES IN COMMODITY EXPORTS (1955 = lOO) 
Latin America Developing countries 
Developed 
countries 
1970 1975 1970 1975 1970, 1975 
Food 76 71 75 67 121 130 
Agricultural 
raw materials 68 ' 55 75 65 .118 124 
Minerals 108 97 95 99 110 103 
Non-ferrous 
metals 78 49 85 65 107. ; 115 
With regard to raw materials, the share of Latin America and also that 
of the other developing areas declined slightly only in the case of minerals. 
In the case of non-ferrous metals» Latin America's share dropped 
sharply, and significantly more than that of the other developing countries, 
while the share' of the developed countries increased substantially. 
Another factor which should be taken into account in connexion with 
the slow growth of the exports of developing countries is the lower price-
elasticity and income-elasticity of demand for commodities in the 
industrialized countries. By way of example, it might be mentioned that the 
price-elasticity of imports of the United States, Japan and the EEC-for 
animal products is -0.53, -1.13 and -0.50 respectively; for fats and oils, 
-0.43, -0.62 and -0.57, and for vegetable products -0.90, -0.85 and -0.52.4/ 
The income-elasticity of demand for commodities is about 1. 
Until 1965 the proportion of manufactures in Latin America's exports 
was very low. Between 1965 and 1975 manufacturing exports grew significantly, 
and their share more than doubled, amounting to 13.6% of total exports in 1975. 
However,this sharp rise did not have much effect on the growth of total 
4/ See W.R. Cline, H. Kawanabe,.T.O.M. Kronsjo and T. Williams, Trade 
Negotiations in the Tokyo Round, A Quantitative Assessment, Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1978. 
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exports since their share was so small at the beginning of the 1960s. If 
this growth continues, its future effect will be much greater, although many 
of the manufactures exported by Latin America are precisely those which 
run into the greatest barriers in the industrial countries. As the 
competitiveness of Latin America and the other developing areas has increased, 
access to the markets of the central countries has become more difficult. 
This has occurred in the case of textiles, footwear, processed foods and 
various other more traditional manufactures, as will be seen below. 
In addition to these factors affecting demand, there are others which 
limit supply. The possibilities of expanding output of many commodities, 
above all agricultural raw materials, are more rigid in the short term than 
the expansion of manufactures, and price instability in world commodity 
markets also has the effect of discouraging production. 
The transnational enterprises have also helped to some extent to limit 
the growth of exports, and primarily of manufactures. Broadly speaking, the 
goal of the transnational enterprises has been to produce for domestic 
market and to a lesser extent for export to neighbouring countries; only 
recently have exports begun to be directed to other markets. The geographical 
distribution of markets is reflected in the fact that exports of parts and 
components are largely made to other subsidiaries or to the parent company 
itself. 
(h) The origin of Latin American imports 
. Latin America's share of world imports has also declined, although 
relatively less than in the case of exports (see table 3). 
The United States, whose importance in the region's imports declined 
between 1955 and 1976, continued to be its main supplier, furnishing 28.8% 
of Latin American imports in 1976. The EEC, in second place, slightly 
increased its share, which amounted to 17.6% of.total Latin American imports 
in 1976. Imports from Japan increased by a greater amount, and its share 




LATIlï AMERICA s TRADE WITH THE mEi DEVELOPED AREAS 
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aj FtvttTl^c- calculated on a larger number of digits, 
b/ Six original members, 
c/ Nine members, 
d/ EFTA (original members), 







European Economic 1955V 1.4 15.1 1.4 I6.O 0.03 +2.1 
Community (EEC) 1965b/ 2.5 19.2 2.0 16.7 +0.5 +19.3 
1970b/ 3.4 19o7 3.3 17.8 +0.2 +3.2 
1973b/ 5.3 17.9 5.4 17.2 -0.1 -2.5 
1975c/ 6.6 22.5 6.8 21.6 -0.2 2.7 
1975c/ - 8.2 16.9 11.2 19.7 -3.0 -36.5 
1976c/ 10.0 18.6 10.4 17.6 -0.4 -3.9 
European Free Trade 19554/ 1.2 13.0 1.0 11.0 +0.2 +21.3 
Association (EFTA) 19654' 1.5 11.4 1.3 10.9 +0.2 +10.9 
1970d/ 1.6 9.2 1.8 9.9 -0.2 -15.0 
1973d/ 2.4 8.1 2.7 8.4 -0.3 -10.9 
197%' 0.9 3.1 1.3 4.1 -0.4 -40.2 
1975«/ 1.2 2.5 2.0 3.6 -0.8 -€9.7 
19760/ 1.5 2.8 2.0 3.4 -0.5 -33.1 
Japan 1955 0.2 2.6 0.2 2.2 0.05 20.8 
1965 0.5 4.1 0.5 3.8 . 0.04 8.2 
1970 1.0 5.7 1.1 5.9 -0.1 -12.1 
1975 1.9 3.8 4.7 8.2 -2.8 -150.5 
1976 2.0 3.8 4.8 8.1 -2.8 -136.5 
European countries 1955 0.2 1.9 0.1 . 1.6 +0.1 +20.0 
with centrally planned 1965 0.7 5.6 . 0.6 5.0 +0.1 +17.8 
economies 1970 1.0 5.7 0.9 5.0 +0.1 +6.1 
1975 3.9 7o9 2.5 4.5 +1.3 +34.0 
1976 3.8 7.1 2.8 4.8 +1.0 +26.7 
United States 1955 3.8 40.3 3.5 40.2' +0.3 +7.6 
1965 4.2 32.1 4.2 35.1 -O.O9 -2.2 
1970 5.6 32.2 6.5 34.7 -0.9 -15.3 
1975 17.1 35.2 16.9 • 29.8 +10.2 +1.0 
.1976 19.2 35.8 17.0 28.8 +12.2 . +11.4 
/Latin America's 
- 21 -
Latin America's trade with the developed countries is characterized by 
a striking imbalance in its composition. Whereas agricultural and mineral 
products showed surpluses - 7,800 and 2,400 million dollars respectively 
in 1975 -, manufactures recorded a considerable deficit (27,100 million 
dollars), or 85% of total exports to the industrialized countries.5/ 
If the protectionist trends continue, they will affect Latin America's 
export capacity, and also its industrialization process by restricting its 
capacity to import. This situation would also have adverse effects on the 
industrialized countries, which are the principal suppliers of the 
intermediate products and capital goods which Latin American industry 
requires for its development. 
(c) Latin America's trade balance with other major areas 
Latin American exports to the United States increased, particularly 
over the last decade, at a higher rate than imports, so that the trade 
balance with that country, previously in the red, turned into a surplus 
(2,200 million dollars) representing 11.4% of exports to that country in 
1976. Excluding Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, however, Latin America 
shows an accumulated deficit of 1,700 million dollars between 1970 and 1975 
on trade account with the United States. 
The situation is exactly the opposite with the European Economic 
Community (EEC). From 1970 onwards the trade surplus with the EEC became 
an increasingly large deficit, amounting to 400 million dollars in 1976, 
which represented 3.9% of Latin American exports to the area. Much the same 
is true in the case of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), with 
which the region has had a trade deficit since the mid-1960s, amounting to 
500 million dollars in 1976, or 33.1% of exports to that group of countries. 
Trade with Japan has followed a similar course, since the surplus 
obtained until the mid-1960s thereafter became an increasingly large deficit. 
The gap between imports and exports amounted to 2,800 million dollars in 
1976, i.e., 136.5% of the latter. 
5/ CEPAL, "The economic relations of Latin America with Europe", CEPAL/CID/ 
Preliminary Version/175, June 1978. 
/Trade with 
- 22 -
Trade with the European countries with centrally-planned economies 
has followed a trend favourable to Latin America, with increasingly large 
surpluses throughout the period (see table 5). 
2. Extent and features of protectionism 
The protectionism of the developed countries is by no means new in 
their economic policy. During many periods in the past century and between 
the crash of 1929 and the end of the Second World War they applied severe 
restrictions to trade, and subsequently energetically and systematically, 
protected many manufacturing sectors which make intensive use of natural 
resources or labour, although in other industrial sectors with more advanced 
technology trade barriers have gradually been reduced over the last 20 years. 
Examples of the above are the policies followed by the European Economic 
Community, the United States and Japan of restricting imports of agricultural 
commodities or manufactures and the tariff escalation whereby they 
systematically imposed higher duties on imports of commodities with more 
processing. 
Again, there is nothing new in the use by the developed countries, 
together with trade restrictions on certain goods, of domestic support 
policies for their own output of those goods, by support prices, subsidies, 
credit assistance and other measures. These policies have been applied in 
ways which have allowed inefficient productive sectors to subsist, not 
because of passing circumstances but due to structural causes which could 
not be overcome. Clear examples of this may be found in agriculture in 
the EEC, which is defended by the common agricultural policy, and in the 
support provided by developed countries to certain industries, such as 
textiles. 
In recent years, however, protectionism has reached new heights and 
acquired, new characteristics, and this has revived the concern of the 
Latin American countries. Trade restrictions have been intensified and 
extended to new products; they now affect agricultural and mineral goods 
(especially processed products such as sugar, soya, flowers, meat, oils, 
/dairy products 
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dairy products, copper and zinc) textiles and textile articles, footwear 
and leather manufactures, preserved fish products, electronic articles and 
durable consumer goods, motor-vehicles, steel and ships. 
These are all sectors of great interest to Latin America, where they 
have made a significant contribution to diversifying exports and maintaining 
growth rates; and to a large extent the growth and rationalization of output 
and the possibility of providing employment for unemployed or underemployed 
labour depend on the dynamic growth of exports of these sectors. 
The above list is clearly not a closed one: as Latin American exports 
of a specific product become sufficiently large to represent serious 
competition for the developed countries, the latter begin to restrict imports. 
The problem must therefore be weighed up in the light not only of past cases 
but also of possible future developments. 
The new forms and instruments of protectionism are ceasing to be 
isolated measures - if ever they were - to become a coherent system which 
heavily limits imports from the developing countries. They are tending to 
become institutionalized in clear, explicit rules of the game by means of 
international agreements, which systematize and stabilize them. The 
relative importance of tariff barriers is declining, while restrictions of 
other kinds are growing in importance.; these are more effective and 
presumably will be applied normally rather than exceptionally within the 
legal framework which appears to be coming into being. In many cases 
tariff and non-tariff measures complement each other, with the latter being 
more severe for many products which are subject to lower tariffs j the use 
of more subtle and effective measures, such as voluntary restrictions and 
arrangements to organize markets is also increasing, 
(a) Tariff protection 
The average tariff applied by the developed countries is low. Together, 
the developed countries grant exemption from custom duties on 40% of their 
imports. In addition, the average tariff level has been declining over time 
/through wide-ranging 
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through wide-rànging multilateral trade negotiations; thus in 8 developed 
countriesj6/ the average rate on dutiable products, which was over 50% in 
1950, dropped to 26% in 1956, 18% following the Dillon round (1961) and 
close to 9% following the Kennedy round (1967). 
It seems clear, however, that the tariff cuts made by the developed 
countries through these multilateral trade negotiations have primarily 
occurred for technologically more advanced products mainly traded among 
industrialized countries ; on the other hand s high tariffs have been 
maintained for the manufactures exported by the developing countries. 
Thus the tariff protection for the goods of interest to the developing 
countries, particularly Latin American countries, is on average rather high. 
This is not properly reflected in the overall averages given above, and 
is influenced by a fundamental feature of the tariff structure of the 
developed countries; tariff escalation according to.the degree of processing 
of the product, whereby higher duties are levied on final products than on 
less processed ones. Thé tariff cuts which may stem from the current 
negotiations will not apparently solve the problem of escalation, and in 
some cases may even increase it, by further cutting present tariffs on 
commodities by more than the tariffs on the same products when imported in 
manufactured form (see table 6). 
It may be seen from table 6 that in the case of the domestic sectors 
producing manufactures of great interest to Latin American countries 
tariff escalation provides an effective rate of protection which is double 
or even triple the nominal tariff. In the EEC, United States and Japan, 
the effective rate for textiles and textile products is between 40 and 45%, 
whereas the nominal rate is between 14.5 and 23.8%. In processed foods, 
effective protection in the three developed areas ranges from 22.1 to 68%;7/ 
on the other hand, nominal protection ranges from 9.3 to 27.9%. Much the 
same is true of the products of light industries and more complex industries 
exported by Latin America. • ' 
Belgium, United States, France, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden. 
Information is not available on effective protection applied by the 






NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE TARIFF PROTECTION APPLIED BY THE DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES TO GOODS OF IMPORTANCE IN LATIN 
AMERICAN EXPORTS 
(Percentages) 
United States European Economic 
Community 
Nominal Effective Nominal Effective Nominal Effective 
protection protection protection protection protection protection 
Processed foods 9.3 22.1 13.8 a/ 27.9 68 
Textiles 
and textile 
products 23.8 42.5 14.5 40 15.4 45 
Light industry 9.4 24.1 7.2 15 10.3 26 
More complex 
industry 6.7 16.2 8.8 22 11.0 22 
a/ Data not available. 
/It might 
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It. might be hoped that the multilateral, trade negotiations currently 
being held in GATT would improve this situation. However, the offers made 
so far by the developed countries would not significantly reduce the 
protection applied either to agricultural products (chapter 01 to 24 of the 
Brussels tariff nomenclature) and manufactures (chapter 25 to 99) exported 
by Latin America (see table 7). 
Table 7 clearly bears out this assertion. The first column of the 
table gives the tariff cut stemming from the offers made by each of the 
import markets under the most favoured nation clause. This cut brings an 
advantage or benefit for imports; but subtraction must then be made of the 
loss for the Latin American countries represented by the erosion of the 
generalized system of preferences brought about those offers by reducing 
preferential margins. The result of that subtraction gives the net reduction 
in the average tariff rate benefiting imports for which tariffs cuts have 
been offered. 
The second column indicates the value of the imports made by each 
market from Latin America for which tariff cuts have been offered. Multiplied 
by the tariff cuts, this gives the total value of the drop in tariff receipts 
in each market, i.e., the total value by which duties are reduced and 
consequently the net monetary effect or better tariff treatment for the 
imports in question, shown in the third column of the table. 
Finally, the last column shows the total value of dutiable imports 
from Latin America, subject to offers or not, which should be compared with 
the figures in column 3 (total tariff cuts) in order to obtain the results of 
the negotiations. 
It may be seen that in all cases the net tariff gain is very small in 
relation to the total value of dutiable imports, from the standpoint both of 
the net cut in the weighed average rate and of the total value of the tariff 
cut involved (see table 7). If in what remains of the negotiations no 
significant favourable change is made, the tariff protection of the developed 













to t a r i f f s 
cutting offers 
Reduction 
in to ta l 
value of 
t a r i f f s ' 
due to 








Chapters 01-24 Percentage 
points 
Thousands of dollars 
Gross gain measured by t a r i f f value -3.8 697 678 26 512 
Erosion of GSP measured by t a r i f f value -2.8 219 227 6 139 
Net gain measured by t a r i f f value -2.2a/ 478 451 20 373 
Total value of dutiable imports from Latin America 
- - - 1 716 031 
Chapters 25-99 
Gross gain measured by t a r i f f value 
Erosion of GSP measured by t a r i f f value 
Wet gain measured by t a r i f f value 




. 2 750 267 
913 517 




3 263 350 
European Economic Community 
Chapters 01-24 
Percentage 
points Thousand of Unite of Acoount 
Gross gain measured by t a r i f f value -2.1 1 735 893 36 454 
Erosion of (SP measured by ta r i f f value -1.8 40 791 734 
Net gain neasured by t a r i f f value -2.0a/ 1 695 102 35 720 
Total value of dutiable imports from Latin America - ~ - - 2 741 531 
Chapters 25-29 
Gross gain measured by t a r i f f value -3.0 1 187 916 35 638 
Erosion of GSP measured by t a r i f f value -4.0 - 563 302 22 532 
Net gain measured by t a r i f f value -0.8a/ 624 614 13 106 
Total value of dutiable imports from Latin America 
Japan 
1 259 523 
Chapters 01-24 Percentage points Thousands of dollars 
Gross gain measured by t a r i f f value -2.2 116 618 2 566 
Erosion of GSP measured by t a r i f f value -3.2 7 069 226 
Net gain measured by t a r i f f value -1.8a/ 109 509 2 340 
Total value of dutiable imports from Latin America - - - 410 249 
Chapters 25-29 
Gross gain measured by ta r i f value -3.2 104 566 3 345 
Erosion of (SP measured by t a r i f f value -4 .1 66 049 2 708 
Net gain, measured by t a r i f f value -0.4a/ 38 517 638 
Total value of dutiable imports from Latin America - - 314 106 
a/ Unlike the others, th is rate was obtained by dividing the value of t a r i f f s resulting from rates in force before the 
negotiations and rates coring into force following offers by the sum of the value of imports covered by the offers 
plus imports under the generalised system of preferences, whose preferential margins are eroded by the of fers (Sees 
El nuevo proteccionismo y el desarrollo de América Latina» E/CEPAL/L. 184). Tables 28-33« 
(b) Non-tariff 
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(b) Non-tariff restrictions 
Many of the tariff items corresponding to goods exported by Latin 
America are subject to non-tariff barriers which are extremely effective 
in restricting imports. These barriers affect raw materials, inputs and 
manufactured goods» which frequently have low tariffs but the trade in 
which is limited through quantitative or other types of restrictions in 
order to ensure that they supplement domestic output in the industrialized 
countries without competing with it. An idea of the use made of such non-
tariff measures.may be obtained from the following comparison which appears 
in table 8. For the United States9 76 out of 165 tariff headings analysed 
were the object of restrictions; in.other words, for 1,051 tariff items 
covering Latin American exports for a value of 8,000 million dollars annually, 
400 applications of measures of this type were identified, primarily 
quantitative and sanitary restrictions. In the EEC, in 479 itmes representing 
some 8,000 million dollars annually, around 300 applications of non-tariff 
measures were identified, whose variety was unequalled in other markets» 
In Japan, in the 431 headings considered, representing 3,600 million dollars 
of Latin American exports per year, 100 applications of such measures were 
identified. These 800 applications of non-tariff measures, whose proliferation 
is a basic feature of the new protectionism, do not include internal taxes. 
Nor do they include the so-called voluntary action taken by exporting 
countries to avoid the application of restrictive bilateral measures which 
would presumably be even harsher. Such voluntary restrictions have acquired 
greater practical importance in recent years>0/ 
6/ See, El recrudecimiento del proteccionismo en los países industriales 
(E/CEPAL/1055). October 1978. and Pedro Mendive (Consultant), El nuevo 





NON-TARIFF BARRIERS APPLIED BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO 
GOODS OF IMPORTANCE IN LATIN 
AMERICAN EXPORTS, 1976 
(Number of headings and items affected) 
United States a/ European Economic Community b/ 
Japan c/ 
Headings Items Headings Items Headings Items 
Quantitative 65 
Sanitary 10 
Variable levies and 
components 
Others 1 





















aj 165 headings considered. 
b/ 172 headings considered. Does not include internal taxes, 
c/ 126 headings considered. 
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The multilateral trade negotiations taking place in GATT will have 
slight favourable impact on the non-tariff barriers affecting the developing 
countries. With very little effective participation by the developing 
countries, a set of proposals is taking shape aimed primarily at consolidating 
the present situation with regard to market distribution and "the policies 
followed by the industrialized countries. Through the draft proposals 
on codes of coduct for countervailing duties and subsidies, safeguards, . 
valuation, State purchases, technical standards and rules and import licensing, 
the developed countries will most probably finally agree to consolidate the 
instruments they have already been using while clarifying the rules governing 
their application. 
A recent meeting of high-level experts organized by CEPAL found, 
inter alia, that the draft codes under consideration fundamentally cater to 
the interests of the developed countries, do not take due account of the 
interest of the developing countries and tend to institutionalize and 
facilitate the application of the policy currently followed by the former with 
regard to non-tariff restrictions.9/ 
With regard to changes in GATT, the legal framework which since 1948 has 
played an increasingly large part in governing international trade, the 
chances of making relative reciprocity cleared and compulsory and introducing 
the special and differentiated treatment accepted in the Tokyo declaration 
will remain, as far as can be foreseen, purely theoretical. 
The results of the negotiations on these institutional questions may 
constitute a potential threat to the trade flows of many developing countries, 
frustrating yet another laborious attempt on their part to gain international 
recognition - of a binding nature - for their legitimate trade and economic 
development interests. 
The above-mentioned meeting emphasized that sectors of importance to 
developing countries such as agriculture and tropical products have hitherto 
been treated only tangentially in those negotiations• that the clauses 
restricting trade which are currently applied only exceptionally might become 
institutionalized as normal practices^ that there is no significant 
9/ See, Informe de la Reunion sobre el Proteccionismo de Países 
TtaWar»r>nílados (E/CEPAL/1057), 14 November 1978, p. 5. 
/differential treatment 
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differential treatment for the developing countries; that on the other hand 
they may be harmed by clauses such as those concerning gradualism, selectivity 
and unilateral application of safeguards. The meeting also drew attention 
to the fact that if this were confirmed in what remained of the negotiations, 
the results.of the Round would have little connexion with the objectives of 
the developing countries and even vith the statements contained in the Tokyo 
declaration. Access to the markets of.the developed countries would not 
improve, and restrictions would not decline appreciably. 
3* Types of protectionist measures 
The variety of protectionist measures applied by the developed 
countries is quite large. Some of the most significant are singled out 
here, including those which have recently acquired importance. 
(a) Quantitative restrictions 
— 1 1 I . • — ' 
Broadly speaking, the protectionist policy of the developed countries 
has been based on two types of parallel measures: subsidies or minimum 
prices for domestic output, and import restriction. The fixing of reference 
prices has also frequently been a valuable auxiliary measure. 
Quantitative restrictions have been widely used for some time, in the 
form of either absolute prohibition or quotas. Long-standing examples are 
the treatment of sugar in the United States, and of preserved fruit and fruit 
and vegetable juices, in the EEC» to mention only two. An extreme case of 
quantitative restriction is import prohibition, a conspicuous example of 
which occurred in the case of meat; the EEC closed its market to Latin 
American imports for quite a long period, and between 1974 and 1977 conditions 
ranged from total prohibition of such imports to compensated trade in which 
imports were only permitted to the same extent as exports. The United States 
and Japan have practically closed their markets to certain types of meat 
from certain Latin American countries. 
Recently, the United States has fixed import quotas for steel, and zinc 
producers have asked the international trade commission to do the same for 
zinc, and establish a duty for amounts in excess of the quota. 
... • /Among the . 
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.. Among the instruments used by developed countries to defend their 
domestic production which de facto amount to quantitative restrictions, one 
of the most important is subsidies for producers on account of the extent, 
intensity, and frequency with which they are used. The United States has 
often applied this measure and the common agricultural policy of the EEC is 
an excellent case in point. On some occasions the developed countries have 
chosen to subsidize domestic producers rather than increase import restrictions 
(as in the case of the United States and footwear, for example), 
(b) Countervailing duties 
In addition to the above there are various practices used by the 
developed countries which, without actually being identifiable restrictive 
measures, are in fact effectively or potentially such effective restrictions 
that their mere existence, or threat of it, induces countries and producers 
to cut back their sales, either directly or by eliminating various elements 
which favour their competitive capacity. In particular these practices 
include anti-dumping and countervailing duties (GATT articles VI and XVI) 
which were very little used in the past but became widespread from 1973 
onwards due to the difference in bargaining power between the developed 
countries and the developing countries. While there have been some accusations 
of dumping, the application or threatened application of countervailing duties 
is more often brought on by the existence of subsidies. 
Agreement does not in fact exist on what should be considered a subsidy, 
nor on the various instruments used to provide subsidies. In practice, every 
developed country has its own interpretations and grounds for appraisal, which 
may even vary according to the product under consideration. In addition, the 
concept which has grown up in GATT is similar to that of the industrialized 
countries. Thus article XVI, "subsidies", introduced in the General 
Agreement in 1958, was not adhered to by the developing countries. 
In any event, countervailing duties can neutralize the export promotion 
measures and policies of the developing countries. In the case of exports 
among developed countries, the application of subsidies by one may lead to 
anti-dumping measures tending to offset them. This is not the case when 
export promotion measures are applied by developing countries, because, as 
will be seen below, their curcumstances are different from those of the 
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developed countries (without prejudice to the fact that it is not desirable 
for the developing countries to use subsidies of unreasonable size or duration). 
In practice9 however, countervailing duties have been applied to Latin American 
exports, sometimes to an increasing extent. This may create a serious problem 
for the region» since it endangers the policies for the promotion of non-
traditional exports applied by the Latin American countries since the mid 1960s 
- following paths taken long ago by developed countries - as part of their 
efforts to open up their, economies to the exterior, and at the same time reduce 
protection and rationalize their industry and make it more efficient. Frequently 
these policies seek to offset the unfavourable effects on exports of exchange 
rates which over-value local currencies, of indirect taxes, etc. 
The United States applied countervailing duties» for example, to Brazilian 
footwear and leather articles in 1977. Again, United States producers have 
asked for countervailing duties to be applied to men's and children's clothing, 
on the grounds that Colombia has established subsidies by its policy of issuing 
certificados de abono tributario (CAT) - tax credit certificates -, preferential 
shipping rates and other measures, 
(c) Different treatment of Latin America 
The Lome Convention presents a special situation. Under it, the EEC 
grants special preferences for the developing signatory countries (ACP countries) 
as a result of which different treatment is given to imports from those countries 
and from Latin America of a series of products of great importance to the 
region. 
Table 9 lists 65 products - tariff items - taken from the total list of 
76 which the Latin American countries selected in 1973 for consideration within 
the group of tropical products in the present GATT round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. These 65 products, under the Lome Convention, bear a zero rate for 
the ACP countries as a special preference, i.e., the exports of those countries 
enter the EEC duty-free. Under the generalized system of preferences granted 
by the Community to the Latin American countries inter alia, only 36 of these 
65 tariff items or products benefit from preferential rates *, and of those only 
6 are duty-free. 
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1976 (thousands of 
Units of Account) 
00017900 Bovine of fa ls 7.0 Mo 0.0 43 051 
02049500 Whale meat 10.0 0.0 0.0 • • • 
02049300 Other meat 14.0 7.0 0.0 66 
03011300 Salmon,fresh,chilled or frozen 8.0 No 0.0 
03011900 Fresh-water fish- 0,0 No 0.0 2 624 
03012100 Herring imported between 15/11 and 15/VI 0.0 No .0.0, 
03012600 Herring imported between, 16/VI and 1 4 / n 15.0 No 0.0 * • « • 
03013500 Tunny, fresh, chilled or frozen 22.0 No 0.0 1 787 
03015600 Sardines 23»0 No 0J> 
03016500 Anchovies 15.0 No 0.0 • •O 
03019300 Swrdfish f i l l e t s 15.0 No 0.0 176 
03019730 Tunny f i l l e t s 18.0 No 0.0 
03019770 Fish f i l l e t s 15.0 No 0.0 ose 
03031200 Crayfish 25.0 8.0 0.0 9 129 
03034100 Crab and prauns 15.0 8.0 0.0 8 
03034300 Shrimp 16.5 6.0 0.0 3 858 
03036500 Mussels 10.0 No 0.0 00« 
03036850 Other frozen molluscs 8.0 No 0.0 
03036860 Squid 6 .0 : . No 0.0 «•ft 
03036870 Other molluscs, not frozen 8.0 No 0.0 
04060000 Natural honey 27.0 25.0 0.0 33 581 
07051000 Beans 4.5 No 0.0 
07059100 Dried l en t i l s 2.0 0.0 0.0 • • • 
08013000 Bananas 20.0 10.0 0.0 326 609 
08015000 Pineapples 9.0 No 0.0 2 429 
08016000 Avocados 8.0 6.0 0.0 19 
08017300 Coconuts 2.0 0.0 0.0 8 
08019900 Mangos, guayabasf e tc . 6.0 5.0 0.0 775 
08121000 Dried apricots 7.0 5.5 0.0 ... 
09011100 Coffee,unroasted, non-decaffeinated 7.0 No 0.0 1 512 960 
09011300 Coffee, unroasted, decaffeinated 13.0 10.0 0.0 2 026 
09011500 , Coffee,roasted, nonr-decaffeinated 15.0 12.0 0.0 582 • 
09011700 Coffee, roasted, decaffeinated ' 18.0 15.0 0.0 157 
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IagDorts from 
l a t in America* 
items 
Product description rate rate ra te ACP 
countries 
1976 ( thousands of 
Units of Account) 
09021000 Tea, in instant packaging 11.5 0.0 0.0 »o 0 
09029000 Tea, in other packaging 9.0 No 0.0 
09041100 Pepper 0.0 No 0,0 
C90Ô1300 Nutmeg i c r making o i l s 15.0 6.0 0.0 
11041000 Banana flour 17.0 7.5 0.0 
11049000 Flour of comparable f r u i t .15.0 7.5 0.0 
12010000 Oil-seeds and oleaginous f r u i t 0.0 No 0.0, 457 899 
15041100 Fishliver o i l 6.0 0.0 0.0 
15071500 Castor o i l (15071500) 0.0 No 0.0 16 961 
15071700 Castor o i l (15071700) 6.0 6.0 0.0 16 662 
15073600 Crude o i l s 5.0 2.5 0.0 29 920 
15077000 Cruda solid o i l s 10.0 7.0 0.0 42 418 
16025100 Preparations containing meat 26.0 17.0 . 0.0 125 824 
16047100 Sardines, prepared and preserved 25.0 No 0.0 • • • 
16047500 Tunny, prepared and preserved , 24.0 No 0.0 
17017100 Raw sugar 0.0 No 0.0 251 646 
18010000 Cocoa 5.4 No 0.0 51 305 
18040000 Cocoa butter and o i l 12.0 8.0 0.0 39 027 
20023000 Tomatoes, prepared snd preserved 18.0 No 0 0 108 
20024000 Esparragas, prepared and preserved 22.0 20.0 0.0 3 650 
20071810 Fruit juices 42.0 15.0 0.0 163 
20073510 Orange juice 19.0 No 0.0 54 507 
20074120 Pineapple juice 21.0 18.0 0.0 744 
20075350 Grapefuit juice 15.0 8.0 0.0 71 
21021000 Coffee extracts and essences 18.0 9.0 0.0 « • • 
23013000 Fishmeal 2.0 0.0 0.0 85 009 
24011000 Tobacco 15.0 No 0.0 40 900 
24019000 Other tobaccos 23.0 11.5 0.0 119 715 
24022000 Cigars and cigarettes 52.0 49.0 0.0 ••e 
©351000 
41029900 
Frrnfural 11.2 0.0 0.0 1 798 
Bovine raw hides and skins and leather 8.0 0.0 . 0 .0 100 303 
44149000 Wood ssm lengthwise 7.0 0.0 0.0 16 622 
Non-tariff barries 
a/ á/ JBt, H^ 
VLK ari/ 
HS«/ BQ S/ 
HS»/; BQ«/ 
HS a/, BQ°/ GO«/, DlJ/, VLÍ/ 
HS a / D L ¿ / BQ®/. GQ«A V L i ^ 
HSJA BQ£4 GQ®^ DIÍ' vii/ 
i e « / , bq°', GQ^ i rai', VLË/ 
ED*/ 
QQS/, BQO/, ra^Z 
CO Ol 
.Note; mfjt rate - Most favoured nation rate; GSP rate - Generalized System of Preferences rate« 
a/ Sanitary res t r ic t ion; b/ Licoice; o/ Bilateral quota? if Restriction; e/ Global cpjta; if Specific internal tax (not included in t a r i f f ) Quota; h/ She incidence 
of the variable levy i s not included in the t a r i f f ; i / For ACP countries, State trading; ¿ / Discretionary licence« 
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The table also shows the very many non-tariff measures which affect 
imports of these tropical products included in the negotiations; nine 
categories of non-tariff barriers have been identified, with 50 applications. 
It should also be pbinted out that for other commodities there is 
again differential preference treatment in favour of the ACP countries. Thus 
exports of wheat and maize from Latin America are subject to common agricultural 
policy whereas such exports from the Lomé Convention countries receive 
favourable treatment; groundnut oil, wool and cotton from Latin America are 
subject to rates of duty ranging from 1.5 to 15%, and are not included in the 
generalized system of preferences; on the other hand, such exports from 
countries which have signed the Lomé Convention are duty-free. 
(d) Variable levies 
Sliding duties are again a very effective instrument. In the case of 
meat, the EEC applies them at such high rate that, together with a nominal 
tariff which does not exceed 20%, in 1977 they established a total duty for 
imports of livestock of 105% and for meat of 151%. In addition, in the EEC 
these imports face supplementary measures such as licensing prior to import, 
quotas with differential sliding duties - which increase for the more 
efficient producer countries - and export subsidies. 
(e) Exports of raw materials 
The developed countries are tending to secure their supplies of raw 
materials and therefore limit the import from developing countries of products 
processed from them, while the developing countries are in turn trying to 
restrict the export of goods which are not processed within the country in 
order to encourage the corresponding industry. If these policies followed by 
the developed countries were to be incorporated in the principles of 
international trade and thus become established as rules, the advantage Latin 
America enjoys by possessing some of these raw materials would be limited. 
(f) Agreements to restrict trade 
A protectionist measure of increasing importance in recent years is the 
agreement to restrict trade. These are often in the form of bilateral 
agreements and of "voluntary" restrictions of a country's exports, leading 
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to bilateral negotiations among countries whose bargaining power is very 
dissimilar, with results which are presumably less favourable for the 
developing countries. 
Agreements to organize markets made by exporting and importing countries 
are an effective instrument to restrict the trade in specific goods or 
sectors. Thus, for example, in order to have access to specific markets of 
developed countries it is necessary to have adhered to the Multifibre 
Arrangement, which involves the signing of bilateral agreements fixing the 
annual growth rates allowed for the exports of each country over the base 
quota, which are binding. The Multifibre Arrangement was recently renewed 
until 1981 and various developed countries have signed it, including the 
United States and the European Economic Community. Bilateral agreements are 
signed under it. By March 1978, the United States had signed agreements or 
treaties of this kind with seven Latin American countries, and the EEC had 
also signed bilateral agreements with countries of the region. The growth 
permitted for Latin American exports is low, generally allowing only small 
increases. The accepted annual growth rates have been below 1% for textile 
exports to the EEC from Argentina (cotton yarn) and Brazil (eight products 
including yarns and cloth); quotas and restrictions on annual growth rate 
of exports have also been applied in the bilateral textile agreements of the 
EEC with Colombia mid Peru. ' 
One instrument which may harm Latin American exports and which is also 
included in bilateral treaties between developed and developing countries is 
the watch-dog system for items where quotas have not yet been established. 
The purpose of such systems is to forestall increases in imports which might 
be considered damaging to the producers of the developed countries, in which 
case quantitative or other kinds of restrictions might be imposed. Examples 
of this kind are found in the bilateral treaties between the EEC and Colombia 
and Peru under the Multifibre Arrangement. . 
(g) Safeguards 
The use of safeguards is allowed when aimed at protecting balance-of-
payments equilibrium and when the import of a product occurs in such 
quantities that it causes or threatens to cause serious harm to national 
producers (articles XII and XIX of the General Agreement). In the first case, 
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the country which has recourse to the safeguard fixes limits of recovery 
and time periods which canriot be exceeded; and in the second-case, it 
indicates what institutional measure it will apply, and shows the,existence 
of "serious harm". • Recently, this measure has been arbitrarily broadened and 
extended, without respecting the provisions of those articles, and there has 
even been a move for it to become institutionalized in the draft code under 
consideration. In fact, then, safeguards are ceasing to be exceptional'and 
becoming customairy practices of great importance and thus systematic instruments 
to restrict trade. Hitherto the reaction of the developing countries faced 
with the application of safeguards has been limited and of slight effectiveness, 
(h) Voluntary restrictions 
An increasingly widely used type of measure consists in the so-called 
voluntary restrictions, which are usually agreed upon by the exporting and 
importing countries. The label is not an accurate description of the measure, 
since these restrictions are adopted by developing countries which are large-
scale producers and exporters of the good in question, generally at the 
initiative of the developed country importing the good, since they know that 
otherwise the exporting country will apply quantitative or other kinds of 
restrictions which might be even worse. Naturally, the effect of these 
"voluntary" limitations on production and trade is similar to that of the 
application of restrictions; but in addition they are difficult to appeal 
against, because formally the developed country has not adopted any measure or 
violated any principle òi international trade. Even the developing countries 
which are not among the main producers and are therefore not subject to these 
restrictions feel their effects, since they know that they would be if their 
exports increased beyond definite narrow limits. "Voluntary" restrictions have 
been applied on footwear, at the suggestion of the United States, by the main 
suppliers (Korea and Formosa) and these have indirectly affected the countries -
of Latin America. They will also be applied to textiles by virtue of agreements 
between Canada and its main suppliers as of January 1979, to replace quotas. 
"Voluntary" restrictions also sometines lead to a reduction in the 
incentives to export a particular good on the part of a developing country, 
after negotiations with a developed country0 in order to avoid the application 
of quotas or countervailing duties by the latter. This has occurred in various 
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Latin American countries. In Colombia, producers of leather goods accepted 
that the CAT (tax credit certificates) should be reduced and even eliminated 
to avoid the application of countervailing duties by the United Statesj and' 
for the same reason flower-growers accepted a reduction in the CAT to a purely 
nominal level (but even so some groups in the United States are still asking 
for the application of quantitative restrictions), 
(i) Other restrictions 
There are also other widely-used restrictive practices, including 
discretionary licences, technical, packaging, marking and labelling standards 
and sanitary barriers. 
The first.of these are not always real restrictions in the strict sense 
of the word, but when they are accompanied by some form of quantitative 
restriction, such as global or bilateral quotas, tariff quotas, etc., they 
become restrictive. The second, used in the main import markets on the 
grounds that they defend consumers' interests, are often also used to regulate 
the volume of imports through the rise in costs caused by such standards. 
Finally, sanitary barriers imposed to protect public health and the environment 
are in fact used to regulate the level and geographical origin of imports. 
4. Factors spurring protectionism 
(a) Slackening of demand in certain sectors in the developed, countries , 
The world economy is affected simultaneously by a severe recession 
and by inflation which is becoming both structural and endemic. The 
simultaneous presence of these problems makes it difficult to solve them, 
because many of the measures used to tackle the one are self-defeating for 
the other. In thé countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), unemployment is high and persistent ; in some of 
them balance-of-payments problems have been brought down to manageable levels 
by controlling imports and slowing the growth rate, while in others the 
external sector continues to be a source of priority concern. Inflation 
reflects a social conflict in which wage-earners and employees fight over 
their shares of national income, and installed productive capacity is only 
partially used in some sectors. 
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Although these problems have a short-term dimension, they are not 
merely short-term problems but rather are specific to a long-term transition 
period towards new productive structures through which the economy of the 
developed countries is passing. 
This transition began to take place as the OECD countries overcame 
the damage of the Second World War and completed their adjustment to post-war 
internationally economic circumstances. The relative position of the different 
developed countries changed: the economies and competitive position of some 
were strengthened, those of others weakened. Some productive sectors which 
played a leading role in the economic growth of the developed countries in 
the last thirty years began to grow sluggish as the accumulated unsatisfied 
demand became saturated. Because of the characteristics of the demand for 
many non-durable consumer goods and some durable consumer goods, once the 
minimum necessary consumption was satisfied, demand grew more slowly than 
income since such goods usually allows less technological renewal, which 
limits the ability to bring out new models.10/ This primarily affects 
economic sectors such as those mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
which are the object of the protectionism of developed countries: the more 
dynamic demand is shifting from those countries to the developing countries, 
where unsatisfied needs still exist, 
(b) Wage trends in the developed countries 
This less buoyant demand is accompanied by another factor: the change 
in the structure and level of wages and salaries. From the end of the war 
until quite recently some developed countries had a double wage structure: 
some industries, modern and highly productive, paid good wages while other 
less productive activities were paying much lower wages for equally skilled 
labour. This made it possible for economic activities providing employment to 
subsist.; nevertheless, the gap between the two parallel wage structures was 
closing and tended to disappear, with the lower levels rising to those of the 
more efficient industries as the overall real wage level rose. These changes 
weakened the capacity of the developed countries to compete in sectors where 
production processes were labour-intensive. 
10/ For the OECD countries growth rates are expected to be lower in most 
of the 1980s than on average in recent decades. 
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(c) Protectionism and changes in thè international division of labour 
For many years some of the main developed countries supported, for 
social and political reasons, comparatively backward and inefficient 
economic activities by means of subsidies and measures of protection against 
the exterior, as in the case of European agriculture and the textile and 
steel industries in many developed countries. As a result, in addition to 
subsisting in an uneconomic manne*» these industries did not carry out the 
necessary technical renovation. 
When this process was at a relatively advanced stage the increasingly 
stiff competition of the developing countries began to be felt in the 
international markets for those goods. According to an UNCTAD document,11/ 
between 1970 and 1976, developing countries' exports Of manufactures .to 
developed market economy countries increased in volume'terms at an annual 
rate of about 14%, or more than twice as fast as imports of.manufactures into 
the developed market economy countries from the world (including their intra-
trade), twice as fast as manufacturing output growth in developing countries 
and four times as fast as manufacturing output growth in developed market 
economy countries. In contrast, between 1962 and 1970 there was no increase 
in the developing countries' share in total imports of manufactures into 
the developed market-economy countries, and therefore the recent trend is of 
the utmost importance; for the first time in history, a change, albeit 
limited, has begun to take place in the age-old international division of 
labour in which the developed countries exported manufactures to the 
developing countries, which in turn only sold commodities. 
In many highly important industrial sectors, the' developing countries 
are now not only satisfying their own domestic demand but also competing 
increasingly actively with the dèveloped countries themselvesi in addition,. 
the number of sectors in which this is happening is increasing, and they now 
include not only non-durable consumer .goods but also consumer durables , motor-
vehicles and some capital goods. In 1976, of the total imports of 21 developed 
11/ UNCTAD, Review of recent trends and developments in trade in manufacturés 
and semi-manufactures, TD/B/C.2/190, p. 3. 
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market economy counti'ies, the developing countries provided 18.3% of fuel 
manufactures, 40.2% of wood and furniture manufactures, 22.1% of leather and 
footwear, 14.8% of textiles and 37.2% of clothing.: and although in the case 
of the engineering industries the proportion was smaller, it was still 
increasing very rapidly. 
(d) Countries and goods involved in the process of economic change 
The number of developing countries taking part in this process is so 
far small. In the period 1970-1976 the sales abroad of manufactures from 
eight markets 12/ generated 78.1% of the increment in exports of manufactures 
of the developing countries and two of them alone (South Korea and Hong Kong) 
accounted for 42.1%.13/ However, the number of developing countries involved 
in this process in Latin America, Asia and Africa is growing. 
During the same period there was likewise a heavy concentration of most 
of the growth of exports of manufactures of the developing countries in 
certain types of goods. Seven groups (clothing, engineering excluding motor-
vehicles, textiles, miscellaneous light manufacture, wood and furniture, 
processed food products and leather and footwear) generated 88.1% of the 
increment while the first two groups together accounted for 50.4%. As is 
pointed out above, the variety of goods exported is increasing as the 
developing countries gain experience and find substitutes for the products 
in which exports have run into difficulties. 
(e) Changes in the economy and in the monetary system 
The new role of the developing countries as exporters of manufactures 
is a natural consequence of the industrial advance which began with import 
substitution for the domestic markets. As indicated elsewhere in this study, 
the transnational enterprises which originally had a negative attitude to this 
process and preferred to export such goods from their countries of origin, 
spurred by increasing competition among themselves and although to a limited 
extent subsequently began to shift production of labour-intensive goods to 
developing countries in order to take advantage of lower labour costs and 
12/ Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Singapore and Yugoslavia. See UNCTAD, loc.cit., table 2. 
13/ UNCTAD, ibid., table 14. 
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also of the domestic markets. For théir part, national or regional enterprises 
of déveloping countries, including Latin American ones s began actively to 
join in the export of manufactures, and governments gave firm support to 
these efforts, carrying out important changes in their economic policy (more 
realistic exchange policies,*ejqsort promotion systems, reduction of protection 
to industry and support to make the industry more efficient). 
These changes in the economy could not fail to be reflected in parallel 
changés in the international monetary system. The.system of fixed parities 
agreed on at Bretton Woods at the end of the war was abandoned and replaced 
by floating exchange rates ; The currencies of some countries have been 
revalued against others, and clear priority has been attached to stabilization 
before growth. Changes in exchange rates have naturally affected 
competitiveness, which, however, only take place gradually and has not yet 
been fully achieved. The floating of currencies, necessary because of changes 
in the relative economic position of various countries, has nevertheless 
contributed to uncertainty and to making economic policies more complicated. 
The actions of one developed country have repercussions on the others,, and 
attempts at co-operation and co-ordination among those countries are aimed-
at avoiding the mutual export of inflàtiôn and unemployment. 
The déveloping countries have played and still play a practically 
passive role in this process* They have little effective participation in 
decisions on the monetary system; they must peg their currency to that of one 
of the developed economies with which they have strong economic relations, 
receiving the impact of changes in major currencies without being able to 
affect them. They likewise have little say in the decisions to modify the 
rules of international trade. 
(f) The redeployment of economic activity and liberalization of trade 
In the long term, part of the developed countries' answer to these 
problems is the redeployment of their productive-structure and particularly 
of their industry. In order to régain a higher growth rate and continue to 
raise their'productivity and standard of living, they are trying to modernize 
their traditional sectors and place them on a competitive footing,, if possible; 
and if this is not viable, to shift the main priorities of development from 
these sectors which are growing sluggish to others where technological 
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innovation is more rapid and. more skilled labour is employed. This process 
may have favourable consequences for the developing countries, on condition 
that it is carried out in keeping with their interests, i.e., that there is. 
not only a shift to them of labour intensive activities, but also that they 
develop technologically more advanced export industries: that their national 
decision-making capacity is strengthened so that they cease to play a purely 
secondary and passive role in a process, guided by the developed countries 
and transnational enterprises; that the enterprises of developing countries 
are strengthened; and that their capacity for technological innovation should 
increase so as to;reduce this one-sided dependence on the developed world and 
thereby increase their decision-making capacity and bargaining.power. 
The process of structural transformation of the developed countries, 
essential in the long term, is for the time being running into strong 
resistance, linked with the recession and inflation and headed by the affected 
sectors. This raises an apparent contradiction between the longr and short-
term goals of the developed countries, which;can be.resolved by regulating 
the pace of redeployment so,that its short-term impact can be absorbed. 
However, in practice it appears that in major developed countries the 
immediate anxieties and pressures of the affected sectors are receiving the 
most attention, at the expense of long-term goals and particularly of 
redeployment. Top priority is attached to maintaining employment, balance-of-
payments equilibrium and monetary stability,.at the expense of the rate of 
transformation of the productive strata, the long-term economic growth rate 
and the growth rate of international trade. At the same time, the main 
impact of these cautious policies is shifted to the developing countries, • 
through the protection of imports of goods produced by those sectors which 
are precisely those which offer the Third World the greatest possibilities 
of manufacturing export g r o w t h . . . , .. 
The protectionism of .the developed countries and its recent growth are 
thus not isolated or relatively minor events, but rather intimately connected 
with the direction of economic policy, .in those countries and with the 
transformation and problems of the world economy.. 
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5. Consequences of protectionism for the Latin American countries 
It is not easy to make an exact, quantified evaluation of the 
consequences of protectionism for the Latin American countries. The 
restrictions applied for some decades now, together with other factors, 
have unfavourably affected the share of the developing countries, 
particularly the Latin American ones ? in the world trade in many commodities 
or semi-manufactures, in which the developed countries have not only carried 
out heavy import substitution but have also significantly increased their 
share of world exports. The effects of the growth of protectionism in recent 
years cannot yet be weighed up because of a lack of sufficiently recent 
statistical data. In addition, the most important effects of the policies 
on the Latin American countries are not reflected so much in past performance 
as in the future growth of exports, and consist not only of the direct 
effects of the measures adopted but also of the consequences of such policies 
in the limitation by Latin American countries and enterprises of the growth 
of their investment and output in view of the unfavourable prospects they 
perceive. 
A fundamental consequence of protectionism is the lag it produces in 
the transformation of the productive structure of the developing and 
developed countries, at the expense of the rate of growth of productivity 
and of higher standards of living. What is at stake in the Latin American 
countries is the rate at which they can carry out their policy of opening up 
their economies to the exterior and the possibility of making their industries 
more efficient and thus be able to take advantage of their natural and acquired 
comparative advantages. The growing difficulties faced by non-traditional 
Latin American exports are obstructing the transformation of the region's 
foreign trade structure, which is in turn necessary to sustain a dynamic growth 
rate of total exports. This reduces the growth rate of the economy and thus 
worsens the problems of labour unemployment and critical poverty, whose 
solution calls for higher rates of growth. Inasmuch as the protectionism of 
the developed countries persists and affects the growth rate of Latin American 
exports, the possibility cannot ruled out that the Latin American countries 
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may change their outward-looking policy. Without returning to the very high, 
indiscriminate protection of the past, they may in turn be obliged to apply 
import controls; some tendencies along these lines have been visible in 
recent years in some countries or sectors of the region, although many of 
them are vigorously trying to obtain greater openness. It would certainly 
not be ideal for external circumstances to oblige the region to take the 
path of greater self-sufficiency, among other reasons because it continues 
to need trade with the developed countries in order to get from them the 
modem technology required for development; but if other options are closed, 
the fact of having in reserve a large domestic and regional market with 
tremendous growth potential could warrant a change in development strategy, 
in shifting some attention from the international market to national and 
regional ones. To the extent that these economies become closed to the 
exterior, harm will be done to international trade and to the growth of 
the economy of the industrialized countries themselves, whose defensive 
policy of controlling imports would thus have a counterpart in the slower 
growth rate of their exports of manufactured intermediate goods and equipment 
to Latin America. 
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Chapter III ; -
INTEGRATED PROGRAMME FOR COMMODITIES: SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
-r • 
The main action lines of the Integrated Programme for Commodities 
aim at stabilizing commodity prices and export earnings and developing 
the commodity economy. . Existing or proposed instruments for dealing with 
these problems are price stabilization, commodity agreements and the common 
fund to stabilize prices, and the compensatory financing facility of the 
International Monetary Fund and the Stabex system established by the Lomé 
Convention for the ACP countries, to stabilize earningswhile the 
development of the commodity economy would include the expansion of local 
processing and the improvement of marketing and distribution systems. 
Progress in these matters has been uneven. In practice, the 
analysis made delved deeper, into the topics in question and activities 
were concentrated on stabilizing prices, but little progress was made in 
forms of compensatory financing other than those already established, or, 
in developing the commodity economy. A summary is giveji below of the 
progress achieved in the negotiations on the common fund and the preparatory 
meetings on commodities, concluding with a r\eview of the system of the 
main export commodities of the Latin American countries on.which agreements 
exist or which are included ,in the list of preparatory meetings agreed 
upon in resolution 93 (IV) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. . 
1. Some policies applied with a view to stabilizing prices 
As has been said, the main instruments used in the international 
negotiations for the purposes of price stability were the commodity 
agreements and the common fund, 
(a) Commodity agreements 
In accordance with resolution 93 (IV), to which reference has already 
been made, a series of preparatory meetings was to have been held between 
September 1976 and February 1978 on a group of individual products mentioned 
in the resolution, 'to which others could be added in accordance with the 
/procedure set 
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procedure set out in it. The objectives of these meetings were to propose 
appropriate measures to achieve the objectives of the Integrated Programme, 
determine financial requirements, recommend follow-up action, and basically, 
prepare draft proposals of commodity agreements. The experience acquired 
in the course of the preparatory meetings has demonstrated that the time 
allocated for carrying out these extéhsive and complex tasks was extremely 
short, Ônly in the case of rubber was it possible to convene the 
negotiating conference. As has already beén said,14/ this slow progress in 
concerting agreements was particularly due to the lack of political 
willingness on the part of some governments, particularly of devéloped 
countries, which are reluctant to adopt norms restricting their action. It 
was not only the producer countries which adopted common positions or 
presented specific proposals. The lack of financing for the buffer stocks 
caused by the delay in setting up the common fund introduced another basic 
limitation. A further obstacle - also mentioned in thé report quoted - was 
thé lack of importance given to stabilisation arrângéments-, iri this respect, 
the experience of the preparatory meetings on jute, hard fibres, cotton and 
tropical timber showed that it was relatively easy to reach arrangements oh 
measures such as impetus to research, pifoductivityimproveméntj promotion 
and diversification. Difficulties also arose "when the inclusion in the 
agreements of semi-processed or processed products was proposed, although 
resolution 93 (IV) expressly includes some of them (such as jute and hard 
fibre products). In some of these preparatory meetings, too, requests were 
made for studies which are not easy to prepare and in some cases do not 
seem to.have a clear and direct link with the measures under consideration.15/ 
Despite the numerous obstacles met with, account should be taken in 
evaluating the results obtained of the considerable progress which the 
preparatory meetings have signified - and which the negotiations may 
14/ See UNCTAD, Comprehensive report on progress under Conference 
resolution 93 (IV). Report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD 
. (TD/B/IPC/AC/20), June 1978. 
15/ See UNCTAD» Comprehensive report on progress under Conference 
resolution 93 (IV), op.cit., pp. 3 to 6. 
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possibly represent - in that, within àn overall and systematic approach, 
they establish a dialogue, identify the basic points of coincidence and 
dissidence, and make a move towards unifying the positions of both 
consumers and producers. 
The programme of preparatory meetings covered an. appreciable.number 
of commodities of importance for countries of the region (vegetable oils 
and oilseeds, cotton, tropical timber, iron ore, manganese and copper), 
although the meetings on bananas and bauxite are pending. With regard to 
meat, which is a product which has been suffering restrictions in various 
markets for several years, the UNCTAD secretariat did not achieve any 
progress in the preparatory meetings, since this is a product which is 
included in the present multilateral negotiations in GATT. Another four 
products of importance,iri the exports of different countries of the region 
(sugar, coffée, cocoa arid tin) are at present governed by international 
agreements, and have their own organizations which review the problems 
relating to them. 
In view of the slow progress made durihg the series of preparatory 
meetings on commodities, the Trade and Development Board at its last session 
agreed to extend the deadline for achieving the òbjectives of the 
Integrated'Programmé for Commodities, as laid down in UNCTAD resolution 
93 (IV) to the end of 1979. 
(b) The negotiations òri the common fund 
The first stage'of the negotiating conference on the establishment 
of a common fund for the financing of buffer stocks took place in March 
1977, and following four weeks of discussions in which no substantive 
agreements were reached, it was suspended, and.resumed in November of the 
same year. Although some progréss was made in this stage of the 
negotiations, they had once again*to be interrupted when no consensus was 
achieved on fundamental principles, upheld by the different groups of 
countries. 
• ' Following a period of intensive consultations by the Secretary-General 
of UNCTAD, with gcvernments and financial agencies, the negotiating conference 
met from 14-30 November 1978, and substantial progress was made., although 
no specific agreements could be reached.- on this occasion, a request was 
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made to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to reconvene the negotiating 
conference before the fifth session of UNCTAD-, awhile the Chairman 
presented his conclusions and pointed out that progress had been made in 
some of the most important matters, although there was still no agreement 
on some major elements. 
In this third stage of the conference^ agreement was reached on 
two particular problems which were at the root of earlier disagreements\ 
the first was the nature of the fund, i.e.» whether it was to be a supply 
of resources or a pool of individual reserves; the second concerned 
possible functions of the fund apart from financing reserves ("second 
window"). With regard to the first of these, it was accepted that the 
fund should have its own resources»- derived from direct contributions 
by the governments (a fixed equal sum for all the member States and an 
additional sum according to the formula governing United Nations 
contributions) and resources from the operation of international commodity 
agreements, as a proportion of the maximum financial requirements of 
such agreements (in the form of cash deposits, capital available on 
demand and guarantees). The fund's:resources would also include loans, 
voluntary contributions and net gains. , 
With regard to the last mentioned, it was accepted that the 
"second window" would finance measures other than those relating to 
the constitution of reserves, to include research and development and 
productivity increase. The resources would come partly from direct 
contributions by the governments, and the rest from voluntary contributions, 
and would be held in a separate account0 
A general discussion .also took place on the.problem of allocating 
votes. It was agreed.that they would be granted to the member States, 
and not to the international commodity agreements * while no member State . 
would have the right of veto. The Chairman's report indicates that the 
fund would contribute from its first window to the financing of 
international buffer stocks, and in accordance with the forms of action 
determined, of internationally co-ordinated local reserves as part of 
international commodity agreements. 
/Among the 
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Among the main topics on which the Chairman of the Conference 
considered that it would be necessary to continue negotiations, was the 
amount of the capital payments and the percentage of the deposits which 
would come from the commodity agreements, the amount of the funds which 
would be allocated to the "second window" to finance other measures and 
their sources of financing (voluntary,'compulsory or both), and the 
basis for the weighted distribution of votes, in keeping with the 
principles of equality and proportion. 
It would seem that the progress achieved to date, provided some 
flexibility existed in the positions of the groups, would make it 
possible to reach a compromise agreement between the opposing ideas of 
the different-groups. 
2» Compensatory financing to stabilize earnings 
Parallel to the problem of price instability, it has been necessary 
to tackle that of instability in export earnings through compensatory 
financing. The instruments used in both cases are complementary and not 
optional, since their purposes are different. The compensatory financing 
facility set up by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Stabex 
system within the Lomé Convention exist for the momenta However, there 
are shortfalls in their coverage of countries and products, and in their 
modalities, which as the UNCTAD secretariat pointed out would rëquire 
the reform of the IMF facility and the establishment of a new special 
facility for commodities. 
The UNCTAD secretariat is studying the possibility of some reforms 
which could be proposed in the IMF compensatory financing facility for 
a more efficient application. Among the matters considered is the 
desirability of introducing an objective formula to determine the drop 
in earnings, using a sufficiently large number of years to establish 
the trend, taking into account the purchasing power of exports, fixing 
the amounts drawn in terms of such indexes as per capita income, the 
situation of the balance of payments and the reserves position, rather 
than according to quotas, and easing the regulations on the refunding of 
compensation, linking them to the country's payments capacity. 
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The UNCTAD secretariat also proposes to study the feasibility and 
financial needs of anew facility to offset the decline in earnings as a 
result of. commo,dity exports. This facility would operate as follows: 
(i)- access would be reserved for developing countries only and would 
cover all commodities (foodstuffs, agricultural raw materials, minerals 
and metals); (ii) compensation would be. .available when export earnings 
from specific commodities declined, subject to balance-of-payments 
requirements, and taking into account the tranches in the IMF facility; 
(iii) the formula for measuring the drop in earnings would be based on 
the trend over a sufficiently long period and would,take into account 
changes in the purchasing power of .export earnings; (iv) t.he decline in 
the earnings of the relatively less developed countries would be totally 
covered; (v) the refunding of the compensation would be linked to the 
country's payments capacity.16/ 
3. Development of the commodity economy 
. The development of.the. commodity economy .is essentially bound up with 
local processing of. these products and their marketing and distribution 
systems, • 
In developing countries, local processing does not only lead to 
larger export earnings - since a larger , value added is sold - but also 
gives impetus to the overall industrialization process. . The UNCTAD 
secretariat has estimated that the semi-processing before.export of ten 
commodities 17/ in the developing countries would have meant additional 
annual gross earnings of around.27 billion dollars, on the basis of 
1975 figures.18/ 
Latin America exports the majority o,f its commodities unprocessed. 
Of imports of, 17 products from 11 Latin American countries by the OECD 
16/ See UNCTAD, op.cit. 
17/ See UNCTAD, The processing before export of primary commodities: 
areas for further international co-operation, Geneva, 1978. 
18/ Copper, bauxite, phosphates, natural rubber, cotton, jute, hides, 
non-coniferous timber, cocoa and coffee* 
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countries 74% had not been processed, 10% had been semi-processed and 
16% had received further processing (see table 10). Among the main 
causes of. this situation are the tariff and non-tariff barriers set up by 
the governments, those resulting from the structure of the markets and the 
operation of the transnational corporations, the obstacles arising out 
of the scale of production required and investment requirements, and 
other restrictive practices such as product differentiation, and the 
increase in shipping freights.19/ 
Faced with these restrictions, developing countries have in several 
cases prepared policies to give impetus to processing by the producer 
country. The best known"example is that' of the restrictions imposed on 
the outflow of unprocessed products, which include prohibitions, quotas 
and dutiesj this policy has.been successfully applied to exports of hides 
and timbers. If the measures agreed upon are to be really efficacious, 
however, they must be co-ordinated among the developing countries which 
apply them. The co-ordination of investment and supply to the markets 
could also be intensified, which is what the Central American Common 
Market and the countries of the Andean Pact have done in certain cases. 
There is in any case a broad margin for increasing trade among developing 
countries, especially in semi-processed and processed products. 
With regard to co-operation among developed and developing countries, 
the main lines of action suggested by the UNCTAD secretariat 20/ could 
be the following: market access for processed products, abolition of the 
discrimination between primary and processed products in market access, 
the structure of shipping freights and the special and bilateral systems 
of preferences; prohibition on new subsidies to industries in developed 
countries which are in competition with those of developing nations and 
the gradual reduction of existing subsidies; closer supervision of the 
price policy of the transnational corporations, in order to eliminate 
19/ For an analysis of each of these barriers and obstacles, see UNCTAD, 
Thé processing before export of primary commodities: areas for 
further international co-operation, op.cit. 
20/ See UNCTAD, Commodities. Action on export earnings stabilization 
and developmental aspects of commodity policy, Geneva, 1978. 
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Table 10 
QECD COUNTRIES: IMPORTS OF 17 BASIC COMMODITIESlA ACCORDING TO DEGREE OF PROCESSING 
(Thousands of dollars and percentages) 
Degree of 
processing 
World to ta l • 




from the 11 
Value Percentage Value Percentage countries 
Grade 1 51 358 030 34.70 7 720 792 73.50 15.03 
Grade 2 29 279 776 19.78 1 096 259 10.44 3.74 
Grade 3 67 388 491 45.52 1 687 926 16.07 2.50 
Total 148 026 297 100.00 10 504 977 100.00 7.10 
Source» UNCTAD data bank. 
a/ Meat, f i sh , f r u i t , vegetables, sugar, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, hides, tropical timber, pulp and 
paper, wool, cotton, iron ore, bauxite, manganese arid zinc. . 
b/ Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Venezuela. 
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the differences between the prices of products when they are controlled 
by enterprises from developing countries; and an improved allocation of 
financial resources - especially by international institutions - for 
local commodity processing in devèloping countries. 
Marketing and distribution. It is well known that the marketing and : 
distribution of a large proportion of commodities is controlled by the 
developed countries. This control if particularly exercised through 
the transnational corporations , owing to their dòininant position in the 
distribution channels of the developed•consumer countries, and also in 
financing9 transport and-related services. The production3 marketing 
and distribution of various Commodities is to be found concentrated iti 
the hands of a few enterprises; for example, six or less firms control 
more than half of world'trade - excluding the countries with centrally-
planned economies and taking each commodity separately - in bananas, bauxite, 
alumina, aluminium, manganese and tèa; and more that 70% of the United 
States market in bananas, còcoa, coffee, copper, rubber' and tobacco.21/ 
This Control permits the generalized practice of trade within a single 
enterprises, as is discussed belów in chapter VÌI, while in several cases 
the vertical integration of the enterprises takes in the production, 
processing and distribution òf the commodity, as in the case of bananas, • 
tobacco, bauxite, sugar, tea and rubber. 
As a result of their lack of bargaining power and absence of control 
over the production and marketing process, among .other factors, the part 
of the final consumer price which the producer developing countries 
receive is notably low in many cases; for example, it is less than one-
third in commodities the processing of which is relatively simple, as in the 
case of cocoa, citrus fruits and bananas. If ;it is also considered*that 
21/ See UNCTAD, Marketing and distribution of primary commodities; 
areas for further international co-operation, Geneva, 1978. . 
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the value of the export includes the local costs of transport and 
marketing, it may be.concluded that the part of the price received by the 
primary producers is very smallo22/ 
In the face of this situation, the UNCTAD secretariat is studying a 
series of measures,23/ among which the following may be mentioned: 
(i) increase in technical, financial and legal support by the developed 
countries and the international financial institutions for developing 
commodity marketing and distribution systems with funds which could come 
partly from the duties placed by developed countries on food and beverages 
from developing countries; among other things, this would mean the 
financing of stocks, storage services and market research, and the setting 
up of joint marketing committees and State export agencies; (ii) support 
to research into the structure and functioning of markets and long-term 
contracts in connexion with commodities; (iii) creation of an 
international framework which would contain the marketing and distribution 
policies for primary products and include measures concerning information 
supply; inclusion of marketing, transport and distribution of primary 
products in policies to counter restrictive trade practices; elimination 
of discrimination against developing countries in transport, marketing 
and distribution; and the. undertaking to support the standardization of 
trade practices and agreements, including long-term contracts and within 
these, the fixing of prices and renegotiation of their clauses. 
The preparatory meetings on commodities; situation 
of the main products exported by Latin, 
American countries 
The international commodity markets were characterized in 1978, with 
very few exceptions, by marked instability and strong tendencies for prices 
to drop. The weakening of prices is still more significant when measured 
22/ See UNCTAD, Proportion between export prices and consumer prices 
of selected commodities exported by developing countries* (TD/184/ 
Sup,3, May 1976) and A. Orlandi, "Prices and gains in the world 
coffee trade1', CEPAL Review, first half of .1978. 
23/ See UNCTAD, Commodities« Action on export earnings stabilization 
and developmental aspects of commodity policy, op.cit. 
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in real terms, i.e., by their purchasing power. Table 11 gives a 
comparison of the prices in dollars at current prices and in dollars 
at constant 1970 prices for some of the most important export commodities 
of the Latin American countries, excluding petroleum. The next few 
paragraphs examine the evolution of the negotiations, consultations or 
preparatory meetings held on commodities of export interest to these 
countries, indicating where relevant the influences on prices and on 
the general situation of the market, 
(a) Sugar 
The entry into force, as from 1 January 1978, of the International 
Sugar Agreement, was successful for a few weeks in countering the 
downward trend in the prices of raw sugar in the world market during the 
previous two yearsj but this trend once again gained momentum as from 
March, and prices plummated to levels well below the minimum of 11 US cents 
per pound laid down in the Agreement, The depression in the market, 
which originally reflected a large-scale disequilibrium between total 
volumes of world production and consumption, was accentuated by United 
States and European Economic Community sugar policies. As from 
January 1978, the United States Government also imposed an additional 
duty of 2.7 US cents per pound on imports of raw sugar. This duty, 
plus the current tariff (2.8 US cents per pound) raised the total duty 
on imported sugar to 5.5 US cents per pound thus placing the price of 
sugar imports in the United States on a level close to that of the 
domestic support price which stood at 14.65 US cents during 1978. The 
adverse effects of the surcharge on imports established in the United 
States were aggravated by the situation of uncertainty existing throughout 
the year with regard to the ratification of the International Sugar 
Agreement by the United States Congress. It was not ratified, and this 
not only caused a continued climate of insecurity with regard to the 
future of the Agreement but made it impossible for its operational 
machinery to begin to function, including the system of contributions to 
the stock financing fund, which should have begun to operate on 1 July 
1978, and could not do so because its application depended on the 
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172.0 86.0 14.0 7.0 68.41 34.21 104.? 52.4 114.4 57.2 73.9 37.0 154 77 280 140 462 231 454 227 59.34 29.67 489.6 244.5 
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138.9 64.0 14.5 6.7 85.10 39.22 122.4 56.4 124.2 57.2 69.2 31.9 144 66 250 110 366 169 440 203 56.44 26.00 539.9 248.8 
144.9 66.2 16.5 7 .5 97.93 44.72 130.8 59.7 135.5 61.9 73.0 33.3 153 70 296 131 477 218 414 189 59.26 27.06 529.5 241.8 
155.3 000 11.4 94.01 130.8 132.2 71.8 164 264 434 eoo 63.58 594.4 
tn 
CD 
developed countries, 1970 = 100. . 
Sourcesi ( l ) UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bullet in, Special Supplement 1960-1976 and November issue 1978» 
(2) United Nations. Monthly Bulletin of S t a t i s t i c s (July and November 19?e). 
(3) FAO, Production Yearbook, 1975 atjd 1977. 
(4) FAO, Monthly Bulletin of" Agricultural Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , Volume 1 , No. 7 /8 , 1978. 
Notes Column A: Internat ional pr ice in dol lars h t current p r i ces . 
Column E ; Adjusted prices internat ional pr ices def la ted by the unit value index of exports of raanufactures 
^ a/ Current pr ices deflated by the unit value iindex of exports of manufactures by devtioped countr ies , 1970 = 100. 
H b/ Raw sugar, fob Caribbean por t s , fo r export^ to the f r e e market ( l ) . 
"c/ Colombian coffee , manizales type , Kew YorkT2), prod. Ho. 84. 
£ / Cocoa beans, average daily pr ices New York/London, fu tu re ( l ) . 
T/ Central American bananas, cif Hamburg (3), (SL). 
2 £ / Beef, frozen, boneless, average import pr ices in the United S ta tes , *oS¡ entry port (3) f o r 1970 to 19755 ( l ) f o r 1976 and following years . 
¿ Wheat, No. 2, Hard Red Winter, United Statep export p r i ce , fob Gulf ports ( l ) . • — - » - — ' 
Maize, Argentina, c i f United Kingdom up to . 
if Mexican cotton, SM-1 1/16, cif United Kingd m ( l ) , 
7 / Clean wool. United Kingdom, combed, quality 
K/ Soyabean,_United S ta tes , No. 2, yellow, bul 
T/ Linseed o i l , any or ig in , United Kingdom ( l ) 
1/ Fishmeal, any origin European por t s , 64-65$ 
SII SWPer» ?a5h pr ices in the^ London Metal ,Exc rnnge, e l ec t ro ly t i c copper bars ( l ) V/ Tin, cash in the Lond»n metal Exchange ( l ) . 
972; from 1973 on ci f North Sea por t s ( l ) . 
50 (New Zealand Wool Marketing Corp., Clacton-on-Sea, England ( l ) . 
c i f London up to 1976v from 1977, cif Rotterdam ( l ) = 
prote in , cif Hamburg ( 3 ) . 
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The European Economic Community for its part not only decided not 
to take part in the International Sugar Agreement, but went ahead with 
an active policy to export sugar» upheld by a system of refunding or> 
subsidies which increased rapidly during the last two years. In view of 
the situation of exportable surpluses which has characterized the world 
sugar market in recent years, the subsidizing of EEC exports has enabled 
it to increase its participation in the market9 at the expense of the 
exporters members of the Agreement, whose efforts to counter the downward 
trend in prices were thwarted by the policy of subsidized exports 
introduced by the Community. ,In order to illustrate the magnitude of the 
progressive increase in EEC subsidies to sugar exports, it should be 
mentioned that between the end of 1975 and mid-1976 these subsidies 
fluctuated between 40 and 55 Community units of account per ton; for the 
agricultural year 1976/1977, they fluctuated between 104 and 177 units 
of account, and in July 1978 they reached their maximum level of 
265 units of account per ton.24/ 
(b) Coffee. 
The last International Coffee Agreement came into force in October 
1976, and up to the end of September 1978 there had been no need to bring 
its regulatory clauses, particularly export quotas, into effect. In mid-
1977, however, the international commodity market showed signs of 
deterioration, and in the face of the prospect of a.more intensive decline 
in prices, the Administrative Council of the Agreement met at the end of 
September to consider what measures could be adopted. At these meetings, 
agreement was reached in recognizing that the minimum agreed price for 
introducing export quotas - 77 US cents per pound - was too low but there 
was no agreement on establishing a new range of prices whose minima or 
maxima would control the application or abolition of export quotas. 
However, it was, agreed.that the Executive Board, of the Agreement would 
24/ In July 1978 the EEC unit of account was equivalent to 1.24 US dollars 
consequently, the subsidy granted by the Community at that 
time was equivalent to 328 dollars per ton. The average price of 
raw sugar for export to the world market in the third quarter of 
1978 was 159 dollars per ton. 
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keep the market under observation and meet to take the relevant decision 
when the guiding price of the Agreement (which is an average of different 
types of coffee) was less than 1.28 or more than 1.74- US cents pa.1 
pound. 
(c) Cocoa 
The prices of cocoa beans in 1977 reached their highest levels of 
any period,, as a result of the impact of a decline in production; although 
it was only 12% of the world total compared with 1976, it reached much 
higher percentages among the major African producers (Ghana, Nigeria, 
and Cameroun), while Brazil's production also dropped, although to a 
lesser extent. The instability of the market, however, has continued, 
partly because although world output in 1977-1978 was an improvement on 
the previous year, it was unable to return to the levels of the period 
1974-1975, and also partly because there have been pessimistic rumours 
about the 1978/1979 harvest in Brazil and West Africa. As a corollary 
to the climate of uncertainty which has prevailed in the international 
cocoa trade, as from September 1977 the publication of the cash prices 
of cocoa bean transactions in the New York cocoa market was suspended. 
The present International Cocoa Agreement, in force since September 
1976, has not had to use its regulatory machinery (export quotas and 
purchases for the buffer stock), since market prices have exceeded the 
ceilings established in the Agreement, Since October 1977, the prices 
established by the International Cocoa Organization have ranged from 
a minimum of 65 to a maximum of 81 US cents per pound. Although the 
text of the present Agreement anticipates the possibility of extending 
it for a further two years when it expires in September 1979, the 
International Cocoa Organization decided to set up a preparatory committee 
to prepare a new draft agreement with machinery and provisions which 
would attract countries which do not belong to the present Agreement. 
The negotiations for this new agreement would take place in the first 
months of 1979. 
(d) Tin 
Tin prices have fluctuated fairly considerably over the last two 
years, but have generally maintained an upwards trend supported by short-
/and long-
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and long-term factors. To begin with, world production of refined tin 
has not increased significantly in the course of the last 10 years, 
while during some periods annual consumption has far exceeded production; 
this has been the result of periodic sales of tin from the strategic 
reserves of the United States, and in other years from the reserves 
accumulateci in the buffer stock operating within the International Tin 
Agreèment. So as to provide a greater inducement to increasing tin 
productibn, thè International Tin Council has modified - by raising it -
the range of prices within which the buffer stock of the Agreement can 
operate; its minimum ceiling in July 1978, was fiked at the equivalent 
of 4.32 dollars per pound of metal and its maximum at 5.45 dollars; the 
maximum ceiling was only slightly below the market price during those 
months. The lack of metal in the buffer stock, supplies, of which ran 
out in January 1977, and the continuing uncertainty during the second 
half of the year as to whether the United States Cóngress would 
authorize the marketing of 30,000 tons of metal and a contribution of • 
5,000 tons to the buffer stock of thè Agreement, resulted in further 
price increases which reached their maximum when Congress adjourned 
without having taking a decision on these two matters. Part of the 
increases recorded in the last months of the year were thus the result 
of speculation, so that a moderate drop may be expected if the United 
States Congress adopts the proposals described in the first months 
of 1979. 
The commodities reviewed so far (sugar, coffee, cocoa and tin) 
have international agreements in force, and therefore have their own 
administrative organization and institutional dystem for carrying out 
intergovernmental consultations or the necessary negotiations vis-â-vis 
situations not covered by the Agreement or which require to be interpreted 
or referred to rules. This, for example, is the case of the revision 
of the price ranges laid down in the agreements¿which bring into force 
machinery to restrict or liberate exports or production. The inflation 
which has been affecting the developed countries for several yèars now 
and the consequent drop in the purchasing power of the dollar, have meant 
that these price ranges become obsolete within a short time and require 
/periodic revision. 
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periodic revision. Some of the objectives of the Integrated Programme 
are thus achieved within the agreements as a result of the measures 
adopted to reduce or attenuate price fluctuations, 
(e) Copper 
In the programme of preparatory meetings on commodities organized 
by the secretariat of.UNCTAD, copper has received considerable attention. 
Between 1977 and 1978 five meetings were held® without any consensus being 
reached for setting up an organization grouping copper producers and 
consumers, although at the third meeting it had been agreed that a standing 
intergovernmental copper body should be established, and to that end a 
working group had been convened to prepare the draft proposals on rules of 
procedure, organizational structure and financial requirements of such a 
body. In the subsequent preparatory meetings, however neither the proposal 
to set up the standing body nor others which would lead to the drawing up 
of proposals for negotiating an international copper agreement materialized. 
The depressed situation of copper prices worsened in mid-1977 and 
lasted until mid-1978, when a moderate recovery began; this has only 
meant re-establishing prices at their average 1976 level, whereas in real 
terms they emerge as lower than prices in any year during the period 
1970-1977. It should be recalled that as from the end of June 1976 the 
member countries of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper-Exporting 
Countries (CIPEC) left it to their members to adopt the production . 
policies most in keeping with their interests, thus abandoning the 
agreement maintained up to that time to cut down production as much as 
15%, as a means of countering the rapid fall in prices during 1975. When 
this restriction was dropped in 1976, as has already been said, prices 
once again followed a downwards course which has only been interrupted 
in recent months. 
While this was happening at the level of the international 
negotiations, the International Trade Commission of the United States 
had recommended that the President of that country impose restrictions 
on imports of refined copper by establishing a total annual quota of 
300,000 tons, arguing that excessive imports were harming national 
producers. Total imports of refined copper by the United States in 1977 
/amounted to 
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amounted to 387,000 tons, and it is anticipated that in 1978 they will 
exceed 600,000 tons. It must, however, be recognized that this increase 
in United States imports has taken place because local producers have for 
many months kept prices above those of the London Metal Exchange, so that 
many users of copper have preferred to import it rather than buy it at 
the prices demanded by local producers. The above recommendation was 
rejected by the President at the end of October 1978, since it was 
considered that it would cause domestic inflation and have adverse effects 
on the multilateral negotiations in progress. 
(f) Iron and manganese 
The prices of iron and manganese ore have tended to fluctuate only 
slightly in the last two years, when compared with other metals. The first 
preparatory meeting on iron ore was held at the end of November 1977, but 
no specific measures were discussed at it, except the recommendations to 
set up an intergovernmental group of experts who would meet and analyse 
information on the different aspects of the world iron ore economy. The 
group of experts held their first meeting at the end of April 1978, but 
decided to defer until a subsequent meeting the review of the proposals 
on stabilization measures and techniques in connexion with this product, 
and also requested that certain studies be carried out. . 
With regard to manganese ore, the first preparatory meeting was 
held in mid-June 1977 and concluded with a joint statement by the producer 
countries to the effect that it was necessary to identify specific problems 
relating to the production and marketing of manganese as a preliminary 
step to a future meeting of both consumers and producers. In brief, 
although the preparatory meetings on both ores permitted a first : 
exploration of the trade positions of the main countries importing and 
exporting these products, they did not succeed in making sufficient 
progress to indicate what type of measures or techniques could be used 
to tackle the problems in this connexion. 
(g) Cotton 
Cotton prices declined persistently during 1977, succeeded in 
recovering partially in the first half of 1978, and once again declined 
moderately during the third quarter of the same year. Latin American 
/cotton has 
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cotton has to compete with that of two countries which occupy the first 
and second places in world'exports - the United States and the Soviet 
Union, whose exports during the trade year 1977-1978 accounted for 29% 
and 22% respectively of the world total. In contrast, the exports of the 
Latin American countries as a"whole have declined in-recent years, 
especially in Brazil, Mexico and Peru, owing in some cases to the slow 
growth of production (which leaves less of a surplus for" export owing to 
the increase in domestic consumption), and in others because it has been 
possible to develop exports of cotton, products (yarns, fabrics and 
manufactures). The problems of the international cotton trade have for 
many years been discussed in the International Cotton Advisory Committee, 
an organization which covers a large group of producer countries, although 
it has not been possible to reach agreements implying any degree of 
international co-operation to defend prices or the stability of the cotton 
markets, or the handling and operation of buffer stocks. Within the 
Integrated - Programme for Commodities three preparatory meetings on cotton 
have taken place, and have shown once again the great' complexity of the . 
problems which must be solved in this field, and the major discrepancies 
existing between exporting and importing countries, and even between 
developing exporting countries in reaching agreements. To some extent 
this is due to the fact that cotton is facing competition with synthetic 
fibres, which means that it must be taken into account that measures 
restri&ting~it£ trade (for example, to defend a specific level of prices) 
may cause its position to deteriorate vis-a-vis other fibres. Insofar as 
the developing countries in particular wish to stress the promotion Of 
exports of cotton manufactures rather than of raw cotton,*the problems 
become even more complex, owing on the one hand to the existence of an 
agreement on cotton textiles and on the other to the intensification of 
the protectionist barriers of some developed countries vis-a-vis exports 
of textiles, through what are inaccurately termed "voluntary agreements" 
to restrict exports, 
(h) Meat 
Exports of; beef continue their recovery from the severe quantitative 
restrictions to which they were submitted in recent years in the European 
/Economic Community 
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Economic Community and Japan, although they have still not succeeded in 
returning to prices comparable - in current terms - to those existing 
before the application of these restrictions was generalized. The review 
of the problems relating to international trade in beef have progressed 
simultaneously in two fora - the multilateral trade negotiations in GATT, 
and the Integrated Programme for Commodities. In the special subgroup on 
meat within the Agriculture Committee of the multilateral trade negotiations, 
bilateral negotiations have been taking place with regard to conditions 
of access to markets and other aspects of international trade in meat, 
from which final agreements have still not materialized. At the end of 
March 1978 the first preparatory meeting on meat was held in UNCTAD, 
during which there was discussion of questions relating to: (i) guarantees 
of greater .security of access to the markets of the importing countries 9 
continuity and security of supplies and voluntary restriction of exports 
in periods of excess supply; (ii) more precise and clear agreements on 
sanitary regulations; (iii) a multilateral approach to the application of 
measures such as subsidies to exports and safeguard clauses, and (iv) 
improvement of the machinery of information, supervision and consultation. 
The discussions at this preparatory meeting, however, were unable to 
progress towards more specific agreements, while awaiting the results of 
the GATT negotiations. 
In the United States, where imports of meats are governed by a law , 
which'-lays down quotas with an annual growth factor, the President vetoed 
a bill recently approved by Congress which, if it had been applied , would 
have further restricted tbtal imports of meat to that country. The 
President1s veto was based on the fact that a further restriction of 
supply would have inflationary effects, especially at moments of low levels 
of domestic supply, and also on the fact that more restrictions on imports 
could cause a deterioration of relations with traditional suppliers, such 
as the Latin American countries. The total quota of imports of meat for 
1978 was finally increased by 200 million pounds, i.e., 15% higher than 
the previous year. 
/(i) Wheat 
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(i) Wheat 
Wheat export prices declined steadily until mid-1977 from their high 
levels in 1974, and then began a process of recovery which lasted 
throughout the first nine months of 1978. Although from the strictly 
formal point of view an International Wheat Agreement continues to exist, 
because the Agreement which expired in 1974. has been renewed annually by 
means of protocols, it is a fact that these renewals have only served to 
maintain the administrative structure of the organization while a new 
Agreement is being negotiated. It should be observed that the last 
International Wheat Agreement, unlike those in force in the previous two 
decades, did not contain clauses on maximum prices nor commitments on the 
part of the member, countries with regard to.sales and purchases of wheat. 
Its express objectives were to promote international co-operation, solve 
international wheat problems, promote the expansion of international trade 
in wheat and wheat flour, and contribute as far as possible to stabilizing 
the international wheat market. In the preliminary conversations for the 
negotiation of a new agreement held to. date, however, it has become evident 
that this agreement should contain provisions regarding prices and the 
maintenance and operation of stocks in the exporting countries. In these 
preliminary negotiations it would already appear to have been agreed that 
an endeavour would be made to set up three different instruments: an 
agreement on wheat trade, an agreement on trade in secondary grains, and 
a third on food aid. This last-mentioned agreement had precedents in the 
International Wheat Agreement of 1971 and is of great importance to the. 
most backward developing countries. The negotiation of this group of 
agreements is bound up with- the multilateral trade negotiations in GATT. 
Of the programme of preparatory meetings, those on bananas and 
bauxite - commodities which interest the Latin American countries - could 
not be held. A working party within the FAO Intergovernmental Group on 
Bananas examined the elements for an international agreement on the product 
and promoted a series of consultations among exporting countries on export 
quotas and how to settle them. Within the group of exporting countries, 
however, doubts still exist as to the feasibility of an international 
banana agreement of a restrictive nature. 
/This brief 
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This brief summary of the course of the international commodity 
negotiations suggests that progress is slow» and even practically nil, 
and that the governments of both developed and developing countries will 
have to give definite proof of political willingness if the objectives 




EXTERNAL FINANCING AND MONETARY PROBLEMS 
The big imbalances recorded in the balance-of-payments current 
accounts of most of the countries in the world since 1974 have slowly been 
diminishing. The surplus of the oil-exporting countries, which was very 
high in 1974, has been going down since then because of the high capacity 
of absorbing imports shown by some of them. Indeed, in some cases the 
increase in imports has exceeded that of exports, so that the surplus has 
gone down or even sometimes been converted into a current account deficit. 
At the same time, the deficit of the rest of the world has diminished. 
Within this general picture, however, the situation of the rest of 
the world has changed. The industrialized countries on the whole, and 
especially the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, have appreciably 
reduced their current account deficit or increased their surplus, while 
the developing countries as a whole also reduced their current account 
deficit up to 1977, although 1978 seems to have brought a recrudescence 
of the external imbalance of these countries. 
Latin America, too, has been subject to these trends: the current 
account deficit of the non-oil-exporting countries of the region, which 
came to 16 billion dollars in 1975, dropped in 1977 to a little less than 
6 billion dollars, but it is estimated that in 1978 it will have risen 
again to a total of 9 billion dollars (see table 12). 
There does not seem to be any quick and easy way of reducing the 
current account imbalances of the Latin American countries. On the one hand, 
although the capacity of the oil-exporting countries to absorb imports has 
proved to be greater than was at first believed, as soon as that capacity 
threatened to reduce those countries' current account surpluses, new oil 




EXTERNAL FINANCING CF NOH-OIL~EH>ORTING UTIN AftERKAH COUNTRIES 
(Billions of dollars) 11 • • 
1966-1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Deficit on current account a/ -2.0 -13.1 -16.1 -11.5 -7 .5 
Increase in reserves b/ 0.4 -0.7 -2.2 4.9 4.4 
Use made of external financing 2.4 12.4 13.9 16.4 11.8 
Net external financing received 2.5 12.6 14.4 16.2 10.5 
Direct investment 0 .7 . 1.6 • 2.3 2.2 (2.3) 
Transfer payments 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 (0.2) 
Net loans e/ 1.7 10.9 12.0 13.8 (8.0) 
Loans from of f ic ia l sources 0.9 1.9 1.9 (2.0) (2.2) 
Multilateral . 0.4 0.9 0.8 (0.9) (1.0) 
Bilateral 0 .5 1.1 • lbO (1.1) (1.2) 
Loans from private sources 0.8 9.0 10.1 11.8 (5.8) 
Suppliers 0.4 0.2 0 .1 . 0.6 (0.6) 
Commercial banks 0.3 8.2 , .8 .2 7.5 4.7 
Bonds -0.1 0.2 0.5 (1.0) 
Others and unspecified 0.1 0.6 0.6 2.2 , -0 .5 
Source» International ftonetevy Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; Bank for International Settlements, yearbook 
and supplements for July and December 1978; CEPAL estimates« 
a/ Excluding o f f i c ia l transfer payments, 
b/ Positive figures indicate an increase in reserves« 
c/ Including Ion®-, medium- and short-term non-compensatory and compensatory loans. 
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This means that the rest of the world has to accept a corresponding deficit 
in their balance-of-payments current account. Moreover, the import-
absorption capacity of the oil-exporting countries is manifested in an 
appreciable increase in their demand for products of the industrialized 
countries, so that the compensatory.effect of these imports is reflected 
fundamentally in the latter countries while the current account deficit 
of the developing countries, including those of Latin America, tends to 
persist. 
It is perhaps the very current account imbalances of the countries 
themselves which generate a flow of financial resources that steadily 
increase the size of the private financing market. While the balance-of-
payments financing resources of the International Monetary Fund and other 
resources of multilateral or bilateral official financing have not grown 
in keeping with the level of imbalances or of trade, the private credit 
markets have developed extremely rapidly and offer relatively abundant 
financing. Consequently, most of the countries of the region have not 
had any difficulty in obtaining financial resources to cover their current 
account deficit: indeed, the financing available has enabled the countries 
of Latin America to increase their gross international reserves in recent 
years. 
Table 12 shows the use made of external financing by the non-oil-
exporting Latin American countries, together^with the sources of. such 
financing. It can be seen from this table that loans from private sources, 
which represented on average one-third of total net external financing 
in the period 1966-1970, covered almost 60% of that financing in 1977. 
The component which has shown the most spectacular growth is that made up 
of lonas from foreign commercial banks. These loans, which represented 
12% of net external financing on average in the period 1966-1970, accounted 
for over 50% in 1977. 
These figures indicate that the importance of both bilateral and 
multilateral concessionary and non-concessionary official financing in 
covering the current account deficit of the non-oil-exporting Latin American 
countries is going down. 
/The OECD 
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The OECD countries' policy of giving priority in their development 
assistance programmes to the relatively more backward countries, together 
with similar tendencies in the World Bank, as well as their limited 
capacity for making lonas, help to explain the sharp drop in financing 
from official sources. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), for 
its part, has been hampered in expanding its operations by the delay in 
obtaining promised contributions from some of its member countries. 
The big current account imbalances, of the countries and the expansion 
of private financing markets have, brought with them quite marked fluctuations 
in the exchange rates of the principal currencies, since.the combination 
of big imbalances and great ease in changing the composition of the currency 
holdings of countries, enterprises and individuals makes it very difficult 
to keep exchange rate fluctuations within narrow limits. 
The expansion of private financing markets and the floating of 
currencies have been the main features of the international monetary system 
in recent years. These two features, which define the framework within which 
the external economic relations of the countries are carried on, will be 
examined first, after which brief mention will be made of the domestic . 
policies of opening up to the exterior followed by the countries of Latin 
America within the.international context, and finally an examination will 
be carried out in somewhat greater detail of the external financial situation 
of the non-oil-exporting countries of Latin America. 
1. The expansion of the private financing markets 
The available estimates indicate that the Eurocurrency market has 
grown at an average rate, of 19% per year between 1973 and 1978, while the 
level of total external indebtedness (both public and privates guaranteed 
or non-guaranteed) of the developing countries has grown at an average rate 
of 22% between the same dates, the rate for Latin America (excluding the 
oil-exporting countries) being similar to this global figure. 
the main sources feeding the private financing markets are funds 
deposited by the oil-exporting countries and deposits made by monetary 
authorities and enterprises which have accumulated ¡foreign exchange surpluses. 
/Exchange rate 
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Exchange rate floating is an added incentive to the private sector 
to build up foreign exchange balances, since in these conditions the 
private sector has to play an intervention role in the market which, in 
a system of fixed parities, would only be the responsibility of the monetary 
authorities. Since the system of floating parities has already been 
operating for several years now, it is probable that the private sector 
has adjusted its currency holdings to this factor; so that the predominant 
elements in its currency demands in the future will be those affecting the 
composition of its currency holdings rather than their level, the latter 
being influenced only by such elements as the growth of trade and international 
payments, whose effect is.slower. 
The private financing markets have functioned in such a way as to 
facilitate a higher level of recirculation of funds between surplus and 
deficit countries than had been expected. Thus, the Eurocurrency market, 
in particular, which operates without any formal regulation by the national 
monetary authorities, has a high multiplication capacity which will continue 
as long as the United States payments deficit persists. The multiplication 
capacity of this market is limited by the outflow of resources to the latter 
country, and even if, in net terms, there is a permanent inflow of additional 
resources, this limiting factor only operates in a weak manner. 
The growth of the Eurocurrency market will undoubtedly be affected 
to the extent that the United States succeeds in balancing its external 
current and total payments, particularly if the measures taken by the 
United States emphasize action on the domestic interest rates in that 
country. If these rates rise, there could be a return flow of funds to 
that country which would restrict the capacity of the Eurocurrency market 
to function over and above the level of expansion of the availability of 
resources in the United States. If, at the same time that an improvement 
is secured in the current account of the United States, a reduction is not 
achieved in the current account surplus of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Japan and the oil-producing countries, then the current account deficit 
of the developing countries, and especially the Latin American countries, 
will be bound to increase in keeping with the improvement of the United 
States, thus further increasing the financing requirements of those countries. 
/It is 
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It is unlikely that such a conjunction of unfavourable factors will 
take place, however, and the likelihood will be still less to the extent 
that the international agencies responsible for the global appraisal of 
the effects of the policies of those countries keep the system under close 
supervision and press the countries with surpluses to co-operate in the 
process of international adjustment. It is therefore in the interest of 
the Latin American countries that.there should be the greatest possible 
co-ordination of the economic policies of the industrialized countries and 
the other big surplus holders. 
2. Currency floating 
The private financing markets also help to introduce a certain degree 
of instability into the economies of the countries. The ease with which 
the composition of the currency holding of governments, enterprises and 
individuals can be changed means that the expectations which may be generated 
regarding the future values of currencies are reflected very rapidly in the 
market and even tend to be self-intensifying. Thus, for example, because 
the prices of import and export products react more quickly than the volumes 
produced, the devaluation of an important currency brings about a reduction 
in the export prices and an increase in the import prices of the country in 
question even before the respective volumes have been modified. The. 
devaluation therefore tends to cause an aggravation in the very short term 
of the imbalances which gave rise to it and on which the expectations were 
based, and it also tends to intensify itself until the effect on the export 
and import volumes becomes stronger than that on prices. 
Examination of what has happened in the last year or two tends to 
confirm this appraisal and appears to suggest that in present circumstances 
the fluctuations in exchange rates will have to be much greater than was 
expected in order to bring about the sought-for balancing effect on current 
payments. In other words, in order for the exchange variations of the 
currencies of the most important countries to tend to bring about a balancing 
effect on the current account, it will be necessary for a length of time to 
pass which must surely be measured in semesters rather than months. Moreover, 
the imbalances will tend to get worse before they will begin to get better. 
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Naturally, if the industrialized countries co-ordinate their economic 
policies in order to secure a more symmetrical adjustment process, this 
would reduce the violent exchange rate fluctuations with their sequel of 
negative secondary effects. 
It seems almost like a joke that the most generally accepted theoretical 
analysis asserts that the floating of the most important currencies will 
give greater freedom to countries*in their-domestic policies. Thus, for 
example, it is suggested that a country suffering a higher rate of inflation 
than its trading partners would see its currency go down on the market in 
comparison with the other currencies and that by these means the economies 
of the other countries would not be affected by inflationary pressures. 
Even with floating, however, there are various mechanisms by which the 
inflationary pressure in one country will tend to spread to others. 
The evolution of domestic credit and the existence of inflationary 
pressures in a given country will be taken into account by the market in 
determining the exchange rate of its currency, so that the market will 
anticipate future inflation to some extent in its transactions. 
Thus, it may happen that the loss of international value of a currency 
may be greater than that justified by taking account exclusively of the 
rates of inflation in various countries at a given moment, or alternatively 
the fall in the external value of the currency may be less, depending on the 
expectations for the future. Whatever happens, however, if the domestic 
interest rates are not rapidly adjusted to the expected changes in the external 
level of the currency this may generate capital movements which will tend 
to strengthen-the tendency to devaluation. For example, if a devaluation of 
10% over one year is expected and the domestic interest rates do not vary 
with relation to external rates, it will become profitable to take capital 
out of the country which is to devaluate its currency and transfer it ot 
countries whose currency is being relatively revalued. 
Although interest rates have reacted more rapidly in recent months, 
the normal situation has been for them to change rather slowly. This brings 
about a flight of capital from a country with a weak currency to a country 
with a strong currency, thus creating inflationary pressures in the latter 
which affect either the supply of means of payment or, through the substitution 
/of currencies, 
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of currencies, the demand. In order to avoid this, the interest rates of 
the country which is going to devalue should be raised, or else those of 
the other country should be lowered in keeping with the expected rates of 
relative devaluation or revaluation. 
The countries do not generally permit their currencies to float 
absolutely freely, but intervene in the market in order to moderate the 
fluctuations, thus impairing the efficacy which exchange rate adjustment 
could have as a means of eliminating the spread of inflationary pressures. 
Another mechanism by which inflation is transmitted from one country 
to another is connected with the fact that price levels (and, in inflationary 
circumstances, exchange rates) are more flexible in an upward than in a 
downward direction. For this reason, even with floating of currencies the 
relative price adjustments which have to take place as a consequence of 
exchange variations push prices upwards. 
This reluctance,of prices to go down is reflected in the fact that 
while the prices of the products imported by the country which is carrying 
out a devaluation tend to go up in terms of its currency, the prices of 
the products imported by countries whose currency is gaining value in 
relative terms at the international level do not tend to go down 
proportionately in terms of those countries' own currency, so that the 
inflationary pressures tend to spread. 
For all these reasons, there would appear to be grounds for expecting 
the inflationary pressures of one country to spread to other countries 
regardless of whether they have fixed or floating exchange rates. In order 
to see whether this really does take place, we may take the standard deviation 
of the inflation rates of the countries, divided by the average rate of 
inflation for several years. Table 13 shows the results obtained. 
Thus, the coefficient of variability is practically identical for the 
period of floating exchange rates (1974-1977) and for the period of fixed 
exchange rates (1960-1970), whereas in the intermediate period (1970-1973) 
this coefficient shows a marked drop. The empirical evidence therefore 
does not bear out the traditional theoretical conclusions but suggests instead 
that the mechanisms for the international transmission of imbalances operate 
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The floating of currencies also creates'an incentive for the private 
sector to increase its currency holdings so' that it can carry out the 
intervention role which is at least partially abandoned by the official 
sector. The changes in the composition of the currency holdings of the' 
private, sector., as we have already noted, cause some difficulties in the 
management of monetary policy and make necessary a very precise harmonization 
- very difficult to achieve in practice - between interest rates-and 
exchange rates. In the absence of this harmonization the movements caused . 
by the desired changes in the composition of the private sector currency 
holdings may be of such magnitude as to cause unacceptable exchange 
fluctuations and make necessary official intervention, with its consequent 
effects on the supply of money and on the correct evaluation of the necessary 
degree of restrictiveness or liberality of the-.monetary policy. This 
evaluation is made more difficult by the changes in the demand for domestic 
currency generated by the desired change in the composition of currency 
holdings. 
The abrupt exchange - variations of the currencies of the industrialized 
countries cause increased uncertainty about the future of the foreign trade 
of the developing countries. This is because the developing countries do 
not usually have very well developed foreign exchange markets where it is 
possible to cover risks easily. If the exchange rate fluctuations are not 
correctly predicted, they tend to cause unexpected losses or profits, and 
since this uncertainty is a .real cost, the fluctuation of currencies tends 
to diyert productive resources from, the generation of internationally 
tradeable goods to other goods, and.services. 
The fact that most of the developing countries link their currency 
to that of one of the industrialized countries with which they trade does 
not eliminate these unfavourable effects, although it does tend to reduce 
them. Even if the trade and financial movements of a developing country 
are related exclusively to a developed country,- the linking of the former 
country's currency to that of the latter will not eliminate the disadvantages 
of floating, since the exchange rate movements for the main country will be 
induced by its own external equilibrium needs, and not by those of the 
developing country. The exchange fluctuations which could have a balancing 
/effect for 
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effect for the principal country do not necessarily have the sane effect 
for the developing countryV and indeed they will generally tend to be 
unbalancing for the latter. This' is all the' more so when the developing 
country in question trades with more than one other country. 
If we consider the different speeds at which the prices and volumes 
involved in external trade vary, we arrive at the conclusion that movement 
of the exchange rate alone can hardly have much balancing effect on trade 
in the short run, especially when we consider that exchange rate movements 
are directed more towards the overall equilibrium of the balance of payments 
than to that of the current account. If an important currency is in the 
process of devaluation, for example, this accentuatés the trade imbalance 
and thus strengthens the devaluation process, which, in its turn, leads to 
pressures for increases in the domestic prices of the country whose currency 
is being devalued, and these pressures generally tend to accentuate also 
the expectations of future exchange rate changes in the same direction.25/ 
In order to check and reverse this process, other economic policies 
are called for, particularly those affecting currency and interest rates. 
The size of the monetary and credit markets and the rapidity with which 
inter-currency transactions can he carried out, however, make it more 
difficult to decide what degree of strictness or liberality of monetary 
policy is needed on the basis of observation of the growth rate of some 
monetary aggregate. 
Thus, for example, if the process of variation of exchange parities 
led to a desire to rèduce the importance of a particular national currency 
in the currency holdings, this would be equivalént to decreasing demand 
for that'currency, so that a reduction in the rate of growth of its supply 
might pròve insufficient to secure the desired effect. A tendency to reduce 
the importance of a given currency or currencies in holdings may result, 
in reality, in monetary policies being incapable - if managed within limited 
margins - of checking and reversing the tendency towards devaluation. 
25/ As more experience is gained with floating exchange systems, the . 
expectations could cease to play the destabilizing role which they 
appear to have at present. Better understanding of the functioning 




In .order to secure correction of this, tendency, what is generally 
required is a sufficiently large rise in the rates of interest paid on 
currency of the country which is devaluing to persuade currency holders 
that it is no longer worth continuing to change the composition of their 
holdings. In order to do this, the domestic interest rate would have to 
be such that - taking account of certain expectations of devaluation - it 
could induce movements of capital in the right direction or prevent them 
from taking undesirable directions. 
Producing this effect may call for considerably larger variations in 
domestic interest rates and, in the money supply than those recorded so far. 
To some extent, these variations' may be made less abrupt by the direct 
intervention of the monetary authorities in the exchange markets. The 
amounts involved are such, however, that it is difficult, to believe that 
direct intervention alone could modify exchange movements appreciably. 
It is therefore to be expected that financial markets will be.subject to 
» 
bigger fluctuations in the future than in the.past, either because exchange 
rates vary or.because interest.rates have to be changes. 
These larger fluctuations.could be reduced by closer co-ordination 
of the economic policies of the industrialized countries, since if such 
policies led to low inflation rates which were similar from one country, 
to another, the magnitude of the fluctuations needed on exchange and 
financial fnarkets to achieve equilibrium would be reduced. 
In order to achieve such co-ordination it is necessary to make the 
process of adjustment of external payments imbalances symmetrical, thus 
minimizing the cost of achieving such adjustments in terms of growth. If 
all or most of the weight of the adjustment falls on the deficit countries, 
as it usually does at present, this means that the international monetary 
system will have a deflationary bias, since the system will be adjusted 
fundamentally on the basis of the restrictive policies of deficit countries. 
If the process of adjustment were made more symmetrical, however, the 
process would contain not only the restrictive policies of the deficit- » 
countries, but also measures of an expansiohary nature in the surplus 
countries. 
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At the same time, the international co-ordination of economic policies 
would help to guarantee a more orderly and systematic process of expansion 
of international liquidity. Such co-ordination would help to limit the 
balance-of-payments deficit, measured in terms of the liquidity of the 
countries with reserve currencies, thus helping to slow the growth of the 
private currency markets and opening the way for an increase in the creation 
of Special Drawing Rights, the expansion of which would permit the reduction 
and possible elimination of transfers of real resources to the benefit of 
countries with reserve currencies. 
Both the achievement of greater symmetry in the process of adjustment 
and the regulation of expansion of international liquidity are matters of 
interest to Latin America. As regards the process of adjustment, it is 
in the interest of the Latin American countries that the world economy should 
grow at a rapid rate, since their own growth rates depend upon it. Moreover, 
they need to accumulate international liquidity and would benefit from 
increases in the amouht of Special Drawing Rights, while at the same time 
the greater stability on the international money and credit markets achieved 
through the international co-ordination of economic policies would facilitate 
a steady and orderly process of financing. 
3. Policies of opening up to the exterior 
Within this general framework, various Latin American countries have 
been increasingly opening up their economies to movements of goods and 
capital, albeit to different extents. This opening-up, which produces 
favourable effects on the assignment of resources when it is designed to 
correct excessive levels of protection, sometimes runs into certain difficulties 
Typically, a movement towards opening up of the economy will tend at the 
beginning to increase the balance-of-payments current account deficit, since 
imports will tend to react more quickly than exports. On the other hand, 
as opening up the economy is considered a favourable element by international 
private banking circles when judging the solvency of a country, it is 
normally accompanied by a flow of capital to the country, and this flow,, 
which generally takes the form of external loans, makes it possible to finance 
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the current account deficit and even leave a surplus. Consequently, such 
opening up to the exterior generally results in a favourable balance-of-
payments position on the whole (when the duration of the loans obtained 
is more than one year). 
The process of opening up the ecoiiomy is usually accompanied by fiscal 
and other reforms which help to generate considerable changes of relative 
prices in the economy. Even without these complementary measures, however, 
it still tends to bring about such changes, which are all the greater when 
the initial prptection has been at a high level. 
The changes in relative prices, in turn, bring about an appreciably 
greater reassignment of resources than is usual. This reassignment calls 
for additional financing, thus raising both the demand for domestic credit 
and domestic interest rates. If the movement of goods is freed, but not 
that of capital, domestic interest rates may rise to dizzy heights in the 
process unless measures are taken to increase the supply of domestic 
credits. These measures are often difficult to apply, especially if the 
country is facing an inflationary process. It should be remembered that 
experiments in opening up the economy often go hand in hand with-the 
elimination of restrictions on the variation of domestic interest rates. 
High domestic interest rates, in their turn, stimulate the inflow of 
capital where this is possible, and tend to have the effect of redistributing 
wealth in favour of those who have access to the limited cheaper external 
financing. Moreover;, a net inflow of external capital may be an important 
factor m the expansion of the means of payment, which usually brings 
additional complications in monetary policy. 
If the movement of capital is freed, the increase in the domestic 
demand for credit will be reflected not only in the interest rates, but 
also in a rapid process of external indebtedness building up in a few years 
or even months and involving loans of shorter duration than has been usual 
in the past and at full commercial interest rates. 
If exports could rapidly grow and diversify in these circumstances 
- a process which should be accompanied by a gradual relative freeing of 
imports - the increase in external indebtedness would not involve any 
excessive risk, but what happens is that the external indebtedness itself 
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tends to provoke a certain degree of over-valuation of the national currency 
which adversely affects the stimulus to export. Only careful management 
of interest rates and domestic monetary policy, as well as exchange policy 
and international reserves, will enable future problems to be avoided. 
International reserves for their part, are increased by the process 
of rapid indebtedness, and this is precisely what causes some degree of 
monetary over-valuation. Such over-valuation occurs when the authorities 
consider that the rapid increase in reserves thus produced is unnecessary, 
or at least too fast, and try to limit it by accepting some degree of 
over-valuation of the currency. In reality, however, the increase in 
reserves which takes place in such circumstances must be viewed in the light 
of the fact that it is due to the inflow of short term capital, which means 
that higher reserves must be maintained in order to be ready for a possible 
reversal of such inflows. 
When interest rates and/or exchange rates are fluctuating on international 
markets the probability of reversal of capital movements is greater. 
Apart from this, the increase in external indebtedness to private 
creditors has generated among the latter some concern about the composition 
of their assets in terms of borrower countries: the "sovereign risk". 
This concern has been reflected in some cases by action of an official 
nature in the creditor countries to apply certain risk criteria. Generally 
speaking, the procedures used for this purpose are not the most suitable, 
since they are based on a few partial indicators of a static nature which 
do not reflect future prospects. 
From this point of view, the increase in the resources of the 
International Monetary Fund and a suitable review of its conditional..! ty 
criteria would be an important contribution to greater stability of the 
market. The recent agreement to increase the country quotas in the IMF by 
50% is a positive step in the right direction, although it is still not 
big enough. 
In addition, the stability of the private financing market calls for 
an improvement in the process of international adjustment and in the creation 
of liquidity. Both objectives can be achieved by greater co-ordination of 
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the economic policies of the industrialized countries, together with 
suitable supervision by the IMF and an increase in its resources. 
External financing in Latin America 
As already noted, the current account deficit of the Latin American 
non-oil-exporting countries has been covered fundamentally by means of 
credits from the private commercial banking.system in the exterior. A 
growing proportion of these credits is obtained without official guarantee 
and does not figure in the detailed statistics on guaranteed debt prepared 
by various international agencies, especially the World Bank. 
The information on State-guaranteed external indebtedness shows that 
in 1977 this indebtedness came to a total of 146 billion dollars for 
75 non-oil-exporting countries, i.e., five, times the 1967 figure. For 
the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries, the officially guaranteed 
external debt at the end of 1977 came to almost 60 billion dollars, six 
times the 1967 level (see table 14). 
These figures do not include the non-guaranteed debt of the countries 
in question. Table 15 gives an estimate of the overall indebtedness of 
the non-oil-exporting Latin American countries, including both State-
guaranteed debt and the non-guaranteed debt. In 1977 the overall indebtedness 
of these countries together came to over 90 billion dollars, and it is 
estimated that in 1978 it rose to more than 100 billion dollars. 
As already noted, the composition of the global debt has changed 
rapidly, with a big increase in loans from private sources and a consequent 
relative drop in the proportion of loans from official sources. 
The rapid change in the composition of external financing has brought 
with it a deterioration in the terms, since loans from official sources are 
generally for a longer period and at lower interest rates than those from 
private sources. This is what has happened with the external debt of the 





NON-OIL-EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (NOBEVCO)» STA1E-GUARANTEED 
EXTERNAL BEBS®./ 
(Billions of dollars) , , 
1967 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977b/ 
75 non-oil-exporting 
developing countries 30 44 67 82 100 123 146 
Most advanced-Mediterranean 
developing countries o/ 5 6 9 10 12 14 16 
Subtotal (NODEVCO) 25 38 58 72 88 109 130 
Latin American norwoil-exporting . . . 
countries (LANOCO) 10 15 24 32 38 49 59 
Others 15 23 34 to 50 60 71 Source» World Bank, Wbrld Debt Tables, 1977« and estimates based on partial information from IMP and World Bank. 
a/ Refers to actually disbursed medium- and long-term debt outstanding at end of year, 
b/ Estimate based on information from IMF, OECB and World Bank, 




KON-OIL-EJ(PORTING LATIN AMERICAN COPTRJBSi- ESTIMATED TOTAL DEBT 
(Billions of dollars) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 
Non- Non- State- Non- State- Non-State- Total State- Total Total guar- Total guar— guar- guar- guar- guar-guar- anteed debt guar- anteed debt anteed debt anteed debt anteed 
debt bank if 
anteed 
debt • bank 0/ 
anteed 
' debt bank a/ 
anteed 
debt bank ±1 
debt debt debt debt 
Argentina , , 3.05 2.42 5.54 
Brazil 8.99 9.62 18.60 
Mexico 8.08 4.82 12.89 
Subtotal 20.12 16.86 37.03 
Chile 3.73 0.55 4.47 
Colombia 2.09 1.34 3i43 
Peru 2.07 0.92 3.00 
Uruguay 0.52 " o.oé ' 0.68 
Subtotal 8.41 2.89 11.58 
Other countries b/ 2.98 0.01 3.11 




















































Source« World Bank, World Debt Tables, September 1977 and supplements for July, September, October and November 1977; 
Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report and Press Review, June and December 1977; International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, January 1978, and estimates by CEPAL. 
Notet All the figures refer to the debt actually disbursed as at the end of each year. The State-guaranteed debt 
includes only medium- and long-term debts. The non-guaranteed bank debt is that contracted without State 
guarantee with foreign commercial banks operating in Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy 
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States, and with branches of 
United States banks operating in the Caribbean and the Middle East. These figures are probably underestimates, 
as they only include partial information on the operations ef extra-national financial centres. Apart from this 
underestimation, the estimates ef the total indebtedness do not include non-guaranteed suppliers' credits. 
a/ Including debts to the IHF. 





MffiER COUNTRIES OF THE D£VEWS>MENT ASSISTANT COHfOTTEEt SET FINANCIAL 





1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
(a) Billions of dollars 
Total net financial flows 11.0 17.8 19.7 24.6 28.0 40.4 40.5 43.7 
Official development aid 6.0 7.7 8.5 9.4 11.3 13.6 13.7 14.8 
Private disbursements a/ 4.2 8.0 9.6 12.8 14.5 23.6 23.7 25.9 
Other official flows 0.8 1.3 1.5 2.5 2.2 3.0 5.3 3.0 
(b) Percentage of gross national product 
Total 0.77 0.80 0.77 0.79 0.81 1.05 0.97 0.92 
Oficial development aid 0.44 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.31 
Source« OECD, Development Co-operation, 1977 Review, November 1977, p. 164; 3JF, Survey, 3 July 1978, P° 200. 




KEKBEB COUHTOIiS OP DAC AMD MULTILATERAL AGENCES^/i GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OP NET FINANCIAL 
FLOWS TO CERTAIN NON-OIL^ EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTOIES (N0CEVQ3) 
(Billions of dollars) 























LANOCO countries b/ 4.18 0.75 18 6.70 0.90 14 
Africa c/ 2.78 1.73 62 8.87 4.14 46 
Asia d/ 4.29 2.62 6l 6.a 3.62 58 
Oceania 0.54 0.38 70 0.67 0.57 85 
Europe e/ 1.83 0.37 20 2.30 0.42 18 
Source» OECD, Development Co-operation, 1977 Review. 
a/ Multilateral aconoioa whose flows are wholly or partly on non-consessionary terms (concessionary element less than 
25$) are not included. 
b/ In the case of South America and America in general unspecified amotmts were included as corresponding to LANOCO 
countries. . 
c/ Excluding Gabon, Nigeria and Algeria, 
d/ Excluding the Middle East and Indonesia. 
e/ Including Cyprus, Gibraltar, Greece, Israel, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
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Table 18 
AVERAGE TERMS OP STATE-GUARANTED LOANS AND CONCESSIONARY FACTOR, BY REGIONS 
Loan commitments 
Region Year Maturity Grace , . period 









Africa south of 
the Sahara 
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
North Africa and 




























































































Source» World Bank, Annual Report, 1978 (p. 131). 
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Official development assistance by the member countries of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has gone down from an annual average 
of 0.44% of their gross national product in the 1960s to 0.31% in 1977, 
and it will probably continue falling. . 
Projections made by international agencies indicated that for the 
years 1976-1980 official development assistance' by the member countries 
of DAC would tend to represent a decreasing percentage of their gross 
national product. This forecast has been more than fulfilled, since the 
proportion projected for 1976-1980 was 0,33%. 
In the United States, whose behaviour is of particular importance 
for Latin America, the proportion of the gross national product accounted 
for by official development aid was 2.79% in 1949, when the Marshall Plan 
began, falling to 0.53% in 1960, 0.31% in 1970 and 0.22% in 1977, the 
projection for 1980 being only 0.21%. 
Moreover, the percentage of concessionary elements in the net financial 
resources transferred by the DAC member countries and multilateral agencies 
to the non-oil-exporting Latin American countries shows a tendency to fall. 
In 1976 the concessionary factor in the State-guaranteed loans 
obtained by Latin America was lower than in similar loans to'any other , 
region of thei world. • 
The marked change which has taken place in the last ten years in 
the source of credits for the Latin American countries has also considerably 
affected the duration of the loans. As already stated, credits from official 
sources tend to be of longer duration, and in certain extreme cases the 
amortization payments have even been renegotiated. In contrast, since 
1975 the credits from private sources have generally been of a shorter-term 
nature (one to seven years) and up to the end of 1977 only in exceptional 
cases were they for more than seven years (see table 19). 
Even if the level of indebtedness had remained constant, the annual 
amortization payments, which increase in inverse relation to the average 
duration of the loan, and the payments of interest would have increased 




PUBLICIZED EUROCURRENCY BANK LOANS, BY MATURITY TIMES , 
(Percentages) 
1978 
1974 1975 1976 1977 (second 
ha l f ) 
Industrial ized countries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
. 1 - 3 years 3.2 8.0 5 .5 1.2 3.1 
3 - 5 years 11.6 36.7 27.5 10.6 5 .3 
5 - 7 years 30.6 39.0 54.1 63.0 11.0 
•ver 7 years 50.7 8 .1 4.4 19.0 75.8 
Maturity not known 3.9 8.1 8 .5 6.2 4.7 
Developing countries 
1 - 3 years 1 .9 5.7 2 .3 3.9 2.6 
3 - 5 years 13.6 62.9 53.6 19.5 3.8 
5 - 7 years 18.5 24.1 30.6 63.8 25.9 
Over 7 years 62.5 5.0 4.7 8.6 65.3 
Maturity not known 3.6 2.2 8 .9 4.2 2.4 
Source» World Bank, Borrowing in International Capital Markets, December 1977, pp. 94 and 95, and September 
1978, pp. 153 and 134. 
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Normallys as already noted, the deadlines for repayment of private 
loans,without State.guarantee are shorter than those for State-guaranteed 
loans. The rapid increase in the former must therefore have brought about 
a fall in the average duration of loans, but even in the case of guaranteed 
loans the proportion from private sources, generally of shorter duration 
than those from official sources, has grown too. Consequently, although 
there are no. reliable data on the average duration of loans, everything 
clearly points to a deterioration in this respect. 
Table 18 shows how the average duration of State-guaranteed loan 
commitments in Latin America fell from 14 years in 1969 to 10.4 in 1976. 
The fall is, even.more striking if account is taken of the total indebtedness 
and not just that accounted for by State-guaranteed loans. Moreover, the 
same table shows that the average duration of loans in Latin America is 
the lowest of all the regions considered. 
The liquidity conditions on the Eurocurrency market in the first half 
of 1978 facilitated access to longer-term credits, but even so the Eurocurrency 
bank loans to developing countries for periôdê of over 7 years represented 
a lower percentage of the total publicized credits granted to those countries 
than the corresponding figure for the industrialized countries (see table 19). 
It seems clear that the availability of longer-term loans on the 
Eurocurrency markets will depend essentially on the degree of liquidity of 
those markets, i.e., oh the circumstances of the lender rather than of the 
borrower. It could well be that the more a borrower country wants to extend 
the duration of its loans the more difficult it will be for it to do so, as 
the market will take the unsatisfactory structure of the country's indebtedness 
as a negative indicator. 
One way of facilitating à change in the structure of loan maturities 
might be to increase the issues of bonds by the Latin American countries 
in the exterior. Only a few Latin American countries have made use of bond 
issues to any substantial extent. Thus, Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela are 
already established bond issuers, but the rest of the Latin American 
countries have either not made use of this form of financing at all, or 
else only to a negligible extent. 
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The countries supplying capital have laid down limitations on access 
to their markets in accordance with their own domestic policy needs. These 
limitations, together with the fact that investors in bonds are not 
generally financial intermediaries with direct knowledge of or close 
contacts with the issuing countries, make it difficult to penetrate these 
markets.26/ 
If to this general picture we add the protectionist tendencies which 
are to be seen in the main world markets and which are considered in 
Chapter II of the present document, it becomes even clearer that in the 
process of opening up to the exterior it is necessary to take into account 
the fact that the growing external indebtedness often involved in this can 
only be dealt with successfully in the medium term through a rapid expansion 
of exports. 
5. Conclusions 
The magnitude of the international imbalances, together with the 
process of opening up to the exterior, in which a number of the countries 
of Latin America are involved have increased their needs for external 
financing. 
The growth of Latin America external indebtedness has enabled the 
region to play a balancing role in international economic relations. At 
a time when the world economy has shown marked weakness, Latin America's 
economic growth rates have been relatively buoyant, although this has 
involved quite a heavy sacrifice in the form of external imbalance. These 
growth rates have been possible because a considerable part of the external 
imbalance has been financed. If this had not been so, the region would 
have been obliged to apply much more drastic external adjustment measures 
which would have reduced its demand for goods from the rest of the world 
and would therefore have helped to aggravate the situation of relative 
26/ On this subject see the document of the Joint Ministerial Committee 
of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund on the transfer of real resources to the developing 
countries (Development Committee), Seminar on Access to Capital 
Markets, Paris, 11-13 October 1978. 
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weakness and sometimes even of outright deterioration of the level of 
world economic activity. If this latter event had taken place, the drop 
in Latin America's, growth rate would have, been even greater. 
Although the Latin American countries have been able to play this 
balancing role in international economic relations by having recourse to 
private financing markets, the fluctuations in world rates of exchange 
and interest rátes do not guarantee the continued expansion of these -markets, 
so that the growth of their exports have become a key element in the 
economic strategy of the Latin American countries. Such growth will enable 
them to sustain both their growing external indebtedness and the greater 
activity of the world economy. 
In order to ensure the growth of Latin American exports, the domestic 
policies of the countries are not enough. An expanding world economy is 
also required, together with a steady reduction of the tariff and non-tariff 
barriers set up by the industrialized countries. If these conditions are 
not fulfilled, Latin America's growth rates could suffer more than they '* 
have done in the recent past, unless some great increase in the trade among 
developing countries could fill this vacuum. This seems improbable, 
however, in view of the magnitudes involved, so that if world trade does 
not recover its dynamism and if the industrialized countries maintain or 
even increase their present protectionist tendencies, Latin America 'could 
be forced to look inward again, as it had to do during the Second World 
War and the decade following it. 
kow, however, Latin America will undoubtedly have to place more 
emphasis on intra-regional trade and carefully appraise the short-, medium-
and long-term costs and benefits of the various courses of action open 
to it in the field of external protection. 
/Chapter V 




REGIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
1. Recent factors influencing co-operation 
Economic co-operation among Latin American countries should be evaluated 
from two complementary angles. First, consideration should be given to 
developments in connexion with de facto integration, i.e., the intensity and 
structure of intra-regional trade and forms of co-operation concerning specific 
aspects which have either emerged or considerably increased in the last few 
years. Secondly, developments in connexion with Latin America's formal 
integration processes should be reviewed. 
The complexity of a balanced appraisal is evident if it is taken into 
account that in the de facto integration there has been a significant increase 
in the degree and variety of the links between countries, while in the formal 
integration processes there have been considerable delays and problems in 
attaining the established objectives. In addition, the co-operation effected 
through specific agreements, actions or projects is regarded as complementing 
that effected through the multilateral and institutionalized integration 
processes in operation; and this complementarity makes regional co-operation 
more dynamic and permits a wider distribution of its benefits. 
In carrying out this appraisal it is also necessary to take into account 
the recent evolution and medium-term prospects of -the world economy. The 1975 
world recession marked the starting-point of a period of slower growth and has 
intensified protectionist trends in the developed countries. It may be assumed, 
therefore, that the greater difficulties in exporting to other regions which 
the Latin American countries now face are not transitory but long-range 
situations, as noted in another chapter of this study. In view of these 
problems, the regional market is an important potential source of dynamism 
which the Latin American countries can use in the next few years to achieve a 
faster and more sustained rate of growth and a more active transformation of 
their production structures. Despite the short time since these world problems 
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began to make themselves felt, and also the shortage of information, the 
criteria included later in this study regarding developments in intra-regional 
trade in recent years would seem to confirm this important potential role of 
regional co-operation. 
On the other hand, the international difficulties have also, to a greater 
or lesser extent, affected the countries of the région. Several of them have 
faced serious balance-of-payments problems and have had to adopt emergency 
measures to restore external stability. In some cases they have restricted 
imports, which has affected the imports from the region itself. More 
frequently, however, the restrictive measures have been applied less intensively 
to regional imports than to those from outside the region, so that the former 
has retained a certain preference. . . 
Another factor which may affect the potentialities of integration is the 
recent decreases in the tariff margins of preference owing to the fact that 
several countries have adopted trade liberalization policies. All these factors 
should be taken into account in taking stock of the recent progress made in 
economic co-operation in the region and in gaining a full idea of its prospects 
for the coming years. 
2. Real integration. Évolution of intra-regional trade 
(a) Total volume of inter-Latin American trade 
In spite of the problems encountered by the formal integration processes, 
the real links between Latin American countries have continued to be vigorously 
strengthened, as shown by the high rates of growth of intra-regional trade and 
its increased share in the total. Between 1960 and 1977, exports by Latin 
American countries 27/ to the region rose at an average rate of 42.7% annually 
(2.7 times the growth rate of exports from outside the region) to a total value 
of 7,687 million dollars in 1977. 
The share of exports to the region in total exports rose from 8.0% in 
1960 to 16.7% in 1977, when they attained the highest proportion ever (see 
table 20 and figure 1). 
27/ 18 Latin American countries are considered; 11 LAFTA countries, 5 CACM 




LATIN AMERICA a/8 EVOLUTION OF EXPORTS BY DESTINATION 
I960 1965 1970 1974 1975 1976 1977b/ 
Share of Latin American exports in to t a l world exports 
Latin America a/ 6.2 6 .3 4.9 4.7 4.2 4.2 4.5 
Inter-Latin Amerioan exports as a percentage of to ta l exports 
Latin America a/ 8.0 10.3 12.6 14.7 16.4 16.2 16.7 
Argentina 15.8 16.7 20.8 24.2 25.8 26.9 25.4 
Brazil 7.0 12.7 11.3 12.3 14.4 12.7 12.8 
Mexico 2.9 6.0 8.8 12.9 13.0 14.0 13.8 
CACM 8.2 18.0 28.0 29.4 28.2 24.5 21.8 
Rest of Latin America c/ 6.2 10.5 14.6 18.7 20.7 19.2 20.5 
Andean Group d/ 7.6 7.6 8.4 11.7 14.0 13.3 13.9 
Andean Group df and Chile 7.6 7.7 9.2 12.4 15.1 15.1 16.1 
Source» Foreign trade s t a t i s t i c s , and International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade» 
Note» Any differences that may be noted between th is table and others in ear l ier chapter are due to 
the fac t that a more restr ic ted definit ion of the region has been considered here, including 
mainly countries participating in integration processes. 
a/ Comprises 18 countries» 11 LAFTA countries, 5 CACM countries, Panama and the Dominican Republic, 
b/ Provisional f igures . 
c/ Comprises 9 countries» 4 from the Andean Group (excluding Venezuela), Paraguay, Uruguay, Panama 
and the Dominican Republic. 








In 1977^exports to Latin America from nine countries of the region 
represented over 20% of their total exports, and those of other countries 
between 10 and 20%.28/ Exports from the Central American Common Market (CACM) 
to Latin America reached its highest proportion in 1974, subsequently 
decreasing mainly owing to the lesser relative dynamism of trade within that 
group of countries. The vigorous growth of trade within the Andean Group 
continued, as did the trend towards a more moderate growth in LAFTA. 
The vigorous increase in intra-regional trade may be attributed mainly 
to three factors: (i) the effect of the integration processes in operation 
in Latin America; (ii) the export promotion policies implemented by Latin 
American countries; and (iii) the new forms of co-operation between pairs or 
groups of countries, encouraged by the greater mutual knowledge gained by 
entrepreneurs and governments of various Latin American countries. 
The industrialization of the countries in the region has given rise to 
greater possibilities of complementarity between their economies, which has 
sustained the rapid expansion of intra-regional trade. 
The increase in inter-Latin American exports is particularly significant 
if consideration is given to the steady decline in Latin America's share of 
world trade and the difficulties currently affecting the world economy. 
Between 1960 and 1977 Latin America's share in world exports dropped from 
6.2% to "+.5% (see table 20). The increase in the proportion of exports to 
Latin America in relation to the total was particularly marked in 1975, the 
year in which the effects of the world recession made themselves felt, and it 
subsequently remained high, with a slightly rising trend. In other words, in 
a period of general economic recession the Latin American market played 
an important role in maintaining a more rapid rate of growth; and although the 
growth rate of exports to Latin America also dropped in real terms, the 
decrease was smaller than that of sales outside the region. Among the 
countries which took most advantage of the regional market to cushion the 
28/ The first group comprises Argentina (25.3%), Ecuador (34.1%), El 
Salvador (22.9%), Nicaragua (24.1%), Paraguay (27.2%) and 
Uruguay (34.3%). In the second group are Brazil (12.8%), Colombia 
(16.6%), Guatemala (19.8%), Honduras (12.2%), Mexico (13.8%), 
Panama (16.3%) and Peru (17.3%). 
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effects of the external difficulties, mention should be made of Brazil, Peru, 
Ecuador, Colombia ând Costa Rica. In 1975, these countries' intra-regional 
exports developed along much more favourable lines than their extra-regional 
exports. This also occurred, on a lesser scale, in the case of the intra-
regional exports of all the other countries, of the region except three, 
(b) Structure of intra-regional trade 
Intrâ-regional trade is also important because of its structure. 
Manufactures 29/ clearly account for a larger proportion of exports to the 
region than of sales outside Latin America» In a group of LAFTA countries 30/ 
for which up-to-date information is available, in 1976 manufactures represented 
53.1% of their sales to the region and 23.1% of their sales outside the region 
(see table 21). This happened in countries of different sizes: thus, for 
example, manufactures represented over 45% of total exports to the region in 
Argentina (52.1%), Brazil (57.6%), Colombia.<65.3%) and ..Uruguay (48.1%). 
These proportions are appreciably higher than in the case of exports to other 
regions. 
Of the manufactures themselves, those with the highest industrial value 
added and produced with the most advanced technology represent a higher 
proportion of exports to Latin America than of sales to the rest of the world. 
In this same group of LAFTA countries, in 1976 intermediate goods industries 
and metal manufactures and machinery industries accounted for 77.3% of exports 
of manufactures to the region, compared with only 39.6% of exports to the 
rest of the world. In 1961, in contrast, the two proportions were more 
similar: 32.9% and 30.3% of sales to the region and to the rest of the 
world, respectively (see table 22). 
Traditional industries in the six LAFTA countries referred to have recentl; 
accounted for a small proportion of total sales of manufactures to the region 
(18.9% in 1976), whereas in 1961 they accounted for a very high proportion 
(64.6%). This change, which has come about gradually, does not mean that the 
volume of traditional exports has decreased, but that exports of intermediate 
goods, metal manufactures and machinery have increased more rapidly (see 
table 22). 
29/ According to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), 
partially refined petroleum, petroleum products and non-ferrous metals 
are not included. 
30/ Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. 
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Table 21 
GROUP OF LAFTA COUNTRIES a / : SHARE OF MANUFACTURES b/ IN SALES 
INSIDS AND 0U3SIDE THE REGION 
(Percentages) 










1961 29.2 70.8 100.0 7 .7 92.3 100.0 
1965 30.5 69.5 100.0 7.4 92.6 100.0 
1970 44.4 55.6 100.0 13.3 86.7 100.0 
1974 60.9 39.1 100.0 23.2 76.8 100.0 
1975 58.4 41.6 100.0 22.4 77.6 100.0 
1976 53.1 46.9 100.0 " 23.1 76.9 100.0 
Source» LAFTA, foreign trade s t a t i s t i c s . 
a / Comprises the following countries fo r which data are available« Argentina, Brazi l , Colom-
bia , Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay« 
b/ According to the Standard International '..'rade Class i f ica t ion (SITC); pa r t i a l ly refined 




GROUP OF LATFA COUNTRIES a/ : STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES b/ 
BY MARKET OF DESTINATION ' ' 
(Percentages) 
1961..-. 1965 1970 . 1974 1975 1976 
1.. To the. LAFTA market 
Products of the metal manufactures and 
machinery industries and intermediate 
goods industries ' 32.9 63.3 • 70.6 •77.2 77.4 77.3 
Products of traditional industries 64.6 30.9 24.0 19.0 18.1 18.9 
2. To the rest of the world 
Products of the metal manufactures and. 
machinery industries and intermediate 
goods industries 30.3 30.8 31.1 37.1 42.0 39.6 
Products of traditional industries 69.2 67.3 65.9 59.3 54.5 57.6 
3. Exports of manufactures as a proportion 
of total exports 
To the LAFTA a/ market 22.9 ' 30.5 44.4 60.9 58.4 53.1 
To the res t of the world 7.7 
• ; 1 
7.4 
? 
13.3 23.2 22.4 23.1 
• Sourcet LAFTA, foreign trade s t a t i s t i c s . 1 . . . , 
Notes The difference between these part ial data and 100?° i s accounted for by miscellaneous manufac-
tured products.. , , • • \i 
a/ Comprises the following countries for which data are availablej Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Para 
guay, Peru and Uruguay. ' - ' 
b/. Aocording.to.the Standard International Trade Classification (SXTC); part ial ly refined petroleun, 
petroleum products and non-ferrous metals are not included. . 
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This different composition of sales of manufactures to the region and 
outside itj which is also observed individually in the large, medium-sized and 
small countries, lends significant support to the efforts to develop and 
diversify industry and exports of manufactures. Thus in 1976 the metal 
manufactures and machinery industries and .intermediate goods industries of 
Argentina produced 76.1% of its exports of manufactures to LAFTA, compared 
with only 40.4% of its exports to the rest of the world. Brazil, for its 
part, recorded 80.2% and 42.1%, respectively, for the same industries and 
destinations. 
Viewed from a different angle, the regional market absorbs a high 
proportion of the total exports of the metal manufactures and machinery and 
intermediate goods industries. In 1976, 45.6% of the total exports of these 
goods by the five LAFTA countries mentioned above were destined for the 
region (see table 23). 
It may be observed that there are marked differences in the evolution of 
the destination to which these countries have sent their exports of such 
goods. Thus Brazil, after a, strong tendency towards the regional market (64.4%) 
in 1965, has increasingly turned to extra-regional markets for these exports 
of manufactures^ however, in 1976 Latin America still represented a considerable 
share of its. total external market. ' 
Argentina, on the other hand, has tended to associate itself increasingly 
with the region in the export of intermediate goods, metal manufactures and 
machineryj in 1976 it sold 60% of these goods in the region. As a general rule, 
the linkage with the regional market tends to be closer in the case of incipient 
exports of manufactures involving more advanced technology. 
The regional market's loss of relative importance in certain exports of 
manufactures would Seem to be associated with a situation which may be of 
great interest to those countries seeking to include more advanced manufactures 
in their export goods. Preliminary research indicates that the regional market 
has served as a testing ground for many new exports, particularly those of a 




GROUP OP UFTA. COUHTRIES! RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL MARKET IN TOTAL 
EXPORTS OF INTERMEDIATE GOODS AND METAL MANUFACTURES 
AND MACHINERY TO ALL DESTINATIONS 
(Percentages) 
1961 • " 1965 1970 • 1974 1975 1976 
Group of 5 LAFTA countries 26.1 55.8 53.9 50.3 50.0 45.6 
Argentina 28.9 43.4 55.9 65.9 56.4 60.0 
Brazil 20.1 64.4 50.9 39.2 45.8 35.8 
Colombia 31.2 49.2 57.0 56.3 54.4 58.5 
Peru 46.3 34.6 56.0 67.5 49.8 70.5 
Uruguay 66.7 63.6 86.5 43.1 90.6 87.9 
Rest of the world 73.9 44.2 46.1 49.7 50.0 54.4 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources LAFTA, foreign trade s t a t i s t i c s . 
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According to the results of investigations made in specific sectors of the 
metal manufactures and machinery industries, several countries of Latin 
Americas including the largest countries, started to export these types of 
goods primarily to other Latin American countries. Thus, all or a high 
proportion of these early exports were destined at first for the regional 
market. After a few years, once the manufacturers had gained sufficient 
experience, they began to place an increasing proportion on markets outside 
the region, which brought down the proportion destined for the regional market. 
Thus, the regional market provided support in the early years for the 
development of production and exports, which subsequently made it possible 
to conquer other markets. 
Table 24 shows, in fact, that of a number of exports of metal manufactures 
and machinery by the most important exporting countries of LAFTA the proportion 
sold in that regional market has gradually diminished, especially since 1965. 
This trend is even clearer from an analysis on the basis of products (for 
example, electric generators, office machines, metal-working machines, etc.). 
The trend of exports by transnational corporations, however, is not always so 
marked. 
This role, which the regional market still seems to be playing in the 
case of new, industrially and technologically more complex exports, is highly 
interesting as a basis for an export diversification policy. It makes it 
possible to progress towards the sale outside the region of goods for which 
there is more dynamic demand, with important effects in terms of internal 
industrial and technological development. 
In contrast with the great importance of the regional market for exports, 
nine-tenths of Latin America's imports of manufactures still come from outside 
the region and only one-tenth from other Latin American countries. For example, 
in 1974, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico imported between 20 and 50% of the non-
electrical machinery they required, but in none of these countries was more 
than 1% of the demand satisfied with products from the region. These three 
countries also imported approximately 20% of their electrical machinery 
requirements, but only 1 to 2% was supplied by Latin America. As regards 
transport machinery and equipment, none of these countries obtained from the 
/Table 24 
Table 24 
SOME LAFTA COUNTRIES« IMPORTANCE OF THE REGIONAL MARKET FOR EXPORTS OF METAL MANUFACTURES AND MACHINERY 
(Value in millions of dollars and percentages) 
1961 1965 1970 1974 1975 1976 
Per- Per- Per- Per- Per 
Value 
Per-
Value cent Value cent Value cent Value cent Value cent cent 
. age* age" age" ag§" age" age" 
Argentina 
Metal manufactures and machinery 
industries 6.1 91°8 23.0 72.2 104.9 68.4 550.2 70.6 473.0 59.6 501.5 62.6 
Machinery (except electr ical) 1.6 87.5 10.0 63.0 48.2 66.8 188.1 . 74.0 214.8 63,6 182.9 68.5 
Electrical machinery 1.9 94.7 2.7 88.9 8.7 88.5 47.2 79.4 37.8 79.9 37.0 78.6 
Transport equipment 0.2 100.0 1.3 84.6 10.2 99=2 135.8 67,5 146.7 54.2 144.4 66.4 
Other 2.4 91.7 9.0 75.6 39.8 56.5 179,1 : 67,1 73.7 48.0 137.2 46.4 
Brazil 
Metal manufactures and machinery 
industries . 14.5 55.2 67.1 78.5 205.2 55.6.. 847.0 45.1 1 141.1' 48.5 1 213.6 38.0 
Machinery (except electr ical) 2.8 s i r s 9.2 79,3 69»? 282.1 53.0 425.9 50,0 388.6 T$J 
Electrical machinery 0.2 100.0 . .4.5 • 93,3 17.6 76.1 189.2 28.6 172.0 41.5 203.6 32.4 
Transport equipment 8.1 50.6 7.3 87,7 14.6 34.9 176.0 55.1 298.6 47.8 330.2 41.8 
Other 3.4 64.7 46.1 75.5 108.3 47.0 I99.7 40*9 244.6 51.6 291.2 27.8 
Colombia 
Metal manufactures and machinery 
61.3 64.1 industries 2.3 56.5 • 57.5 9,0 61.1 5 9 ^ 57.5 54.6 67.8 
Machinery (except electr ical) 0.7 71.4 •1.3 53.8 3.7 64.9 19.6 58.7 18.4 84.2 24.0 70.8 
Electrical machinery 0.8 62.5 0 .3 66.7 0.9 55.6 6.7 76.1 6.8 70.6 6.1 86.9 
Transport equipment 0.7 28.6 0.1 100.0 0.6 50.0 5.4 - 59.3 7.1 47.9 8.2 48.8 
Other ° 4 , 100.0 2.3 56.5 3.8 60.5 27.8 51.8 •22.3 59.6 23.0 56.5 
Mexico 
Metal manufactures and machinery 
362.0 industries 20.9 9.1 44.1 27.0 176.0 17.5 _ 405.7 20.6 323.8 O0O • 0« 
Machinery (except electr ical) 5.5 18,2 8.8 30.7 49.6 - 36.1 123.0 30.7 J 184.5 e 0 e / 199.0 00 « 
Electrical machinery 1.0 10.0 2.2 54.5 54.0 5.7 44,9 14.0 
% I 
Transport equipment 3.2 3.1 .1,9 15.8 24.2 60 2 132.4 7.8 85.4 000 90.O 00« 
Other 11.2 6 .3 31.2 24.7 48.2 17.2 105.4 16.0 53.9 000 73.0 00» 
Source» LAFTA, foreign trade s ta t is t ics« Manufactures of petal manufactures and machinery industries according to the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC). 
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region more than 0.1% of their total demand for units, parts and spare parts. 
While these sectors rely heavily on the Latin American market for their 
exports, on the other hand supplies are unquestionably obtained from outside 
the region insofar as the proportion not produced locally is concerned (see 
table 24). 
This apparently paradoxical situation is the result of two deficiencies 
in the economic structures of the countries of the region which they are only 
gradually overcoming: first, these economies are still exporting a very low 
proportion of their manufacturing output and, secondly, they are still 
dependent on imports from the developed world for their supplies of manufactures 
involving more advanced technology. In this respect, a "supply gap" has been 
talked about, and it has been maintained that integration and mutual 
complementarity between the Latin American economies is a feasible and 
effective means of overcoming those structural deficiencies. 
(c) Equilibrium among the countries 
The unequal benefits obtained from integration by the various countries 
constitute one of the factors that has done most to hinder this process, the 
adoption of new decisions and the implementation of those adopted. Countries 
at a more advanced stage of industrial development are in a position to export 
to the region on a larger scale than the less advanced countries, which leads 
to disequilibrium in the volume and structure of regional trade. Therefore, 
the problem lies basically in the relationship between countries of differing 
size and stage of development. The existing trade instruments, though 
important, have proved insufficient to compensate for concentrating trends 
generated by differences in the production structure. Experience shows that 
it would take a fairly long time to create the necessary competitive production 
capacity in countries now lacking it, and that preferential trade treatment 
alone is not sufficient to accelerate industrial development in the less 
developed countries. 
The trade balance of the smaller countries (Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
the Central American countries, Panama and the Dominican Republic) and Peru 
with the region have been consistently negative. In contrast, the three 
largest and most industrially developed countries (Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico) have, in all but a few years, accumulated surplus balances in their 
/trade with 
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trade with the rest of Latin America (1,040 million dollars in 1977). 
Moreover, these balances have been increasing in absolute terms and in 
proportion to exports.. 
Another aspect of the disequilibrium in intra-regional trade derives 
from its structure. The most industrialized countries are in a position to 
export to the region goods involving more advanced technology. The small 
and medium-sized countries have' not yet succeeded in exporting more complex 
manufactures on any great scale, and if they do it is generally to neighbouring 
countries at an equal or more backward stage of development. The quantitative 
disequilibrium existing in intra-regional trade thus tends to be accentuated 
by the qualitative disparity. It should be remembered that the demand for 
moré complex manufactures is growing more rapidly than that for products of 
the traditional industries. Therefore, the existing trade deficits may well 
increase unless the countries manage to. change the asymmetrical nature of 
intra-regional trade.. 
3. Formal multilateral integration processes 
The problems impeding the progress of the integration processes in 
Latin America are only too well known. The design and implementation of the 
general multilateral formulas - with the exception of the Andean Group once 
the crisis caused by Chile's withdrawal had been overcome - have .proceeded 
at slower rates than originally expected, except in their initial, stages. 
Trade carried out independently of the LAFTA and CACM integration systems 
progressed more.rapidly than that generated by the instruments of the systems 
themselves. In spite of the greater relative importance of intra-regional 
trade in the total volume of trade, in the majority of the countries it still 
represents a lower proportion, which is no incentive to governments to reorient 
their economic and trade policies in line, with the requirements of this trade. 
Furthermore, national enterprises have only just started to operate actively 
in the market of other Latin American countries, with some exceptions, and are 
at a distinct disadvantage with respect to transnational corporations. 
/The attempt 
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The attempt to solve the .problems arising from, the different stages of 
development of the various countries, and to make more rapid and extensive 
progress in the subregional groups that had greater decision-making powers, 
led to the establishment of the Central American Common Market and the Andean 
Group. In the latter, set up to create the conditions which in the longer term 
would enable more rapid progress to be made in integration with the more 
developed countries, the members centred their attention on seeking a greater 
measure of real integration among them.: The relatively less developed 
countries belonging to the Eastern Caribbean Cdmmon Market (ECCM) have also 
sought to obtain through this system a fuller participation in the Caribbean 
Community and Common Market (CARICOM). 
The cases of Honduras in Central America and Bolivia in the Andean Group 
reveal the difficulty of solving the problem of equilibrium. In spite of their 
efforts, these countries have not managed to keep abreast of the others, and 
still less to narrow the gap between their stage of development and that of 
the other members of their respective groups. 
In the Andean Group the proportion of exports to Latin America in relation 
to its total exports has grown faster since 1970 than in any other integration 
system, as c o t í be seen in table 25. In the rest of the LAFTA countries 
- decisively influenced by the major countries, Argentina and Brazil - the 
proportion has increased moderately in the course of this decade. Table 26 
shows that the percentage represented by intra-regional trade in the rest of the 
LAFTA countries has not increased since 1965, and has even fallen in relation 
to 1970. In Central America the effects of the recession that started in 
1969 still persist, and since 1970 trade among countries of the area ceased 
to expand as vigorously as before, to the point where it lost some of its 
relative importance In 1976 and 1977, although these economies continue to 




LAtm AMERICAS'-SHARE. OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS WITHIN EACH INTEGRATION SYSTEM 
^ (Percentages) 
I960 • 1 9 6 5 1970 1975 1976a/ 1977b/ 
Latin Anerica (18 countries) """ • 
Regional exports/total exports 8.0 10.3 12.6 . 16.4 16.2 16.7 
Regional imports/total imports 9.8 14.1 13.3 11.7 14.6 15.9 
LAFTA (11. countries) • .. . . 
Regional exports/total exports 7.7 9.0 10.3 13.3 13.4 14.3 
Regional imports/total imports 9.6 12.9 11.2 11.0 12.6 13.8 
Andean Group c/ 
Regional exports/total exports 0.7 1.2 2.2 3.3 4.2 4.9 
Regional imports/total imports 1.0 2.0 2.9 3.5 , - k'B 5.3 
Andean Group of and Chile 
Regional exports/total exports 1.5 2.0 2.8 5.1 5.3 6.4 
Regional- imports/total: imports 2.2 2.9 4.0 6.5 ' 6.8 7.1 
CACM (5 countries) 
Regional exports/total exports 7.0 17.4 26.1 24.4 21.1 19.2 
Regional imports/total imports 6.4 . 15.2 - 24.2 17.9 • 18.5 18.9 
CARICOM (4 countries) , -
Regional exports/total exports 3.9 3.6 4.2 7 .2 6.7 1 6 .3 
Regional imports/total imports 4 .5 ; 3.4 2.6 ' 7.3 6.5 7.0 
Sources CEPAL, on the basis .of o f f i c i a l foreign trade s t a t i s t i c s ; LAFTA; and IMF, Direction pf Trade, 
Notes Latin America (18 countries)s 11 LAFTA countries, 5 CACM countries, Panama and the Dominican 
Republic. " 
a/ Provisional f igures, 
b/ Estimates. 
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1965 65.6 4.1 36.6 10.4 2.1 21.9 100.0 
. 1 275.3 
1970 64.5 4.6 40.9 15.0 2 e 2 18.3 100.0 
1 917.4 
1973 66.2 6.3 37.0 10.9 3.1 19.8 100.0 
3.533.3 
1974 66.7 7.6 34.6 9-1 3.1 21.1 100.0 
5 896.4 
1975 6 6 o 7 7.3 33.9 9.2 3.7 20.4 100.0 
5 915.4 
1976 d/ 68.1 9.3 36.4 9.9 3.2 18.8 100.0 
6 608.0 
1977 e/ 68.0 9.3 35.9 9.8 2.5 19.7 100.0 
8 139.0 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of o f f i c ia l s t a t i s t i c s , LAFTA, and IMF, Direction of Trade. 
Note» The figures represent trade within each system as a percentage of the total for Latin 
America. Trade between the systems was obtained by subtraction. 
_a/ The Andean Group comprises 5 countries» Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
b/ CARICOM comprises 4 countries» Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, 
c/ Latin, America comprises 23 countries» 11 LAFTA countries, 5 CACK countries, 4 CARICOM 
countries, Panama and the Dominican Republic. -




Trade between countries belonging to different subregional integration 
systems have also increased significantly in absolute terms. It should be 
noted, however, that the share of trade between systems in. the total for 
Latin America has not increased greatly in the present decade (see table 26). 
There is little communication between the systems and they are, not, yet, taking 
full advantage.of the regional trade and co-operation potentialities, which 
could be translated into practical results if economic relations among all 
the countries were diversified and intensified. The relations of CACM.and 
CARICOM with the rest of Latin America are particularly, limited. . ,. 
Some indirect effects of the integration processes, however, have been 
greater mutual knowledge among the countries of the region, closer links 
between their public and private sectors, greater facilities in terns of 
regional trade documentation and formalities., a considerable improvement in 
internal transport and communications networks, and the development of , 
financial systems in support of intra-regional., trade. Although these effects 
cannot be ascribed strictly to the integration processes, it is clear that 
even in LAFTA -.despite the limited progress that has been made for some years 
in the process itself - meetings of entrepreneurs and governments have 
gradually brought about a favourable change in the way in which the regional 
market is being taken into account in-the formulation of trade, investment and 
production policies. Trade in items.not subject to any integration decision 
has increased, which is important not¡only in quantitative but also in. 
qualitative terms since it includes manufactures and even turn-key plants 
which are exported almost exclusively within the region. Mention should also 
be made of the setting-up of joint enterprises between countries, the 
establishment of branches of enterprises of one country in other 
countries of the. region, technical co-operation, etc. (see later in this 
chapter the section on new forms of co-operation). From this point of view, 
the indirect effects of the integration processes have supplemented the 
greater incentives provided by the governments' export promotion policies 
and the modifications in exchange policies which have made-exports more 
attractive, . , . . - . 
• /The two 
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The two main types df instruments used in the integration processes 
- trade liberalization and programming - are reviewed briefly below. A 
short account is also given of the salient aspects of policy co-ordination, 
(a) Trade liberalization 
The liberalization of intra-regional trade has shown fairly successful 
results in the Central American Common Market, and is being equally successful 
in the Andean Group. Central AmericI made active progress in the lowering 
of trade barriers before this was done by any other integration system in 
Latin America. The proportion of intra-area trade reached a higher level than 
in any other group of countries, in relation to both total exports and 
domestic production. The share of manufactures in this intra-area trade was 
substantial and influenced industrial development and the import substitution 
process in these countries. During the 1970s, however, the effect of the 
difficulties experienced in the process became evident. 
In the Andean Group, in spite of the countries' specific problems and 
claims, active and extensive progress has been made in Implementing the 
automatic liberalization process, and has started to be reflected in an 
increase in this intra-area trade. Although in some cases the rate of 
elimination of non-tariff barriers has been slowed by balance-of-payments 
problems and practical difficulties of implementation, their gradual 
elimination is envisaged within fixed periods of time. 
In LAFTA the National Schedules of products on which tariffs were to 
be lowered had an important effect on intra-area trade during the first few 
years; subsequently, the process was hindered by a lack of political will. 
From the moment that progress in these Schedules became slower, the growth 
of trade in items on which tariffs had not been reduced, that relied above 
all on export promotion policies, was greater than that of trade in items 
that had been subject to liberalization. No significant progress has been 
made in the reduction of non-tariff barriers, but with some transitory 
exceptions the countries have tried not to extend the trade restrictions they 
have had to use owitig to balance-of-payments difficulties to negotiated goods. 
In the last few years the policy of across-the-board tariff reductions which 
some member countries of LAFTA had introduced for their imports has considerably 
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decreased the preference margins granted, as will be seen below. Thé member 
countries have not yet reached agreement regarding forms of compensation for 
the effects òf such reductions ; nor have they Succeeded in establishing 
machinery for the automatic liberalization of tradè, and progress in respect 
of the Common Schedule has been limited. • 
In CARICOM J as in the Andean Group, internal trade liberalization has 
been accompanied by a common external tariff and special régimes for the less 
developed countries. In actual fact, integration efforts in CARICOM have 
beèn primarily aimed at the trade liberalization process. This"group's 
intra-regional trade has until recently developed along very dynamic lines, 
but with greater benefits for the larger countries than for the small East 
Caribbean islands. The nèèd to' give fresh impetus to industrial development 
is making itself felt in the area, for which purpose other machinery in 
addition to trade liberalization will be required. ' ' • -
^k) Programming instruments and the harmonization of pòlicies 
Industrial programming, which aimed at specialization in spearhead 
sectors that would permit advantage to be taken of the size of the regional 
market' and afford the less developed countries réal opportunities within the 
integration process, met with greater difficulties and delays than was 
originally expected. In LAFTA thè industrial complementarity agreements have 
been'prepared with the considerable participation of enterprises, especially 
transnational corporations; the purpose of some is to distribute markets, 
and of others to facilitate the exchange of short-term surpluses or shortfalls. 
The advantages of these agreements are not extended to countries not 
participating in them, except those at a relatively less advanced stage of 
development. Complementarity agreements have been concluded basically between 
the major countries; although the relatively less developed countries 
automatically enjoy the benefits of thèse agreements, they have been unable to 
take advantage of them except in very limited form, as (save to some extent for 
Ecuador) they lack the competitive industrial capacity required. Because of 
their fairly flexible application, complementarity agreements could be used mud 
more intensivély and permit the fuller participation of national enterprises, 
inasmuch as such enterprises have gradually assumed a more active role in 
intra-area trade. 
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In the Cartagena Agreement the primary aim of industrial programming 
was the development of new sectors. The three agreements already signed 
(covering the metal manufactures and machinery, petrochemical and motor-
vehicle sectors), and those currently under consideration provide for 
instruments that vary in each according to the individual sectors' requirements 
The process of putting into practice the relevant projects under the three 
programmes adopted is necessarily slow owing to the time involved in the. 
negotiation and maturity of these investments. Moreover, there have been 
delays connected with the entry of Venezuela and Chile's withdrawal from the 
Agreement., which had to be taken into account in assigning sectors of 
production to the various countries. The other programmes envisaged but not 
yet adopted (covering the chemical, electronic, telecommunications, 
pharmochemical, steelmaking and fertilizer sectors) require much smaller 
investment and their approval is expected to be a simple matter- With the 
approval of these programmes and the Andean Court of Justice, the Andean Group 
has completed a first stage of basic decisions which would enable it to enter 
the next phase of negotiations with other countries or groups,pf countries in 
the region with a view to the co-ordinated development of industrial sectors. 
As regards the régime for Central American integration industries, much 
less progress was made than in trade liberalization. Some important new 
industries were established, but it was not possible to achieve a more general 
implementation of this system line with the possibilities of the. subregional 
market. 
. In CARICOM no machinery was established to co-ordinate industrial 
development in the area, and.industrial growth was achieved mainly in the 
traditional branches of industry. 
In many cases it has been difficult to bring about the harmonization of 
policies to any great extent, and this is generally regarded as one of the 
last phases in the integration process. One of the most successful examples 
has been the harmonization of foreign investment policies in the Andean Group 
by means of.decision 24, modified by decisions 37». 37A and 102. Such 
harmonization, in defining common rules for the treatment of foreign 
investment, ensures that such investment, and in particular the transnational 
corporations, will adapt their activities to the lines of strategy laid down 
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by the countries, and prevents the competition among them to attract 
investment from weakening the.position of individual countries in 
negotiations with transnational corporations.. . At the same time, it makes 
for greater stability in the treatment of foreign investment in the five 
countries, which is considered a favourable and important point by both 
the countries themselves and the transnational corporations.. Preliminary 
research indicates that the Andean system for the treatment of foreign... 
investment has not driven such investment away from the area; on the contrary, 
it has increased vigorously in the last few years, although not all the , 
countries.appear to have benefited to the same extent. Both CACM and CARICOM 
have made progress in the harmonization of fiscal regimes, 
(c) Conclusion of LAFTA transition period 
The adaptation of the Montevideo Treaty has taken on fresh urgency with 
the conclusion of the transition period (article 2 of the Treaty, modified 
by article 1 of the Caracas Protocol) established for bringing the free trade 
area into full operation (in respect of "substantially all" their reciprocal 
trade). 
Resolution 370 (XVIJI) adopted at the eighteenth session of the 
Conference of the Contracting Parties of LAFTA (November 1978) instructs the 
Standing Executive Committee to carry out during 1979 the preparatory work . 
for the restructuring of LAFTA. According to the aforementioned resolution,, 
this work should cover the following pints: 
"(a) Capacity of the present structure of LAFTA to give impetus to the 
regional economic integration process s . • . . 
. (b). Effectiveness of the liberalization programme and auxiliary machinery 
(in particular, complementarity, agreements); 
(c) Structure and trends of trade in negotiated products and its 
relationship with intra-regional trade and total trade of each of the 
Contracting Parties; 
(d) Result of the system of support for economically relatively less 
developed countries; 
(e) New economic integration formulas and mechanisms for promoting 
this process in the region; 
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(f) Legal and economic implications of the conclusion of the transition 
period; proposal of suitable measures to overcome them: 
(g) Bases for the legal and institutional restructuring of LAFTA 
(h) Procédures facilitating the convergence of LAFTA and other economic 
integration systems in Latin America: and 
(i) Some aspects of area development policies (formula for commitments 
based on an analysis of the possibilities of adopting action agreed ón by 
the Parties, especially in the production and trade fields)." 31/ 
The result of this preparatory work will be reviewed at an extraordinary 
session to be convened at a high government levèl with the object of 
consolidating the indispensable agreements for the restructuring of LAFTA. 
The negotiations will culminate in a meeting of the Council of Ministers, 
which should take place not later than 31 July 1980. 
The conclusion of this transition period affords the opportunity to 
consider, together with an extension of the period, a possible improvement 
of the process that would enable operational flexibility to be adequately 
combined with the provisions orienting future negotiations with a common 
framework. 
In the last few years some factors have not favoured the moré intensive 
use of instruments of the Treaty, nor economic integration among the niember 
countries. A particular factor is the reduction in área preferences as a 
result of across-the-board tariff reductions introduced by some member 
countries. Added to this is the effect of subregional preferential machinery 
and to a lesser degree, of piecemeal arrangements with exclusive preferences for 
the smaller countries in their relations with the major'countries of the area. 
The general tendency has been to use procedures and instruments of a bilateral 
nature or by groups of countries rather than multilateral machinery. These 
facts do not mean a lack of interest in regional relations, but are the result 
of the search for more expeditious and specific links between countries or 
groups of countries in respect of objectives, sectors or concrete projects. 
31/ The text in parentheses has been added by the CEPAL secretariat. 
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In a fairly large number of cases (perhaps a little over 50%) the 
changes in customs tariffs introduced by member countries have affected the 
preferences negotiated in the National Schedules. It may be estimated that 
in a certain number of cases the reduction in the margin has not entirely 
eliminated its operational potentiality. Among those cases in which the 
reduction of duties on imports from all countries has affected area preference 
margins the following situations are identified: (i) where the area preference 
left in force a residual duty on imports from the area, there would be some, 
possibility of restoring at least a proportion of the preferences concerned 
by means of additional reductions in the customs duties applicable to the i, 
area, without altering the new levels established for third countries5 
(ii) where there is no residual duty on imports from.the area, there is no 
possibility of restoring the preferences concerned by means of additional 
reductions in the customs duties applicable to the area; in this ease, the , 
re-establishment of some margin of preference would entail a review of the 
duties applicable to third countries; tiii) where the negotiated customs duty 
for the area may be higher than the new levels for third countries a 
paradoxical situation arises: (iv) in some cases advantages which are granted 
to relatively less developed,countries but are not extensive to other countries 
or liberalization programmes contained in complementarity agreements, may. have 
been affected. 
To restore the effectiveness of LAFTA instruments in promoting the 
expansion and diversification of area trade is a matter which merits -the 
attention of the signatories of the Treaty. There is also need for a.certain 
degree of harmonization of policies and instruments in order to provide a 
coherent and stable operational framework within which flexibility will be 
compatible with the fulfilment of commitments and respect for the interests of 
all, without prejudice to the possibility of dealing with particular situations 
and emergencies, by means of special measures and procedures and some exceptions 
duly provided for and regulated.. As regards the.nature of the negotiations, 
the objective would be not only a certain dismantling of the tariff system in 
favour of intra-area,trade, but the maintenance of an adequate and stable 
preference margin to bring about the desired effects.. 
A . Forms-
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Forms of co-operation in specific aspects ; 
From various points of view it has been said that some integration 
systems in Latin America have entered a phase of virtual stagnation or are 
experiencing serious difficulties as a result of the chronic failure to 
comply with commitments assumed in the respective Treaties or the obligations 
deriving from the integration organ's decisions. Concurrently with the 
relative weakening which, to a greater or lesser extent, Latin America's 
global integration systems have recently been experiencing, however, a 
vigorous trend may be noted towards the expansion of economic co-operation 
among countries of the region through piecemeal action of a specific nature. 
Generally speaking, such action is not explicitly provided for by the 
machinery incorporated in the existing global regional or subregional 
integration systems, although in each case consideration might be given to 
the possibility of incorporating it in view of the flexibility of the global 
agreements. Some of the main areas of joint action recently undertaken by 
two or more Latin American countries in connexion with trade, infrastructure, 
production sectors, technological development and financial co-operation are 
reviewed below, together with some information concerning the main forums or 
machinery used by the countries of the region to promote such action in 
addition to or by way of supplementing the activities assigned to the formal 
integration systems. 
In the field of intra-regional trade, to which the main instruments 
incorporated in the existing formal integration systems relate, the past 
decade has marked some slight resurgence of bilateral agreements, in 
especially between countries in the southern Cone of Latin America» the 
formal conclusion of these agreements has frequently taken place within the 
framework of LAFTA. A first form of action and probably the most advanced 
in this field consists of agreements establishing a bilateral programme of 
trade liberalization, with bigger preference margins and shorter time-tables 
for the signatories than those established by LAFTA. These instruments comprisf 
the agreements concluded between Argentina and Uruguay in August 1974, between 
Uruguay and Brazil in June 1975 and between Brazil and Paraguay in December of 
the same year. Another form of action in this field comprises agreements 
designed, through tariff and non-tariff concessions, to intensify reciprocal 
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trade, in products included, in special lists, which is of interest to the 
signatory countries; among these are the agreements concluded between Bolivia 
and Paraguay in 1974 and between Chile and Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay, and 
Chile and Uruguay, in 1975. , A third form of action which has given rise to 
a larger number of agreements consists of commitments involving pluriannual 
supplies of basic commodities between Latin American countries; these 
agreements, which constitute the main specific integration experience in the 
agricultural field, lead to substantial trade flows and more efficient 
production planning, providing more certainty regarding the subsequent sale 
of commodities. Brazil, for example, has actively, promoted this type of 
arrangement, and has current commitments for the purchase of wheat from 
Argentina and on a lesser scale from Uruguay, and natural gas (and possibly 
steel products, nitrogenous fertilizers and cement) from Bolivia. Brazil has 
also attempted to promote trade co-operation with some bordering countries 
such as Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, through financial and. technical 
assistance in carrying out studies on the Brazilian market for products from 
those countries. A fourth form of trade co-operation which has been attempted 
between some Latin American countries comprises arrangements designed to 
promote direct purchases between the public enterprises of those countries. 
The integration of physical infrastructure among the Latin American 
countries has shown considerable and persistent progress in the last few 
years, particularly in the transport, communications and energy fields, 
facilitating the expansion of their reciprocal trade and the complementarity 
of their production sectors. Of the 19 interior borders of South America 
considered in a recent report on the subject,32/ only three lack the physical 
infrastructure necessary for linking the centres of economic activity of the 
adjacent countries: Venezuela-Brazil, Colombia-Brazil and Colombia-Peru. 
Road transport is the only means with a continuous physical infrastructure 
almost the whole length of the region,.although the services it offers are 
highly concentrated in the South Atlantic countries. Railway interconnexions, 
in contrast, are confined more to the countries of the southern cone, and 
32/ See Institute for Latin American, Integration (INTAL), "La infraestructura 
y servicios en la integración de América del Sur", Integración 
latinoamericana, No. 25, June 1978. 
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although in general the national'railways show a decrease in the networks in 
service, this is compensated for by increases in the tonnage carried. Inland-
waterway transport is used extensively in the River Plate Basin, on the 
rivers Paraná, Paraguay up to Asunción, and Uruguay on its first stretch and 
in the Amazon basin up to Manaos in Brazil and Iquitos in Peru. Rapid progress 
has been made by the Inter-American Telecommunications Network with only some 
micro-wave interconnexions still to be completed, although the satellite 
system with ground stations has been more widely used. 
In the energy field, joint action is concentrated in the electricity 
sector. In recent years the interconnexion of national systems for the 
transmission of electric energy has continued to expand, together with the 
considerable increase in the number of binational projects for the hydroele.ctri 
utilization of joint river basins, of which the Itaipú project between 
Paraguay and Brazil and the Salto Grande project between Argentina and Uruguay 
are in full process of construction, and those at Yaciretá (Paraguay-Argentina) 
Puyango Tumbes (Ecuador-Peru)-y Laguna Mirín (Brazil-Uruguay) and Corpus-
(Argentina-Paraguay) are still in-an earlier stage. The importance of these 
projects in the development of the energy infrastructure of the region will 
be realized if it is considered that the four binational projects in the 
River Plate Basin alone require a total investment of some 10 billion-dollars. 
In the last few years, economic complementarity among the Latin American 
countries through piecemeal action seems to- have gained significant dynamism 
notably in the production sectors, among-other areas. The predominance of 
foreign investment channelled through large-scale transnational corporations 
whose parent companies are located in industrialized countries has made it 
difficult to determine the volume of investment which enterprises of some 
Latin American countries have made in óther countries of the region. The 
latter process in its turn conceals the existence of other flows of production 
resources based not only on the existence of financial surpluses but on more 
permanent and complex factors such as the entrepreneurial and technological.' 
capacity of countries that have reached more advanced stages of-development. 
The increasing heterogeneity observed among the Latin American countries, as 
a result of the unequal dynamism of their sectoral, economic growth processes, 
constitutes an additional incentive toí-carry out joint action for the 
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development of their production sectors, since in many cases such action 
involves combining the markets, natural resources, technological capacity 
and financial surpluses of the various countries. The influence of large-
scale public enterprises deliberately promoted by the State, or the action 
of subsidiaries of transnational corporations which are expanding from the 
developing countries, has also.helped to intensify this process. 
The question of direct inter-Latin American investment was not 
reflected in the legal instruments of the main integration systems at the 
end of the 1960s, after which "the establishment of enterprises with capital 
originating in the area was proposed within LAFTA (resolutions 99, 100 and 
157), the Agreement of the Régime for Central American Integration Industries 
was approved, and decision 56 was adopted within the context of the Cartagena 
Agreement. These instruments were envisaged as auxiliary measures for the 
liberalization of trade and on the whole produced no significant effects in 
terms of the intra-regional transfer of production factors. As thé integration 
systems began to show signs, of stagnation, and as a result of the stage of 
development reached, the countries of the region redoubled their interest in 
becoming integrated in the world economy and expanding their industrial exports, 
while they became more and more desirous of having larger-scale activities 
and enterprises which could take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the 
expansion of the regional market, and even compete on the international 
markets. • 
According to a recent study on the subject,33/ the annual flow of 
direct investment of Latin American origin, which in 1971 was only 1.5 million 
dollars, grew year after year to the figure of 36 million dollars in 1975. 
Although in absolute terms this may not appear very high, it must be borne 
in mind that these statistics probably reflect only a very small proportion of 
the actual sums invested by the Latin American countries. Much of this 
investment is not covered by government licensing arrangements, for tax or 
accounting reasons, which makes it difficult to distinguish between direct 
investment and the flight of'capital; in other cases it takes the form of 
33/ IWTAL/IDB a Las empresas conjuntas latinoamericanas, Serie estudios 
básicos Ho. 1, Buenos Aires, 1977. 
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non-monetary transfers, or is effected from third countries where the funds 
are deposited for security reasons. In any case, attention is drawn to the 
dynamic nature of the process and its global importance for relatively less 
developed countries like Bolivia and Ecuador,34/ in which this investment 
already represents a significant percentage of the stock of external capital. 
Inter-Latin American investment has shown itself to be very flexible 
as regards the manner in which it is effected. Most of the analyses of this 
process, and of the legal instruments adopted to promote it, suggest the 
advisability of a "joint enterprise" model, with.features designed to 
safeguard !the equitable control and distribution of the company's profits, 
and with a markedly prescriptive bias. The aforementioned study identified 
200 cases of joint Latin American enterprises, many of which do not have the 
same characteristics as the model. It seems that a great many Latin American 
investments in other countries of the region follow a different pattern. 
Among the features of inter-Latin American investment are, of course, its wide 
range of organizational possibilities, the tendency towards association with 
local capital, the participation of public enterprises in large-scale 
investment, and a certain apparent compatibility between the economic structure 
and the sectoral distribution of the external investment of capital-exporting 
countries: which would seem to reveal the influence of their relative 
advantages.35/ Colombia's industrial investment is concentrated in the food, 
textile and traditional chemical industries, while Argentina's investment 
covers basic metals, machinery and equipment and, on a lesser"scale, 
foodstuffs. In terms of its relative participation in the production 
activities of the recipient countries, inter-Latin American investment tends 
to be concentrated in the manufacturing sector. 
This points to the importance which the technological complementarity 
process is acquiring among the Latin American countries. Since traditionally 
the bulk of the technology originates from outside these countries and, like 
34/ In 1974, 70% of the investment approved by the competent body in 
Bolivia and 90% of the foreign investment earmarked for the manufacturing 
sector in Ecuador was of Latin American origin. 
35/ Nearly 70% of Argentina's investment abroad is concentrated in 
manufacturing activities and the remaining 30% in the. banking sector, 
while in Colombia the proportions are reversed. 
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other developing countries, they are compelled to acquire it in highly 
unfavourable markets, in some cases they can only exercise some of their 
rights in connexion with the process of acquiring technology (which they 
frequently use inefficiently or not at all), such as that of selecting the 
most suitable technology from among the available choices, and of so 
negotiating the respective contrasts as to reduce to a minimum the transfer 
of monopolistic income. 
For many years, most of the analyses described the technological challenge 
facing the countries of the region in terms of the acquirement of fairly 
suitable foreign technology. Recent studies show that this is an over-
simplified view and that a great many problems whose solution is important 
for the development process of the countries of the region arise only at the 
time of transfer of such foreign technology.36/ According to these studies, 
the most advanced countries of the region already have a sufficient stock of 
professional capacity to produce a certain internal flow of technological 
knowledge to supplement the imported technology. This, on the one hand, 
facilitates the choice of technology (opening a bigger margin for 
disaggregation of the "technological package" offered by the industrialized 
centres) and, on the other hand, permits the fuller adaptation of imported 
technology to local limitations and needs. This is reflected, above all, in 
a larger volume of domestic expenditure on technological research in an 
increasing number of countries in the region.37/ These efforts will help to 
solve problems of incompatibility between the imported technological design 
and local conditions, facilitating the construction of a "new technological 
package" more .suited to those conditions which could have favourable 
acceptance in other markets with similar features as to geographical conditions, 
scales, types and prices of the factors of production, and institutional 
36/ See the studies of the IDB/CEPAL Programme on Research on Science and 
Technology Questions, in particular working monograph No. 30, i.e., 
Jorge Katz, Cambio tecnológico, desarrollo económico y relaciones intra 
y extrarregionales de la América Latina, August 1978. 
37/ In 1968 Brazil's expenditure on research and development was only about 
300 million cruzeiros annually (at 1975 prices), while its current plan 
provides for an annual expenditure of approximately 6 billion cruzeiros 
(ibid., p. 16). 
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structures, thus generating an important export flow of technology to other 
countries of the region. This could take place through many different 
mechanisms, including direct exports of products with "incorporated" technology, 
the sale of licences to firms in third countries 9 direct investment programmes , 
and even the sale of a complete or turn-key plant. The above study identified 
in a single country (Argentina) 36 cases of sales of turn-key plants, 
associated with a wide range of manufacturing activities, to-the region. 
There are indications that industrial process and turn-key plants are also 
exported on a fairly large scale in other countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. 
The oldest financial mechanisms adopted by the Latin American countries 
to facilitate trade operations within the region are the Central American 
Clearing House (1961) and the Reciprocal Payments and Credit System of LAFTA 
(1965). This System, currently composed of 11 member countries of LAFTA and 
the Dominican Republic, operates through the establishment of ordinary 
reciprocal credit lines with maximum ceilings, in United States dollars, 
between each pair of Latin American central banks. The System started to 
operate in 1966, with the participation of six central banks whose cumulative 
credit lines amounted to 46.7 million dollars, while at present the total 
amount of the credit accorded within this framework is over 1,200 million 
dollars annually. From the time the System was brought into use until 1977, 
operations for 13,794 million dollars were channelled through it; If the 
total volume of operations effected through the System is compared with the 
total volume of intra-regional trade, even taking into account that some of 
those operations only represent financial transfers, it will be seen that a 
large proportion of such trade has been channelled through the System's accounts, 
which has saved the central banks of the region considerable sums in foreign 
exchange and has avoided the use of extra-regional points for effecting the 
transfers, with the resulting saving in commissions, interest and expenditure. 
The Santo Domingo Agreement concluded among the same countries in September 1969, 
with the object of mitigating the temporary balance-of-payments deficits 
incurred by the signatory, countries, supplemented the System with the opening 
of new conditional credit lines freely available to the central banks of the 
said countries, the aggregate total of which increased from 30 million dollars 
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in the first year to 205 million in 1977. • Those countries which have made use 
of the Agreement have emphasized its usefulness, stating that despite the 
relatively modest volume of financing and short maturity periods, they had 
brought considerable relief in situations of liquidity shortage. 
Among the Central American countries an agreement in support of their 
balances of payments is currently in operation. In September 1973 the central 
banks of this group of countries established the system of Latin American 
Bank Acceptances (Aceptaciones Bancarias Latinoamericanas - ABLA), an instrument 
which, besides helping to finance regional trade, can be negotiated in extra-
regional financial markets. So far the placement of such securities in those 
markets has not fulfilled the countries * expectations, a fact which in the 
final report of the sixth meeting of commercial banks of the LAFTA countries 
held in July 1977 was largely attributed to internal factors connected with 
the national tax systems, the fact that there were too few operations over 
the minimum amount required for such placements (25,000 dollars) and the 
uncompetitive nature of the system owing to its costs. 
In the last few years the growing needs of the Latin American countries 
in terms of external financing and the difficulties encountered in obtaining 
access to the sources of official development aid has encouraged them to 
seek other options in the field of intra-regional financial co-operation. 
A number of projects aimed at opening up new sources of financial co-operation 
were thus brought into operation. They include the Latin American Export 
Bank and the Latin American Tourist Bank, both with their headquarters in 
Panama City; the financial organ of the Latin American Energy Organization 
(OLADE) t, and the Latin American Arab Bank with its headquarters in Lima. 
Mention should also be made of the agreement of the Latin American central 
banks to provide support for the liquidity of bonds placed by IDB with the 
central banks of the region. . At the bilateral level, the Investment Fund of 
Venezuela has been carrying out various programmes of regional financial 
co-operation, including a trust fund of 500 million dollars in IDB, and 
another of 25 million in the Caribbean Development Bank. 
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In addition to these informal types of regional economic co-operation 
there are other projects within the framework of more permanent and relatively 
more formalized machinery» Foremost among these, because of its geographical 
coverage and the wide range of its objectives is the Latin American Economic 
System (SELA), which promotes joint action for the development of a specific 
sector or project, with the participation of the countries concerned, through 
the machinery of action committees. In addition to the committee in support 
of the reconstruction of Guatemala, so far SELA has promoted the establishment 
of these mechanisms in the fields of fertilizers, food supplements, artisan-
type activities, low-cost housing, and sea and fresh water products, and is 
working on the establishment of three more committees in the agricultural 
sector, i.e., a region mechanism for information on surpluses, shortfalls and 
prices of selected agricultural commodities; one for grains, seeds, oilseeds 
and fruit; and another for meat and dairy products. SELA has also promoted 
meetings of experts from technical and financial integration organs with the 
object of identifying specific possibilities of co-operation among the various 
subregional systems existing in Latin America. Lastly, as noted in another 
section of this report, it has performed important functions as a Latin American 
consultation and co-ordination mechanism in connexion with the region's 
external economic relations. 
One of the oldest of the partial mechanisms existing for economic 
co-operation among various groups of Latin American countries is the River 
Plan Basin Agreement. Although the main physical integration projects in the 
area covered by this Agreement (the Itaiptl, Salto Grande, YaciretS and 
Corpus hydroelectric complexes which together with the Acaray and Monday 
projects in Paraguay constitute an important focal point of energy 
interdependence) have to a large extent been promoted outside the formal 
framework of the system, in the last few years it has succeeded in bringing 
into operation the River Plate Basin financial fund and promoting various new 
undertakings in other infrastructural and services sectors. In July 1978 
the eight countries of the Amazon River Basin, following intensive but 
relatively brief negotiations mainly stimulated by Brazil, signed the Amazon 
River Basin Treaty aimed at promoting integration and co-operation in an area 
of 13 million square kilometres situated in the heart of South America. 
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Notable among the partial mechanisms with which we are concerned, in addition 
to the Central American Economic Co-operation Committee which has had a long 
and fruitful existences is the Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee, 
an advisory organ of the CEPAL secretariat set up in 1975 which has been taking 
steps to promote co-operation in the health, education, cultural, tourism, 
communications and natural resources fields. 
In recent years, action of various types has been taken to promote border 
integration programmes between countries of the region. These programmes have 
been based on the possibility of utilizing shared natural resources, promoting 
economic development in relatively depressed geoeconomic areas belonging to two 
or more countries, or correcting local disequlibria in border regions. 
Although they are all basically intended to establish transport and 
communications infrastructure and services, they do not necessarily exclude 
joint action in production sectors. Currently in progress are the border 
integration programmes between Colombia and Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador, 
Colombia and Ecuador, Brazil and Uruguay, and the border areas of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile and Paraguay. 
Because of the interesting and dynamic situation involved, it may be 
noted that for some years there have been a great many sectoral bodies in 
Latin America not strictly at governmental level, which carry out co-operation 
activities among institutions and enterprises associated with a particular 
sector in the various countries of the region. Currently operating in the 
energy sector are the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), composed 
of 20 Latin American countries, the Latin American State Petroleum Enterprises 
Mutual Aid Association (ARPEL) and the Regional Electricity Integration 
Commission (CIER). There are also several organizations operating in the 
transport sector, such as the Latin American Railways Association (ALAF), the 
Latin American Highway Transport Association (ALATAC) and the Latin American 
Shipowners' Association (ALAMAR). In the manufacturing and services sectors 
there is the Latin American Industrialists' Association (AILA) comprising 
industrialists' entrepreneurial associations in the LAFTA countries, the 
Latin American Food Conservation Industrialists' Association (ALICA) composed 
of food industries of the LAFTA countries, the Latin American Iron and Steel 
Institute (ILAFA) comprising the respective steel industries, and the 
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Confederation of Tourist Organizations of Latin America (COTAL). In the 
financial sector there are institutions such as the Latin American Association 
of Development Financing Institutions (ALIDE),comprising public and private 
development banks, and the Latin American Federation of Banks (FELABAN) which 
represents the commercial banks of the region. 
The last few years have also recorded increased concern for the 
establishment of regional mechanisms for the joint defence of the marketing 
conditions of some commodities of particular interest to Latin America. 
Among these is the Group of Sugar Exporting Countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean (GEPLACEA) which, while not negotiating on behalf of these 
countries or representing them in the International Sugar Agreement the new 
version of which came into force provisionally on 1 January 1978, performs 
important functions in terms of the exchange of information and technological 
co-operation in the sugar industry. Mention should also be made of the 
Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB), the establishment of which was 
stimulated by the favourable conditions of the world market for bananas . 
between 1974 and 1976; its central objectives include the co-ordination of 
the supply policy of banana-producing countries in order to avoid an over-
supply and drop in prices. In addition, the six major coffee-growing countries 
of the region decided in 1977 to maintain a consultation and mutual support 
mechanism which has been operating unofficially up to the present time. That 
same year, Argentina and Uruguay concluded a meat agreement with the object 
of defending the common interests of both countries with regard to this 
commodity. 
There is little information available on these new forms of co-operation 
among the Latin American countries. It is also too early to evaluate the 
importance of these activities from an economic standpoint, their effect on the 
economic complementarity of participating countries, and their relative 
importance for the respective national development processes. A striking 
feature, however, is the dynamic nature of these new forms of co-operation 
compared with the slow progress of the main integration systems existing in 
Latin America. Consideration of this fact leads to the conclusion that the 
impression that regional economic integration would.seem to be passing through 
a critical period is not entirely correct, since in the last few years the 




ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
(EEC) AND THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL 
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (CMEA) 
A. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
1. The Setting 
Latin America's concern over trade and other economic relations with 
the great industrial centres of the world stems from certain premises about 
the objectives of good relations. The first of these underlying premises is 
that satisfactory economic development levels of the countries of the region 
are dependent on the creation of conditions which will permit the transformation 
of national economic structures and production and further export 
diversifications. Another premise is that the region's future development 
process will depend, in the external sector, on a combination of development 
of new manufacturing sectors for the internal market, a substantially 
increased rate of trade growth, and the acceleration of regional integration. 
The third premise is that a sufficient degree of social maturity and political 
sophistication exist in Latin America and elsewhere for the goal of improved 
income distribution to be generally accepted, even among higher income groups, 
as a reasonable one. 
If these premises are accepted, then it is possible to go a step 
farther and examine the logic, as well as the empirical evidence, that prove 
that the structural transformation of production, the diversification of 
exports, and the improved income distribution being sought will not 
automatically come about in a spontaneous chain reaction once a critical 
mass of self-propelled market forces unite. In reality these forces must 
be complemented by planning and careful preparation for the necessary 
allocations and transfers of technology and other resources. The difficulty 
of doing this does not make it any less important to strive to reach agreement 
among developed and developing countries on arrangements that will eventually 
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facilitate a more rational international division of labour.38/ The urgency 
of adjusting to the new realities of a dynamic world economy is beginning to 
be recognized now in the large industrial centres, including the United 
States, and it is no longer only the developing countries that are talking 
about the emergence of a new pattern of world production and trade. On the 
other hand resistance to change is very strong. 
A study recently made in the United States for the use of the Joint 
Economic Committee of Congress attempts to identify which United States 
industries are likely to face heavy competition in the next five to ten years 
from imports of products manufactured in eight developing countries including 
Brazil and Mexico. The study deals with the growth of imports of certain 
goods over the period 1971 through 1975 and with the vulnerability of domestic 
industries manufacturing the same goods to import competition. It is 
recognized that in the future the United States will confront increasingly 
intense foreign competition in respect of many manufactured products, the 
nature of which will become increasingly sophisticated. The authors see a 
new threat from the advanced developing countries in. that they will be 
competing harder than before for ,sales in third country markets. They 
conclude that the United States will be likely to retain an unchallengeable 
competitive advantage only in products and techniques that are at the very 
forefront of technological development or that require a huge integrated 
market for their creation. Finally they recommend that the growing challenge 
to United States competitiveness be met not through isolated instances of 
adjustment assistance, orderly marketing agreements and protectionism at 
the individual product level, but rather by broad economic measures including 
the maintenance of a high level of employment and a satisfactory growth rate, 
permitting exchange rates to adjust to balance-of-payments disequilibria and 
stimulating domestic investment through tax incentives.39/ 
38/ For a discussion of trade-related structural adjustment, see UNCTAD, 
"Adjustment Assistance Measures" (TD/B/C.2/198), 4 April 1978. The 
related subject of industrial collaboration agreements is dealt with 
in documents TD/185/Supp.3 and TD/B/C.2/'179. 
39/ See Stephen B. Watkins and John R. Karlik, Anticipating Disruptive Imports, 
a study prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee of the 
Congress of the United States. United States Government Printing Office, 
Washington, 197 8. p.3. 
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These recommendations sound very familiar to Latin American ears, for 
the representatives of countries of this region have been expressing the same 
or similar concepts in international forums for quite some time. A recent 
example may be found in the views expressed by regional spokesmen at the 
annual meeting of the-IMF and World Bank. 
The new international division of labour now emerging, which requires 
careful orientation, is highlighting the growing dependence of the United 
States and other industrialized countries not only on trade outlets but also 
on the economic progress of the Latin American and other developing countries. 
The 1978 World Development Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development emphasizes the importance of the developing countries' import 
markets for the industrialized countries 40/ and GATT's annual report issued 
in the same year 41/ points out that the developing countries can continue 
to play the stabilizing role in the world economy which they have been playing 
since 1973 only if they can go on selling freely in the markets of the 
developed countries. The report points to the failure of the developed 
countries' imports of manufactured goods from developing countries to continue 
their previous growth trends, the textile and apparrel industries being the 
most outstanding examples of this phenomenon. This failure is directly 
related to the recent increase in protectionism. 
On the other hand the developed countries' exports of manufactures 
to the developing countries have over the years 1973-1977 shown more dynamic 
growth than trade in such products between developed countries. This is true 
for each of the major industrial areas (North America, Western Europe and 
Japan). 
Despite all the fuss about the emergence of the poorer countries as 
competitors, the fact is that they remain overwhelmingly more important 
as buyers. The GATT report referred to earlier notes that in 1977 Japan's 
40/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World 
Development Report, 1978, p. 16. 
41/ See GATT, El Comercio International en 1977/1978, Geneva, 178. 
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exports of manufactures to developing countries were 10 times the amount of 
its manufactured imports from them and even for Western Europe and North America 
the ratios were five and twp respectively. As for increasing protectionist 
restrictions the report noted that these already significantly increased in 
1977 in industries such as textiles, clothing and footwear in which the old 
industrial countries are at a competitive disadvantage vis-k-vis the 
developing countries, and are now spreading into industries in which the 
developed countries compete with each other and, through chemicals, into 
the advanced technology industries in which they enjoy a comparative advantage. 
In the specific case of United States-Latin American trade relations 
it is not only Latin America's markets for manufactured exports which are of 
great importance for United States employment and prosperity but also those 
for agricultural goods. Exports of United States farm products to Latin 
America in the fiscal year 1977/1978 surpassed the 1973/1974 record of 
2.5 billion dollars.42/ This took place in the context of a 26% increase 
in total United States agricultural exports in the first half of 1978 compared 
with the preceding six-month period.43/ 
Imports from Latin America are important to the United States not only 
because this is how the Latin American countries earn the foreign exchange 
needed to buy from the United States but also because the importation of 
lower-priced goods from developing countries helps to curb inflation and 
avoids the costly maintenance of inefficient industries. 
In order to arrive at a point where practical policy objectives for a 
more rational international division of labour can be drawn up, it will be 
necessary to analyse carefully the estimated total production and export 
potential of the Latin American countries for the. next twenty years. A 
preliminary attempt at this type of analysis has already been made in a recent 
study of Latin America's economic relations with Europe, carried out by 
CEPAL in 1978. 
A similar sufficiently detailed and profound work is required in respect 
of Latin America's trade relations with the United States. . 
42/ United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture, 
25 September 1978, p. 15. 
43/ As reported in The Economist, 16 September 1978, pp. 91-92. 
/2. Short-run 
- 133 -
2. Short-run barriers to long-term goals 
(a) Protectionism in the United States 
One of the most important barriers to the achievement of a more 
satisfactory international division of labour is the resurgence of protectionism 
in the developed countries, following the recession of the mid-seventies. 
The origins of this phenomenon and its prejudicial effects for the Latin 
American and other developing countries have been described elsewhere in 
the text and the present section will thus be limited to reviewing the 
salient points of new and established protectionism in the United States. 
Some recent examples, of interest to Latin America, of the intensification 
of protectionism in the United States are: (i) the establishment of the trigger 
price mechanism for steel products early in 1978, following similar action 
establishing minimum, or "basic" prices for such products in the European 
Economic Community; (ii) the Beef Import Act of October 1978, providing a 
valve to shut off imports of beef when domestic production rises and allow 
them to increase when it falls; (iii) the duty increase and additional 
charge on sugar imports (a proposal to support sugar prices at 15 cents a 
pound through import duties and quota reductions was defeated in the House 
of Representatives in its closing 1978 session); (iv) passage in the Senate 
and House of Representatives of a bill to prevent the President from making 
trade concessions in respect of United States textile and apparel imports at 
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations;44/ and the failure of Congress to extend 
the President's authorization to waive countervailing duties. 
44/ The following quotation from Watkins and Karlik (op.cit., p.7) is relevant 
here: "Under the series of bilateral export restraints in effect with 
most of the developing countries, United States imports of wearing apparel 
grow only slowly in the aggregate, although particular categories can 
increase more rapidly if imports of others are reduced. These shifts 
depend on changes in relative demand and profitability for the various 
items. Thus, the slow growth or in some cases even decline in imports 
of certain types-of apparel reflects not the competitiveness of foreign 
producers but rather the distorting effects of our imports restraint 
system. As for the future; continued restraints on apparel imports 
appear highly likely." 
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Other restrictions of importance for Latin America applied by the United 
States in the past two years affect imports of footwear, of great importance 
to Brazil and of potential importance to Uruguay; television sets, of some 
interest to Mexico5 transport equipment (also of interest to Mexico), and 
shipbuilding items, of importance for Brazil. In the case of footwear the 
United States has shown great concern over the increase in imports, due to 
their anticipated effect on national industry and employment. It may be 
noted, however, that the Wall Street Journal of 27 September 1978 (p.45) 
indicated an increase of 40% in the profits of the United States Shoe 
Corporation in 1978. This is only one corporation, but it is a very important 
one and its situation is one of several barometers of the health of the 
industry. 
Protectionist tendencies in the United States extend noy only to 
agricultural and manufactured products but also to certain mineral products 
which are traditional Latin American exports, such as tin, copper and zinc. 
Bolivia protested the proposed sale by the United States of 45,000 tons of i * 
tin from the strategic reserves stockpile and the figure was subsequently 
reduced in a Senate Committe. The proposal did not pass the 95th Crongress 
which adjourned in mid-October 1978, but it is expected that it will be 
re-introduced in 1979. Another mineral product facing possible new import 
restrictions is copper. North American producers have requested the United 
States International Trade Commission to establish import quotas in order 
to alleviate the depressed condition of United States copper mining. A similar 
situation prevails with respect to zinc. 
Additional information on protectionism in the United States and other 
industrialized countries can be found in the chapter of the present document 
dealing with this subject.45/ 
The Secretariat of the OAS has recently attempted a rough estimate of 
the increased protectionist tendencies of the United States by comparing the 
application of countervailing duty and escape clause actions during periods 
45/ See Part Two, Cahpter II. 
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before and after the 1974 Trade Act. In the case of escape clause action, the 
increase was from 12 instances in 1971-1974 to 38 in 1974-September 1978. 
For countervailing duties over almost the same time spans the increase in 
the number of cases was from 16 to 62.46/ 
A new study of conditions of access to the United States market reveals 
that while the average tariff level is relatively low and only a few types 
of non-tariff measures are applied, nevertheless the severity and effectiveness 
of the latter present a formidable barrier to trade.47/ It has been observed, 
moreover, that in the case of certain light industries with relatively high 
manpower density the effective rates of protection outstrip by far the nominal 
tariff duties. Even if it were not already well known that employment 
considerations are an overwhelmingly important determinant of tariff policies 
in the United States, a detailed analysis of the structure of the tariffs 
and the pattern of their modifications under different rounds of GATT 
negotiations would bring this phenomenon to light. 
In the study referred to, 1,051 tariff headings of export interest to 
Latin America were examined and it was found that for 444 of these the 
effective rates of tariff protection in the United States have been increased 
through the action of non-tariff barriers, including quantitative restrictions, 
sanitary regulations and other measures. Textiles, foodstuffs and other 
light industries are affected. As for agricultural raw materials, out of 
156 headings studied 80 were subject to either quantitative restrictions or 
sanitary regulations. Another group of products studied - processed 
foodstuffs - was subject to non-tariff barriers in an even larger percentage 
of cases, in addition to having a higher tariff level. The textile industry 
is a particularly good example of the effectiveness of non-tariff barriers. 
The Tokyo Declaration which preceded the multilateral trade negotiations 
now drawing to a close clearly states that one of the major aims of the 
negotiations was to benefit the trade of developing countries, improve their 
46/ OAS Secretariat, Note (undated) entitled "Protectionism Trends in the 
United States Affecting Latin American Countries". 
47/ E/CEPAL/L.184. See also Part Two, chapter II of the present document 
which deals with protectionism in developed countries. 
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foreign exchange earnings, favour the diversification of their exports, 
improve prices for their primary comciodity exports and in general improve 
market access for products of interest to such countries. The relief from 
protectionism which Latin American countries had hoped for when the present 
round of MTN got under way has not materialized, however. The products 
subject to more generous reductions by the United States-in the negotiations 
tended to be those that were already subject to a low level of protection, 
while there was no significant change in the situation of those receiving 
higher levels of protection, 
(b) Countervailing duties and subsidies 
After the 95th Congress adjourned in October 1978 without extending 
the President's authority to waive countervailing duties against exports to 
the United States that have been subsidized or dumped, the President informed 
the European Economic Community that he was confident the new Congress would 
grant the extension for several months. The authority for the waiver was 
granted to the President in the Trade Act of 1974 and it was considered 
to be a temporary provision while the negotiations (MTN) were in progress. 
There is fear among developed countries that should Congres not grant this 
extension, a trade war could ensue, and the issue has recently become one 
of the most important and newsworthy ones in United States foreign trade 
relations. 
Traditionally the developed countries have, with some, exceptions, 
considered that government subsidies granted to stimulate exports constitute 
an unfair trade practice - a form of dumping which jeopardizes the interests 
of the importing country.48/ Not all countries have agreed on what constitutes 
an export subsidy or on what type of tax rebates and drawbacks may be made 
by a government without justifying the imposition by the importing country 
of a countervailing duty. One of the generally accepted principles of 
international trade has been that the amount of a tax rebate may not exceed 
48/ A detailed discussion of the traditional positions taken by the different 
trading groups, and the relevant provisions of GATT, may be found in 
CEPAL "Fiscal Incentives for Export", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
Vol. XII, N° 1, May 1967, pp. 33-55. 
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the tax actually paid, and that any excess over that amount is to be 
considered a subsidy. On the other hand, there is the question of what 
types of taxes may be rebated without this representing an export subsidy, 
and there has been considerable disagreement on this point. 
The GATT position on subsidies has until recently been similar to that 
of the developed countries. In 1958 paragraph 4 dealing with this subject 
was added to Article XVI of the Agreement, but most of the relatively less-
developed member countries of GATT have not adhered to this paragraph. 
Although the countries that have not subscribed to paragraph 4 are presumably 
not compelled to abide by its provisions, the member States of GATT that have 
done so may bring a complaint before the organization if they consider the 
granting of an export subsidy by another member State to be prejudicial. A 
glance at the list of practices which, according to GATT, constitute export 
subsidies 49/ reveals that not all indirect taxes can be refunded, but only 
those connected with imports or indirect taxes levied at one or more stages 
on the same goods when sold for domestic consumption. The developed member 
countries of GATT have not been able to agree on how to treat some indirect 
taxes, such as those on fuels and machinery. Moreover some industrialized 
countries have allowed the remission of social welfare contributions related 
to production for export, although this'practice is listed as a subsidy by GATT. 
While there is considerable confusion and some disagreement among the 
countries as to what constitutes an export subsidy, the usual practice 
- particularly among groups of countries comprising economic integration 
areas - has been to authorize the refund of indirect taxes in order to 
correct imbalances in the competitive conditions of the different countries, 
whereas the refund, of direct taxes is permitted in exceptional cases only 
or is not mentioned at all as an authorized practice. The GATT position is 
clear. The third item on its list of subsidies mentioned earlier is "the 
remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes or social 
welfare charges on industrial or commercial enterprises". 




Despite all the expressions of principles concerning subsidies, the 
use of techniques of exemption from, or refund of, direct internal taxes as 
a means of export promotion is common in a large number of countries. 
It should be clearly understood that the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade condemns the introduction of the products of one country into the 
commerce of another at less than the normal value of the products if this 
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory 
of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic 
industry. In other words, if no damage is done, and if the result is simply 
to enable the importing country to buy at a more favourable price, the 
subsidy is not condemned. Similarly the Treaty of Montevideo prohibits 
subsidies that "disrupt normal competitive conditions in the area". 
The present United States legal position concerning export subsidies is 
to be found in Title III of the 1974 Trade Act, Chapter 1 of which is entitled 
"Foreign import restrictions and export subsidies". 
The main provisions of this chapter are the following: The President of 
the United States may take certain steps to eliminate trade restrictions or 
subsidies originating in other countries, including: 
(a) Suspension, withdrawal or prevention of the application of benefits of 
trade agreement concessions; 
(b) Imposition of duties or other restrictions on imports from the foreign 
country concerned, or imposition of fees or restrictions on its services. 
The President may take such action when he determines that a foreign 
country: 
(a) Maintains unjustifiable or unreasonable tariff or other import 
restrictions which impair the value of trade commitments made to the United 
States or which burden, restrict or discriminate against United States trade; 
(b) Engages in discriminatory or other acts or policies which are 




(c) Provides subsidies (or other incentives having the effect of subsidies), 
on its exports of one or more products to the United States or to other 
foreign markets which have the effect of substantially reducing sales of 
the competitive United States product or products in the United States or 
in those other foreign markets, or 
(d) Imposes unjustifiable or unreasonable restrictions on access to supplies 
of food, raw materials, or manufactured or semi-manufactured products which 
burden or restrict United States trade. 
With respect to point (c) (subsidies), the Secretary of the Treasury must 
find that a country has provided a subsidy, or an incentive having the effect 
of a subsidy; the International Trade Commission must find that the subsidized 
exports to the United States have the effect of substantially reducing sales of 
the competitive United States product or products; and the President must 
find that the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 and a relevant section of the 1930 
Tariff Act are inadequate to deter the practice. 
Criteria which may be satisfactory for regulating the trade relations 
of the developed countries among themselves can be inadequate or inappropriate 
for regulating the exports of developing countries. It is necessary to take 
into account the quite different conditions and circumstances prevailing in 
the latter. Just as the world had come to accept the concept of the infant 
industry and its protection through the use of tariffs, acceptance must be 
forthcoming for the infant export activity. Any developing country activity that 
is in the early stages of world market penetration has to overcome a number 
of obstacles connected with the organization of distribution channels, the 
lack of familiarity with foreign markets, the adaptation of its production 
to demand patterns in target markets, etc. In order to succeed in overcoming 
the problems encountered in these early stages, special support is necessary, 
and consequently this case cannot be compared with that of developed countries 
which have already emerged from the early stages of market-winning but might 
still want to apply subsidies. 
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A recent study has held that export subsidization by developing countries 
is perfectly justifiable in certain circumstances and that Latin America's 
development strategy has resulted in unintentional high implicit taxation of 
non-traditional exports, so that at times such exports have actually been 
discouraged, rather than promoted. It was pointed out, for example, that an 
examination of conditions prevailing in Argentina in.the year 1969 shows 
that the combined system of tariffs, taxes, exchange rates and incentives 
made it more attractive for the Argentine producer to sell on the domestic 
rather than on the export market. It is. of particular interest to note that 
some of the economic activities which appear to have had insufficient 
export subsidization to offset the other policy disincentives correspond 
precisely to those categories of goods which are highly import-sensitive in 
developed countries (e.g.,footwear, textiles, optical goods). 
It is believed that other Latin American countries which have followed 
similar development policies and strategies and had over-valued currencies 
have likewise had a built-in, unintentional bias against exports. The 
import-substituting industrialization followed in most Latin American countries 
in the 1950s and 1960s involved policies for the protection of domestic4 
producers against competition from imports, labour legislation regulating 
minimum wages and other rights and benefits, higher taxation of profits 
and personal income, preferential credit,rates for basic industries, and 
other intervention which increased the need for, and cost of government 
services. Such policies, while raising the level of industrialization, 
sometimes led to the taxation of exports of traditional products and indirectly 
made more difficult the competition of non-traditional products in the world 
market. 
' ' 1 
The United States has begun to recognize the need of developing Countries 
to use subsidies, and. it is very important for Latin America that such 
partial acceptance should be consolidated in the United States and should 
spread to other developed countries whose views on the subject have not 
yet matured. The use of export subsidies is an essential trade policy tool 
during the present stage of transition through which the Latin American region 
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is passing as it emerges from the era of exporting only primary products into 
one where it-provides semi-manufactures and manufactures for world markets. 
United States support of the developing countries' position will be very 
important for achieving the necessary change in GATT rules. 
According to recent information from the United States Department of 
Commerce, eventual agreement on the question of subsidies was expected in the 
MTN, based on the existing provisions of the GATT and with emphasis on the 
effects of subsidies and the limitation of those that could result in trade 
distortion.50/ While a new code on subsidies and countervailing duties is 
expected to be one of the results of the MTN, there is no evidence yet that 
it will be along the lines sought by Latin America , i.e., one that would 
establish a special and differential régime for developing countries. On 
the contrary, the development of negotiations so far would appear to point 
to a rather limited outcome. Earlier optimism concerning the possibility 
of achieving the regime mentioned above had been encouraged partly by a clause 
in the Tokyo Declaration dealing with the subject of reciprocity, which 
said, "They recognize in addition the importance of applying differential 
measures to the developing countries, through means that would provide for 
them special and more favourable treatment in the negotiating sectors where 
this might be possible and appropriate".51/ 
3* The United States as a competitor of Latin America 
Just at a time when some of the developing countries are reaching 
"semi-industrialized" status in so far as their general economic development 
is concerned, and just when manufactured products are beginning to achieve 
some prominence among their exports, they find themselves in some cases faced 
with greater competition from the developed countries in the international 
trade area. What are sohie of the ways in which this greater competition 
is expressed? In the case of the United States a Presidential task force 
50/ United States Department of Commerce, Business America, 6 November 1978. 
51/ GATT, "Ministerial Declaration approved in Tokyo on 14 September 1973", 
MIN (73) 1, 14 September 1973, p.5. 
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has recently been working on an export promotion proposal which would increase 
United States sales abroad by 10 to 15 billion dollars over five years. The 
proposal foresees: (i) new export financing, including an increase in the 
capacity of the Export-Import Bank to make loans to foreign buyers of 
United States manufactured goods, as well as improved financing for exports 
of agricultural products; (ii) removal of internal barriers to trade, including 
a suggestion that the Justice Department liberalize its interpretation of 
the anti-trust laws in order to permit United States exporters to form joint 
export associations outside the United States, and a further suggestion that 
the discouraging effects of laws against bribery be examined, and (iii) tax 
incentives. 
Substantiating these proposals, one of the recent objectives set for 
the United,States economy by Mr. G. William Miller, Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board,,is an almost 50% increase in exports over the next five years. 
At the Treasury, Assistant Secretary Bergsten has pointed to United States 
export expansion as one of the two main structural changes now required in 
the economy (the other being a reduction in energy consumption). 
According, to recent press reports President Carter has already accepted 
some of the recomuiendations of the task force arid announced new efforts to 
increase exports from the United States. The programme envisages: 
- An addition of 550 million dollars in the fiscal year 1980 to the 
Export-Import Bank's loan authorization; 
- Targeting 100 million dollars of the Small Business Administration's 
current funds for loan guarantees to small business exporters; 
- Allocating an additional 20 million dollars to the Commerce and State 
Departments for export development programmes; 
- Working with Congress to resolve promptly the tax problems of 
Americans employed abroad; 
- Reducing domestic barriers to exports such as regulations, export 
controls, antitrust laws and environmental reviews. 
With respect to agricultural exports, it is proposed to increase the 
short-term export credit financing of the Commodity, Credit Corporation by 
1-1.7 billion dollars in the fiscal year beginning 1 October. 
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In the light of United States plans to boost future exports, it is of 
interest to see how past export promotion efforts of that country have compared 
with those of other developed nations. 
The United States Export-Import Bank has examined the extent of export 
credit in other industrialized countries (direct and discount loan authorizations 
during 1976, excluding guarantees and insurance) in order to see how United 
States assistance to its exporters compares with that of its competitors to 
theirs. The results were as follows: 
However in the first quarter of 1978 the United States Export-Import 
Bank had already made direct loan commitments amounting to 760 million dollars 
(compared to 700 million dollars for the whole of fiscal year 1977). 
According to the Department of State, "The Bank's immediate goal is to support 
at least 12 million dollars in annual exports from the United States1 .52/ 
As for agricultural market development, until now the United States 
has spent far less than its major competitors. According to a Department 
of Agriculture source, in 1976 Israel spent 15 times more and Australia 
11 times more, the figures being expressed in terms of percentages of farm 
export earnings.53/ Funding for market development comes mainly from the 
private sector and has risen 15% in 1978. The proposed Agricultural Trade 
Act of 1978 foresees expansion of the Government's export promotion programme, 
including its mechanisms for gathering, analysing amd disseminating market 
information. The World Food and Agricultural Outlook and Situation Board 
52/ United States Government, Department of State, Department of State-
Bulletin, Vol. 78, N° 2016, July 1978, p. 38. 
53/ United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture, 
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was created in 1977 to co-ordinate all the Department's economic analyses. 
Despite its past relatively low export promotion profile, the United States 
has remained the world's largest producer and exporter of farm products, its 
annual exports of such goods recently reaching 26.6 billion dollars. 
The Departments of State and Commerce are now exploring the possibility 
of adapting certain export promotion programmes which competitors of the United 
States have been following. Along these lipes, the United States might 
expand its free or partially subsidized market research facilities for new 
exporters of manufactured goods; increase the Government's contribution to 
the cost of participating in certain trade, fairs, missions, centres and shows 
in other countries; finance reverse trade missions; and arrange for large 
firms already established abroad to assist smaller newcomers with technical 
guidance and possibly even storage facilities. 
4. The Generalized System of Preferences 
The main instrument which the United States has employed in recent years 
for executing its trade policies designed to benefit the developing countries 
has been its scheme of the Generalized System of Preferences. The details of 
regulations governing United States participation in this international 
undertaking are included in the 1974 Trade Act and moreover have been analysed 
in earlier documents of CEPAL.54/ Although certain changes in product 
coverage have been made from time to time, the nature of the United States 
scheme has not been significantly altered since it went into effect in 1976. 
With respect to country coverage, Ecuador and Venezuela are still excluded 
due to their participation in OPEC. Cuba likewise has been excluded from the 
scheme. Provisions regarding rules of origin are still limiting the 
eligibility of imports from Latin America and other developing areas. In order 
for a product to qualify for preference under the United States scheme, at 
least 35% of its added value must have originated in the exporting country; the 
figure is 50% in the case of a product with value added in two or more 
54/ E/CEPAL/L.133 of 19 April 1976 and E/CEPAL/L.1024 of 15 March 1977. 
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countries forming part of a trade association or integration area.. The 
restrictive nature of these percentage specifications increases very 
significantly through the fact that the added value is limited, for purposes 
of the law's application, to direct costs. Transport, distribution, profits, 
insurance and other indirect costs are excluded from the 35 and 50% stipulations, 
which results in their becoming much more rigid requirements. A third 
limitation on the effectiveness of the United States GSP is the continuing 
application of the competitive need formula, under which exports of a product 
from an eligible developing country cease to receive preferential treatment 
once they exceed 50% of total United States imports of the article or else 
amount to a ceiling which was established at 25 million dollars in the first 
year and is subject to adjustment thereafter. An examination of the number 
of Latin American country-product cases subject to the formula in 1978 shows 
that it exceeded that for earlier years. Thus, the number of country-tariff 
item cases in 1978 was 123, whereas in 1976 it was only 106.55/ 
It was pointed out at a recent AID Conference on the multilateral 
trade negotiations and trade policies toward developing countries that "the 
competitive need formula ... may sometimes be tantamount to a marginal tax 
rate in excess of a hundred per cent. It may penalize success so heavily as 
to mullify the long-run benefits of the original concession".56/ 
The greatest limitation on the effectiveness of the United States GSP 
has of course been the exclusion of so many products from the scheme. About 
700 United States tariff items have been left out on the grounds that they are 
sensitive and that their exclusion is mandatory under the 1974 Trade Act. 
Many of the excluded items are of actual or potential interest to Latin 
America (textiles, apparel, shoes, etc.). However, the list of exclusions 
which is the longest and the most discouraging is that containing all the 
55/ UNCTAD, "Generalized System of Preferences. Scheme of the United States 
of America, Amendment". TD/B/GSP/USA/5, 17 May 1978. 
56/ Agency for International Development, Bureau for Intergovernmental and 
International Affairs, Trade Policies Toward Developing Countries, 
The Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 233. 
/products whose 
- 146 -
products whose absence from the scheme is discretionary* These products 
have been excluded by decision of the President, after public hearings 
and recommendations by the International Trade Commission, due to the 
possibility of unfavourable effects of imports on United States industries 
and employment. Examples of such products have been provided in previous 
documents. Here it might be mentioned that it is sometimes difficult for 
officials in Latin American and other developing countries to understand 
the reasons for the exclusion of certain products from the preferences scheme. 
An example is the case of wines, which are of export interest to Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile: whereas the United States in 1976 imported a total of 
268 million dollars worth of wines (classified under the three statistical 
items corresponding to these countries exports) less than 1% of this total 
was imported from developing Latin American countries,57/ and more than 99% 
was imported from developed countries. Surely in the case of this product 
the threat to United States production is not coming from the developing 
countries - at least not in the immediate future. Another puzzling case 
of exclusion from the GSP is certain perishable agricultural products imported 
from Southern Hemisphere developing countries in the opposite season to 
United States harvests; Costs to United States consumers could be lowered 
if these products were included in the GSP scheme. 
B. RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC) 
Much of what was said in the previous section concerning a new 
international division of labour is also valid for economic relations with 
EEC. Since this subject is fully examined in a study on relations with the 
Community and the rest of Europe which is to be published shortly,58/ only 
selected features of Latin America's trade with EEC will be mentioned here. 
57/ United States Department of Commerce 3 "United States Imports for 
Consumption and General Imports", FT 246/Annual, 1976 
58/ This study is in the course of preparation jointly by the secretariats 
of the Economic Commission for Europe and of CEPAL. 
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1. Brief outline of Latin America's trade with EEC 
As was mentioned above, the Community continues to be the second 
most important market for the Latin American region, after the United States. 
Moreover, in the two most recent years for which reliable data are available, 
the share of both Latin America and the developing countries as a whole in 
EEC exports increased. It was during the recession that the developing 
countries as a whole increased their purchases, and this provided an important 
boost for economic recovery. 
Some differences have been noted among Latin American countries. The 
greatest increase was recorded in purchases made by Brazil, which became a 
more important market for Europe than the Andean Group, in contrast to the 
situation in 1955. During this same period, Mexico also increased its share 
of EEC exports, while the relative share of Argentina in exports from the 
Community to the region dropped sharply. 
Manufactures represented 88.1% of exports from the enlarged EEC to 
the region in 1975. Between 1973 and 1975 Latin America imported from the 
Community on average three times as many manufactures as Japan, and about 
a third as many as the United States and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA). If manufactures are broken down by SITC sections, it can be seen 
that in some of them the relative importance of Latin America for the 
Community is even greater. Thus for chemicals (SITC 5), Latin American 
imports from EEC amounted to just over half of EFTA imports from the same 
source; meanwhile, United States imports of chemicals represented only 
three quarters of the value of Latin American imports from EEC. Almost a 
quarter of the total exports of chemicals to the developing countries from 
the enlarged EEC were sent to Latin America. 
Latin America is a substantial supplier of basic commodities for the 
enlarged EEC, even though its share of imports from outside the Commmunity 
is slightly lower than total purchases by the Community from the United States 
or Africa; in 1973-1975, the latter provided respectively 16.9% and 15.8% 
on average of purchases of such products outside the Community, while 
Latin America supplied 14.9%.59/ There are many products for which 




Latin America is EEC's most important supplier (iron ore, copper, sugar and 
cotton, for example). For a large group of basic products, their share in 
total EEC imports from Latin America did not change significantly during the 
period studied. Even so, there are major differences between the various 
products, which are linked with problems in conditions of access and other 
conditions encountered by the products in the Community market. 
Almost two thirds of imports of manufactures from Latin America to 
the enlarged EEC fall under sections 6 and 8 of SXTC (excluding division 68), 
which generally cover manufactures other than metal manufactures and machinery 
and chemicals. Latin America's share in total EEC imports of such products, 
compared with other areas, is insignificant, as most of the trade in 
manufactures is carried out among developed countries. On the other hand, 
trade in such manufactures is of importance because of the high degree of 
competitivity in respect of many products in this group acquired both by 
Latin America and other developing countries. In 1974 most imports of this 
type of manufacture from the region to the enlarged EEC were textiles, clothing, 
footwear and other leather products, and iron and steel; these headings 
accounted for a value of 397 million dollars, of which 249 million dollars 
represented textile products and clothing. These imports have grown strongly 
in value from the practically insignificant 1965 levels, and are also of 
importance because they also originate from the relatively less developed 
countries, and not only from the three large countries (Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico). These are the products which encounter the greatest obstacles 
when seeking access to the developed countries. Most of these goods are 
described as "sensitive" under the Community's generalized system of 
preferences. 
The region exports not only traditional manufactures, but also 
manufactures from modem industries, especially from Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico, which sell substantial amounts. In 1975, the sales of six products 
in the metal manufactures and machinery section from Brazil to EEC reached a 
value of 51 million dollars, 26 million dollars of which was made up by 
power generating machinery (SITC 711). . 
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Similar products were exported to EFTA, for a value of 18.5 million 
dollars, with the most important category being road motor vehicles (SITC 732), 
for a value of 13 million dollars. Although no systematic data are available 
disaggregated in this form for previous years, the information at hand appears 
to indicate that these categories are recording substantial growth. 
As was indicated above, Latin American exports to the Community have 
not managed to grow as fast as imports from the Community, especially' in 
recent years, and this has meant that the trade balance with the Community, 
which was positive up to 1970, has tufrned into a deficit. 
2. EEC special preferences 
EEC does not offer the Latin American region specially favourable 
conditions of access to its markets which might have an influence on the 
region's percentage share in Community imports. On the contrary - the 
various agreements signed between EEC and various Mediterranean countries, 
with the signatories to the Lomé Convention - 53 African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries - and with some other "European, Asian and African 
countries have resulted in the creation of a trading block between the 
Community and a very large number of developing or semi-developed countries, 
and this undoubtedly has adverse consequences for the exports of Countries 
outside the block. . ' 
EEC grants non-generalized (or special) most-favoured-nation .trade 
treatment to more than 70 countries.60/ This figure is made up as follows: 
(i) Non-reciprocal preferences granted to the 53 ACP countries which 
signed the Lome Convention, the three Maghreb countries and the four. Mashrek 
countries which enjoy preferential trade, agreements; 
(ii) Reciprocal preferences implicit in the agreements in force with 
the four Mediterranean countries which form a customs union with EEC (Cyprus, 
Greece, Malta and Turkey), the eight member countries of EFTA, and Israel, 
which have signed agreements with EEC for the creation of a free trade • 
association. 




Apart .from these agreements, there, are special agreements with 
individual countries concerning a single product or group of products. They, 
include the agreements with Yugoslavia on beef, and the special agreements 
with members of the Commonwealth to compensate, them for the loss of. customs 
benefits caused by the entry.of three new members into EEC. 
The Lomé Convention in, principle grants completely free access to EEC 
for the products of the 53 AÇP countries (apart from products which are • • . -
subject to the Common Agricultural. Policy), without any obligation of 
reciprocity. This is complemented with three additional agreements on 
industrial co-operation, technical and financial assistance and stabilization 
of export revenues (STABEX). 
A special case is that of sugar, which, although it does not benefit 
under the STABEX system, is subject to a special supply agreement, under which 
EEC guarantees the ACP countries that-it will purchase sugar quotas at prices, 
not below the support prices which are paid to producers within the Communityi 
As far as manufactures are concerned, many of the ACP countries have 
a potential export capacity distinctly lower than that of Latin America. 
Even so, their position compares very favourably with'the position of the 
Latin American countries, since for them accesswhich is totally libéralized, 
is not Subject to the quota system which applies to the "sensitive" and ' 
"semi-sensitive" products under the EEC generalized system of preferences. 
Furthermore, some ACP countries' are already in a position to take advantage 
of this better treatment. The Lomé Convention contains a safeguard clause 
which authorizes restrictive measures applied in such way that they cause 
minimum difficulties to the ACP countries if imports produce "serious 
disturbances in the economy of the importing countryt:. 
The less favaourable treatment which the EEC countries trade policy 
grants to Latin America in comparison with these other 70 developed and-
developing countries- might have greater effects in the future than -in the 
past, to the extent -that the recession causes a deterioration in the markets 
for the goods which are subject to this different treatment. 
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In conclusion5 it may be said that protectionism on the part of the 
EEC countries will be one of the central topics in the negotiations between 
the Community and Latin America in coming years. The negotiations will need 
to take into account in addition the different commercial treatment applied 
to imports originating from the region. 
3. Generalized system of preferences: the EEC scheme 
and its use 
In a document published in 1975, CEPAL carried out a detailed analysis 
of the European Economic Community scheme within the Generalized System of 
Preferences.61/ Since then, changes have occurred in the lists of products 
included in the scheme, but not in the structure or in their importance 
for Latin American countries. 
In the Community scheme for 1978 the base year for some calculations 
of general quotas was changed, but this was used only to compensate partially 
for changes in real values. In 1978 there were no improvements in the amounts 
of the quotas for textile products, and only nine new processed primary 
products were added to the previous 296. 
The scheme proposed for 1979 includes: (i) the addition of 13 tariff 
lines to the scheme, which correspond to processed agricultural products; 
(ii) the reduction of the preferential rate for 14 products of the same 
type; (iii) changes in the quota system for preserved pineapples; 
(iv.) measures to benefit the relatively less developed countries. In addition, 
the proposal provides for a change in the scheme of preferences applicable 
to textiles in order to facilitate the fulfilment of undertakings made in 
the bilateral agreements associated with the Multifibre textile agreement. 
In recent years it has been observed that the EEC generalized system 
of preferences has largely tended to introduce changes which can benefit 
the relatively less developed countries, and it is believed that this trend 
will continue in years to come. There are now few Latin American countries 
which are optimistic concerning an appreciable improvement in the scheme of 
direct interest for them. 
61/ "Latin American development and the international economic situation: 
Second regional appraisal of the International Development Strategy, 
Part Two: The external economic relations of Latin America and the 
international situation" (E/CEPAL/981/Add.2). 
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As far as benefits drawn from the Community scheme are concerned, 
both m 1975 and in 1976 the Latin American countries which drew greatest 
benefit were Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Imports to EEC 
from those countries subject to preferential treatment totalled the following, 
in millions of units of account; 
1975 1976 
Argentina 47 74 
Brazil 162 291 
Mexico 59 81 
Peru 32 19 
Venezuela 1 190 
It should be pointed out that the total for all the beneficiaries . 
was 1,792 million units of account in 1975, and 3,501 million units of 
account in 1976,62/ 
Twenty-five basic products make up about two thirds of Latin American 
exports to EEC.63/ Of these, 16 are subject to the payment of tariff duties, 
and only three benefit from preferences. These preferences take the form 
of only partial tariff reductions, but the margins of advantage over countries 
without preferential treatment are very small. From the outset the EEC 
scheme had the purpose of encouraging the export of manufactures and semi-
manufactures from developing countries, rather than the export of primary 
products. In fact, not only do the latter not enjoy preferences, but the 
Community, through the application of its Common Agricultural Policy, 
strongly discourages exports of many agricultural commodities. 
62/ "Generalized system of preferences: Replies received from preference-
giving countries" (TD/B/C.5/30/Add.4) and "Generalized system of 
preferences: Replies received from preference-giving countries: 
European Economic Community" (TD/B/C.5/30/Add.l2). 
63/ A list of these products appears in "The economic and social 




The express intention of stimulating the export of industrial goods 
from the developing countries has been partially frustrated by the limitations 
imposed by the Community' itself. These limitations take the" form of tariff 
quotas and limits which hamper they entry of liberalized goods once the 
limits laid down have been-fulfilled. Regrettably, some of the products 
affected are precisely those non-traditional export products which Latin 
America has been endeavouring to promote with the aim of cutting down its 
disadvantageous dependence on a small number of export products which are 
subject to sharp fluctuations in prices and international demand. 
Forty-six "sensitive" industrial products are subject to tariff quotas, 
with prior allocation of each quota among the members of the Community. Some 
tariff quotas include a reserve portion, so that the allocation can be 
adjusted in line with the use of the quota. There are 131 !lsemi-sensitiven 
products, and these are subject to limits within the Community. For almost 
all the other non-agricultural products which are described as "non-sensitive", 
the maximum limits laid down by the Community are applied when the product 
changes category as far as "sensitivity" is concerned. Each of the exporting 
countries, in particular, is limited in principle to a given percentage of 
the quota laid down by the Community (the maximum amount constraint), which 
means that none of them can alone export more than 50%, 30% or 20% of the 
limit, depending on the product.- The maximum amount constraint are specified, 
product by product, in the list of goods which enjoy preferences included in 
chapters 25 to 99 of the tariff nomenclature. 
Industrial raw materials are not included among the preferences, but 
in general pay very low or zero duties. 
According to information supplied to UNCTAD by the European Economic 
Community there is a large disparity between the value of imports (from all 
sources) of the products included in the system of preferences and the value 
of imports of the same products which effectively received preferential 
treatment from the Community; the ratio in 1979 was 3:1.64/ Some Latin 
American countries (Brazil, Mexico and Peru) recorded a higher degree of 
benefit, according to the figures supplied by UNCTAD. Argentina's percentage 




Two factors which seriously limit the use of the preferences are: 
(i) the maximum quotas and limits imposed by the Community for certain 
"sensitive" and "semi-sensitive" products, and (ii) insufficient knowledge 
and understanding of the scheme on the part of exporters, to which the 
complexity of its rules contributes. Concerning the first of these points, 
in 1976 five Latin"American countries exceeded the maximum limits laid 
down by the Community (Brazil with seven products * Mexico and Venezuela with 
two products each,.and Argentina and Colombia with one product each). ' All 
the countries benefiting from the scheme, including Latin American countries, 
found their liberalized exports of 23 other products limited, as a Result of 
the quantitative restrictions imposed by the Community.65/ This means that 
in the Latin American countries the products affected by the application 
of this type of restriction within the system of preferences reached 36, 
while the products affected in the developing countries as a whole tota3.1ed 105. 
The 36 products correspond to the following categories: hides and skins, wood, 
cement, yarn, fabrics and clothing, footwear, citric and glutamic acid, 
petroleum products, certain manufactured articles of metal and building 
materials. 
For 13 of the products for which a quantitative restriction under the 
scheme affected a Latin American country or countries, the maximum liberalized 
amount reached less than half a million dollars. For other products, the 
total was 800,000 dollars. And for a third group of products, the limits 
are extremely low compared with the total exports of the "beneficiary1' country 
to the Community (for example, hides and skins exported by Argentina, and 
footwear and planed wood exported by Brazil).-
65/ ;!0peration and effects of the generalized system of preferences: 




4. Protectionism and conditions of access to the EEC 
market 
Obstacles to free access for Latin American exports to the markets 
of the Community occur in various form, varying from one group of products 
to another. 
The special preferences described above affect access for Latin 
American tropical products to the EEC markets. It is largely these products 
which the Lomé Convention countries and others enjoying special EEC 
preferences are exporting in competition with Latin America. Products 
originating from Latin America, on the other hand, are to a large extent 
subject to rather high tariffs under the most-favoured-nation formula. The 
Generalized System of Preferences is usually not applied to primary products, 
and grants only reduced preferential margins to semi-manufactures. Of the 
tropical primary products which feature among the most Important Latin 
American exports, bananas, coffee, cocoa and tobacco pay rather high tariffs, 
compared with the exemption from import duties granted to the ACP countries. 
Furthermore, they are generally progressive as the degree of processing of 
the product increases. For example, coffee beans pay 5.4%, roasted coffee 15% 
and soluble coffee 18%. And much higher rates apply to processed products, 
such as cigars. 
A small number of tropical products pay no duty or very low duties 
(peanuts, copra,: timber). In these cases Latin America would suffer no 
discrimination but for the derived effects of STABEX, which may lead the 
Community to prefer to buy such products from the ACP countries, thus avoiding 
the compensatory payments stipulated in the case of a fall in the revenues of 
such countries; 
On the other hand, various products, principally temperate-zone products, 
which are of great importance among Latin American exports - beef, wheat, 
maize and sugar - are subject to the Community's Common Agricultural Policy. 
This policy protects Community farmers by restricting the import of such 
products by means of a complex system of quantitative restrictions and levies 
of different kinds which tend to cancel the comparative advantages 
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which producers from other regions might have. The Common Agricultural 
Policy has contributed to increasing self-sufficiency in such products 
within the Common Market, and to competition affecting third world producers 
in international markets which receive the surplus production generated 
in the Community as a result of the price support policy. 
In recent years the agricultural surpluses of the Community have 
reached very large proportions (one million tons of stocks of powdered milk, 
and 300,000 tons of butter), while the cost of the support policy for the 
prices of milk products in 1976 was estimated at 2 billion units of account. 
As was said earlier., conditions of access for Latin American exports 
of non-agricultural raw materials are theoretically.good, since the tariffs 
applied to them are low or zero. However, some of these products (iron ore, 
leather, cotton, sisal and abaca) are subject to the STABEX, which, as in 
the case of certain tropical products, the EEC has more interest in importing 
from the ACP countries in order to avoid the countervailing duties laid down 
by this system. With, regard to manufactures, the restrictions on free access 
imposed by the system of quotas and other ceilings, and the treatment of those 
products referred to as "sensitive" and "semi-sensitive,?, has already been 
explained in connexion with the Generalized System of Preferences. 
A review of the conditions of access to the EEC market made by CEPAL 
in 1978 has shown that this market is to a large extent more strongly protected 
than that of the United States or.Japan; apart from the structure of the 
tariff, the non-tariff measures have been designed in such a way that despite 
the wide range of items contained in the present round of multilateral 
trade negotiations, it is not within the competence of GATT to negotiate 
them, thus making it impossible for them to be catalogued and identified.66/ 
The study identifies 23 categories of non-tariff measures, and shows that 
nearly all of them (including many which are not known in the United States 
or Japan) are applied by the Community. These measures ensure that, despite 
the fact that duties are kept at low or zero levels, the effects of the 
protection are not lost. It should be noted that 172 tariff positions were 
analysed in this document, of which 156 were found to be covered by non-tariff 
restrictions. 
66/ "El nuevo proteccionismo comercial y el desarrollo de América Latina", 
(E/CEPAL/L.184), October 1978, p. 59 
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The Community is very representative of .the new protectionism which 
defends a series of products of great interest to Latin America. Although 
the new trends are not explicitly.directed against the region, they affect 
it more severely than other developing areas. Specifically, the main 
immediate damage which this policy causes in Latin America is taking place 
in the textile, clothing manufacture, footwear and leather manufactures 
sectors. Exports to the EEC of other products subject to restrictions 
(steel, metal manufactures and machinery, electronic and transport materials) 
have still not become very important, but they are in the line of the 
natural expansion of Latin American exports'. 
As has been the case with the United States, the relief from 
protectionism which the Latin American countries hoped to obtain under 
the multilateral trade negotiations has not materialized. Taking into 
account the undermining of the Generalized System of Preferences by the 
concessions offered in these negotiations, the net gain for the products 
contained in chapters 1 to 24 of the Customs Co-operative Council Nomenclature 
(ex-BTN) in a reduction of 2 percentage units in the average weighted rate, 
which is equivalent to a reduction in the tariffs obtained of 35.7 million 
dollars.67/ This figure is only a small fraction'of the Latin American 
exports affected by the proposed reductions. For the products contained in 
chapters 25 to 99 the results have been similar, with net gains of only 
0.8 percentage unit in the rate, and of 13.1 million dollars in the 
total tariffs.68/ 
67/ The average weighted rate of the tariff for the products in chapters 
1 to 2.4 dropped from 64%. This difference of 2 percentage units, 
multiplied by the value of Latin American exports of these products 
in 1976, give the total value by which the duties collected are 
reduced as a result of the negotiation. 
68/ E/CEPAL/L.184, op.cit., p. 85. 
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C. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH .THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF 
THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (CMEA) 
1. Growth of trade 
The trade relations of the Latin American countries with the European 
member countries of .CMEA have already become very important, because of 
the number of Latin American countries taking part, the volume and value • 
of the trade involved and also certain qualitative changes which these 
relations have undergone in the course of the years. It may be observed 
from an examination of table 27 that the exports of several Latin American 
countries to European member countries of CMEA recorded relatively high 
growth rates between 1973 and 1977: 225% in Argentina and 152% in. Brazil, 
the two countries with the highest proportion of exports to CMEA; 219% in 
Colombia and 113% in Peru - lower values, but also illustrative of a vigorous 
growth rate; and lastly, 478% in Ecuador, also starting from relatively .low 
values.. Although the number of Latin American countries exporting to the 
European member countries of CMEA has increased significantly, however, 
the mass of these exports (excluding those from Cuba) continue to be 
concentrated in a very few countries: in 1960, Argentina and Brazil supplied 
91% of these exports, and in 1977 the same two countries continued to generate 
75% (still excluding Cuba's exports). The same table shows that exports 
by Peru and Colombia have also, achieved values of some significance. Those 
of the other two countries - Mexico and Uruguay - are smaller and have 
been subject to large-scale fluctuations, while those of Costa Rica - also 
of modest value - have increased notably in the last two years. The high 
degree of concentration of exports by countries of origin is also repeated 
in the countries of destination: in fact, two of them - the Soviet Union 
and Poland - absorbed nearly two thirds of Latin American exports (excluding 
Cuba's exports) to CMEA. If the evolution of Latin American trade with the 
member countries of CMEA is considered, it should be recalled that as from 
1960 Cuba began to engage in active trade with these countries, partly as 
means of mitigating the effects of blockade which some countries imposed 




LATIN AMEBICA: TRADE WITH THE EUROPEAN M3SBE8 COUNTRIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR 
MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (CHSA), 1860-1977 
(Millions of dollars) 









I960 59.6 71.3 2.2 - - 1.0 0.1 8.8 143.0 114.8 258.8 
1965 112.5 89.0 11.5 - - 58.6 16.3 9.9 297.8 395.0 698.0 
1970 73.7 123.0 33.6 6.7 8.4 3.7 32.9 28.4 310.4 628.8 945.8 
1971 68.4 130.0 24.6 3.5 14.1 5.4 53.7 9.9 309.6 412.9 736.9 
1972 59.0 213.0 20.4 5.1 13.1 3.8 46.8 16.0 377.2 330.2 744.2 
1973 134.8 340.0 . 35.9 9.7 12.2 7.9 68.1 37.5 646.1 650.4 1 359.4 
1974 280.7 396.0 43.4 3.2 22.8 15.0 112.9 40.3 914.3 1 233.9 2 237.9 
1975 319.3 759.0 33.4 2.9 31.5 9.8 202.0 29.0 1 386.9 2 193.6 3 658.6 
1976 289.7 896.0 71.2 8.8 46.0 21.4 . 131.7 17.9 1 482.7 eoo • #e 
1977 437.9 858.0 114.6 28.0 70.6 9.1 
Exports 
145.0 38.3 1 701.5 oeo ooo 
I960 48.5 79.6 2 .1 - - • 2.6 1.3 17.0 151.7 93.3 250.3 
1965 31.1 63.8 10.7 - 4.9 2.1 2.1 114.7 »0.0 626.0 
1970 17.5" 58.0 17.1 1.0 4.7 6.2 3.8 8.5 116.8 775.3 920.3 
1971 20=9 109.0 17.5 ' 1.1 5.5 7.2 3.5 4.7 169.4 809»8 996.8 
1972 21.5 92.0 11.0 1.3 5.1 6.8 5.5 2.9 146.1 843.8 1 017.8 
1973 26.8 98.0 14.4 3.2 5.6 9=3 15.5 5.6 178.4 970.0 1 217.0 
1974 57.6 186.0 25=2 4.2 8.8 12.5 24.3 5.3 323.9 1 377.0 1 753.0 
1975 100.3 225.0 15.8 5.9 11.2 20.8 30.© 8.5 417=5 1 717.3 2 175.3 
1976 82.6 268.0 24.6 5.2 7.8 43.1 29.3 10.2 470.8 • o © • ao 
1977 SO.O 253.0 33.2 5.9 9.9 19.0 28=7 21.0 450.7 • o« • c© 
Sourcet International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade. The data on Cuba are from official Cuban sources. The total 
for Latin America includes other countries not listed. 
/agreements which 
- 160 -
agreements which. Cuba signed with the CMEA countries as from the beginning 
of the 1960s. As from 1965, the value of Cuban exports to the European CMEA 
countries has generally exceeded - and in some years has more than surpassed -
the value of the exports of the rest of the Latin American countries to the 
same destination (see table 27) „ 
The evolution-of imports from the European member countries of CMEA 
shows somewhat different features. Firstly, Cuban imports achieved a rapid 
and sustained rate which brought them in 1975 to an amount slightly over 
three times that of 1965. Imports from the rest of the Latin American 
countries quadrupled 1965 imports. The figures in table 27 show clearly that 
the growth of the imports of the Latin American countries as a whole 
(excluding Cuba) has been very slow, and that between 1960 and 1972 the annual 
variations were of little importance; they began to grow at a higher rate 
as from 1973 and up to 1976, but the following year they again underwent 
a slight'decline. The large share of Argentina and Brazil may be seen 
heretoo: it accounted for 85% of total Latin American imports (excluding 
Cuba) from CMEA in 1960 and 74% in 1977. It is however, interesting to note 
that a much larger number of Latin American countries participates in the 
import trade from CMEA countries than in exports to that area, although 
the individual values are relatively small. For example, Barbados, Guatemala, 
Haiti,.Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela and 
Trinidad and Tobago - countries which have very small exports to the European 
member, countries of CMEA - do record imports from these countries, mainly in 
terms of products from Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. 
The breakdown of the trade of Latin American countries with the 
European member countries of CMEA, particularly exports, shows a high level 
of concentration in primary goods, in countries like Argentina, Brazil and 
Colombia, where the export of manufactures to other markets is of some 
importance. Mexico's exports, however, are more diversified, since slightly 
less than half is made up of primary goods, slightly over 40% of semi-
manufactures and the rest is distributed among manufactures; however, as can 
be seen in table 27, the total sum of Mexican exports to the European member 
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countries of CMEA accounts for relatively modest figures with large annual 
fluctuations. The predominance of primary goods in the exports of all 
the other Latin American countries would seem to indicate that it has not 
been possible to achieve the objectives set out in the majority of the 
trade agreements existing between Latin American Countries and European 
member countries of CMEA, aimed at promoting the export of manufactures 
to the latter. Thè breakdown of imports from CMEA shows no particular 
features; capital goods-and other manufactures predominate in them. 
Thé different growth rates of exports and imports from and to the • 
European member countries of CMEA in each of the Latin'American countries, 
and the differences in the tendency and magnitude of the trade balance of 
each does not allow of useful generalizations In this field. 
The surplus of the overall trade balance of Latin America is mainly 
represented by two countries. In the others it reflects the maturing'periods 
which takes place between the moment at which the co-operation agreements 
are signed and the date when implementation of the agreed project begins. 
As was observed when imports were discussed", a- certain number of 
Latin American countries import from European member countries of CMEA without 
exporting to them, with the result that traditionally there is' a deficit 
in their trade balance with these countries. Consequently, the problem 
of the trade balance is very different'for the different countries depending 
on the breakdown of their exports, agreed systems of payment (compensation, 
convertible currencies ór a combination of these), and the nature of the 
commitments acquired in economic co-operation agreements which involve ' 
projects with relatively long periods of implementation. Some of these 
aspects are examined briefly below. 
2. The contractual basis 
The contractual basis - the'set of conventions and greements containing 
general principles and conditions - and the specific modalities of. mutual 
relations are already quite well developed. To date the countries of the 
two regions have signed about 200 agreements covering .trade¿payments and 
economic, technical and scientific'collaboration and co-operation, which 
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form a basis on which to develop trade and other forms of long-term 
economic relations. Under these agreements the countries of the two regions 
grant each other most-favoured-nation treatment and at the same time the 
CMEA member countries have unilaterally granted the Latin American countries 
concessions within the generalized system of preferences, and other facilities. 
The contracting parties have also provided for exceptions to the most-favoured-
nation clause,.bearing in mind participation in economic integration schemes. 
Some countries have agreed to develop direct mutual trade, thus avoiding 
or diminishing trade through intermediaries, taking as a price basis world 
market prices at the time the contracts are signed. With regard to the form 
of payment, as was pointed out above some countries have agreed to undertake 
payment in convertible currencies, whereas others use clearing accounts. 
With a view to creating suitable conditions for the development of 
economic relations,.an effort is being made to achieve greater collaboration 
between the institutional systems of the countries of the two regions. 
In developing their economic relations, the countries of Latin 
America and the CMEA member countries laid the basis for greater collaboration 
and co-operation among the national bodies taking part in trade, the joint 
construction of plants, technological collaboration, etc. The problem 
of participatory agents, in the case of economic relations among countries 
with different socio-economic and political regimes, has been difficult but 
the main difficulties have gradually been solved. The national institutions 
participating as agents are public, private, semi-private, national and 
binational bodies. 
The progress made in economic relations between Latin American countries 
and CMEA member countries both in the creation of a contractual basis and 
in collaboration among institutions opens up more favourable prospects for 
the future. In past decades many prejudices have been overcome and greater 
mutual understanding of the needs and possibilities of each contracting 
party has been achieved. 
Nevertheless, difficulties>and problems still exist. Among the problems 
calling for further study are the disparity between the opportunities provided 
by the contractual basis and the use actually made of them; the delays in 
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ratification of agreements; and the need to strengthen and improve 
collaboration among the national institutions planning, orienting, directing 
or supporting economic relations between the countries. 
To conclude, it may said that the development of economic relations 
between the Latin American countries and the CMEA member countries will 
depend both on factors of a material or economic nature and on political 
factors. 
The contractual basis on which relations between the Latin American 
countries, excluding Cuba, and the European member countries of CMEA have been 
developing has undergone important changes in some respects whereas in 
others they have maintained their characteristic features. The early trade 
agreements signed with Latin American countries in the mid-1950s, using 
the clearing system, wère signed with Argentina and'Colombia and subsequently 
with Brazil. Before the end of the decade, Argentina and the CMEA countries 
replaced these compensation agreements with others which provided for 
payment in freely-convertible currencies. Brazil maintained trade relations 
with Czechoslovakia on the basis of a system of payments in convertible 
currency, and with the other CMEA countries on thé basis of bilateral clearing 
agreements, but as of May 1969 trade with the Soviet Union (which accounts 
for the greatest volume) is in convertible currency. According to unofficial 
information, negotiations are underway for the use" of convertible currency 
in bilateral agreements with other CMEA Countries. In Colombia the experience 
was somewhat similar: the clearing agreements with the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia were replaced by agreements which included systems of payment 
in convertible currencies, but compensation agreements were retained with 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland,' Romania and the German Democratic Republic. 
However, Colombian trade with the European countries of CMEA which is 
governed by clearing agreements is greater than the trade with the countries 
operating in convertible currencies. 
It is clear, then, that the Latin American countries have a clear 
preference for the use of convertible currency arrangements, and this is 
one of the major changes taking place in the process of strengthening and 
expanding economic relations between countries of the two areas. The other 
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major change concerns the nature itself of the agreements, which were at 
first strictly limited to the field of trade relations, but more recently 
have become broader and cover, in addition to trade questions, co-operation 
objectives in different fields of economic and social, development. The 
first of these changes, the gradual advance towards systems of payments in 
convertible currencies, is unquestionably very important, but it would be 
an exaggerated simplification to believe that it would suffice to maintain 
and broaden trade relations and economic co-operation between countries 
of the two areas. In the first place, even in the agreements stipulating 
the use of convertible currencies, the European countries of CMEA have 
stressed the need to maintain balanced trade flows, although this concept 
of equilibrium should be understood as a medium-term objective. Secondly, 
it has been argued that if payment of trade balances in convertible currencies 
was to become the general rule, there might be a long-term decline in 
purchases by European CMEA member countries from the developing countries,69/ 
especially when such exports are products which may. be considered non-
essential. 
In the case of Latin America, the clearing agreements between Brazil 
and Colombia and some European countries of CMEA have been the subject of 
controversy, since one school of thought believes that they represent credits 
granted to the CMEA countries, i.e., financing of their imports, while 
another school argues that they represent a means of promoting exports 
which it would otherwise be difficult to secure. Along these lines, the 
problem of the use of the surplus balances generated by clearing agreements 
should not be solved by attempting to do away with the generation of surplus 
balances, but rather by promoting their use for the purchase of goods in 
the markets of the.countries where they originate, or if that is either 
impossible or undesirable, by promoting agreements which facilitate the 
69/ See "Review of the present state of payments between developing 
countries and socialist countries of Eastern Europe", Report by the 
Secretary General of UNCTAD (TD/.B/AC.2-2/2), 4'October 1977, p. 8. 
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transfer of the positive balances to other CMEA member countries. In any 
case, it would seem that this is a decision which cannot be based purely 
on considerations of the profitability "of financial cost of maintaining 
balances in clearing accounts, since other elements should be taken into 
account, such as whether those exports allow stockpiled surpluses to be 
sold, or the use of partially idle material and human resources, or new 
investment to increase installed production capacity, generating economies 
of scale. In sum, what should be determined is whether compensatory 
agreements constitute means of creating new markets (in which case the 
problem of the use of surplus balances should not be considered purely 
% 
from the financial standpoint) or whether they only serve to substitute 
markets, in which case they should be viewed in another light. 
The problem of systems of payment has been one of the most difficult 
to solve in the economic relations between European countries of CMEA and 
the developing countries. In their Joint Statement at the Fourth Session of 
UNCTAD in 1976, they declared their willingness to reinforce the multilateral 
aspects of trade and economic relations in particular by extending the 
practice of multilateral settlements on the basis of the transferable 
rouble (and in other currencies, by common agreement with the countries 
concerned).70/ The coexistence of clearing-account and convertible-
currency agreements in the trade between Latin American and CMEA countries 
illustrates this situation. However, to give greater practical application 
to the Declaration, the countries of both regions must try to make their 
medium and long-term economic interests converge, an area which has not 
yet been sufficiently explored. 
The developing countries have repeated in various forums and on a 
number of occasions their interest in establishing formal arrangements 
for the creation of a multilateral system of payments with the European 
countries of CMEA,"and to that end they adopted, inter alia, UNCTAD 
resolution 95 (IV) which requested the Secretary General of UNCTAD to convene 
a group of experts to study a system of multilateral payments between CMEA 
countries and developing countries. The work of this group of 
70/ Document TD/211, 28 May 1976. 
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intergovernmental expertss which is of great interest in view of the 
different problems to be solved or considered when establishing a 
multilateral system of payments between developing countries and CMEA 
member countries , did hot lead to consensus on a multilateral system' 
of payments; it concluded by suggesting various processes for approaching 
such a system, such'as the combination of payments in clearing accounts 
and in convertible currencies to varying degrees, the use of joint commissions 
as a mechanism for discussing and finding appropriate solutions in the 
field of payments, and the introduction of more flexible methods in present 
payments systems by increasing technical credits, extension of the periods 
for settling balances and the use of special accounts in oconvertible 
currencies.71/ . . 
The other major change mentioned above was the gradual progress 
observed in the types of agreements regulating relations between countries 
of the two areas, which are no longer limited to the narrow field of trade 
but also cover various areas of economic co-operation. Argentina and Peru 
jf 
are the two Latin American countries (excluding Cuba) which have signed, the 
greatest number of economic co-operation agreements with European countries 
of CMEA, followed by Colombia and Mexico. Obviously, co-operation 
agreements only provide the institutional framework within which the 
programmes and projects.enbodying the co-operation in different fields must 
subsequently be defined. Thus there is a relatively large gap between 
the aims and objectives set forth in the co-operation agreements and the 
practical results achieved. 
It is impossible, to evaluate these results here, partly because they 
do not lend themselves to generalization and partly because the projects 
are to materialize and be put into effect in the final three of four years, 
and thus the majority of them are still in the stage of execution. In 
order to show the breadth, of the CMEA countries' conception of co-operation, 
71/ See "Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts to study a 
multilateral system of payments between socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe and developing countries", document TD/B/683, 
14 December 1977. 
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mention may be made of some of the more important projects they have signed 
with Argentina and Peru. With Argentina, the major projects are in the 
energy sector (thermal electricity and hydroelectricity), mining (coal and 
petroleum) and transportation (supply of railway cars). At the end of 1978 
the Government of the Republic of Argentina announced that it had awarded 
the Soviet Union the contract for the final design of the Middle Parana 
hydroelectric project;, involving two power stations with a total capacity of 
5,700 megawatts. With Peru, agreed project include the Paita fisheries 
complex, the expansion of the Canon del Pato hydroelectric power-station, 
the Olmos irrigation project, the exploitation of the Antamina copper deposits 
and others in the fields of education and health. 
The evaluation of the economic relations between Latin America and 
the member countries of CMEA from the standpoint of the volumes of purchases 
and sales, construction costs, structure of trade in goods and technical 
assistance provides a limited view. In many cases short-term factors have 
had a strong effect, causing abrupt changes reflecting the influence of 
individual cases rather than long-term trends. A fuller view is gained 
from the analysis of the contractual basis and of the collaboration among 
the institutions of the two areas, which, together with economic considerations, 
establish the conditions for long-term economic relations. 
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" Chapter "VÍI 
''TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE PRÉSENT STAGE OF 
••'• LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT. 
1. Expansion and common concerns 
The internationalization of the Latin American economies through 
foreign investment and technology has continued in recent years. Foreign 
enterprises aré particularly important in the dynamic sectors of manufacturing 
industry - engineering and metal products and ¿hemicals - financial activities, 
marketing and processing of commodities and exports of manufactures. This 
may bé illustrated ¿y the following CEPAL estimates ::72/ direct accumulated 
investment 73/ by the industrialized OECD countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean amounted at the end of 1975 to 37,600 million dollars, 
practically the equivalent of total Latin American exports in that year; 
the share of the transnational corporations in the aggregate gross domestic 
product of the region in 1975 was only 7%s but twice as much in the 
manufacturing product.' Sales of manufactures by United States transnational 
enterprises in the region grew at an annual average rate of 20.5% during the 
first half of the 1970s, being concentrated in chemicals, machinery and 
equipment, including electrical machinery, and transport equipment (60% of 
total sales of manufactures in 1974-1975); manufacturing exports of those 
enterprises increased at a rate of 23% per year during that period, and 
accumulated United States investment in the financial sector amounted to 
72/ For further details, see CEPAL, "Trends and changes in the investment 
of transnational corporations in the developing countries and 
particularly in Latin America", Economic Survey of Latin America, 1977, 
vol. I. 
73/ It is assumed by definition that direct foreign investment corresponds 
more or less to investment by transnational corporations. Furthermore, 
in the case of the United States more than 70% of total direct 
foreign investment is carried out by only 250 to 300 of them. For the 
United Kingdom, over 80% is controlled by 165 transnational enterprises 
and for the Federal Republic of Germany more than 70% is accounted for 
by 82 corporations (see United Nations, Multinational corporations 
in world development, ST/ECA/190, New York, 1973). 
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some 4.6 billion.dollars in 1975, an annual increase of 55% between 1967 
and 1975. Partial data confirm the steady expansion of transnational 
enterprises in the second half of the 1970s: direct investment by United 
States enterprises in the region increased in 1977 by 15.9%, compared with 
8.0% in 1976 and 11.3% in 1971-1975.74/ 75/ 
The interest of the transnational enterprises in the Latin American 
market arouses a variety of reactions among the countries of the region, 
but in most cases two basic considerations prevail: in the first place, the 
contribution which they can make, and which many Latin American countries 
wish to receive, in the fields of technology, capital, access to external 
markets and business and plant management; secondly, the desire to avoid 
any interference by foreign investment in domestic policy matters, to ensure 
that investment is in keeping with each country's development strategy 
and policy guidelines, and to see to it that their modus operandi is the 
most suitable for local needs and circumstances. 
These fundamental concerns are reflected in the common principles 
upheld by the developing countries with respect to the preparation of an 
international code of conduct for transnational corporations. They were 
also confirmed in the Guatemala Appraisal which established the need for 
transnational enterprises to comply with the laws and regulations and 
submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the host country, refrain from 
any interference in domestic matters, international relations and external 
74/ See United States Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, 
August 1978, volume 58, N° 88. 
75/ The increased value of direct investment in recent years mentioned 
in this paragraph has been affected by the upsurge in world inflation 
and particularly the higher prices of capital goods and services which 
are imported as part of foreign investment. For example, the prices 
of industrial goods in the United States grew at an annual average 
rate of 9.8% betwéen 1972 and 1977, with increases of 6.0% in 1975, 
6.4% in 1976 and 6.7% in 1977, i.e., lower than at the beginning of 
the period. Furthermore, it may be assumed that the purchasing power 
and the effect of this investment on Latin American economies have 
not decreased as a result of local inflation which is reflected to a 
greater or lesser extent in foreign currency becoming more expensive. 
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policy, respect national sovereignty over natural and economic resources, 
comply with national policies, objectives and priorities, report on their 
activities, make net contributions of financial resources, contribute to 
local scientific and technological capacity and, finally, refrain from 
restrictive trade practices.76/ 
The Commission on transnational Corporations, the governmental body 
of the Economic and Social Council in this field,77/ at its fourth session 
in Vienna in May 1978 considered the results of various meetings of the 
Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct 78/ and decided that 
the Group's mandate should be extended in order to decide on a number of 
important pending questions, such as the definitions and legai nature of 
the Code and the obligations of the parties involved.79/ 
Obviously, the preparation and international acceptance of a code of 
conduct for transnational corporations is a complex and difficult process, 
related to the establishment of the New International Economic Order and 
the objectives pursued by the developing countries in the North-South 
dialogue. Without neglecting the prime importance of intergovernmental 
negotiations on this subject, it should be borne in mind that the capacity 
and courses of action of Latin American governments vis-a-vis the transnational 
enterprises are related to the real conditions and experience of the different 
countries, from the standpoint of the links between the two sides and the 
elements of bargaining power and government policies.80/ Taking into account 
the great diversity of national and sectoral situations in Latin America 
76/ See the Guatëmala Appraisal, adopted by CEPAL resolution 362 (XVII), 
in the series Cuadernos de la CEPAL, N° 17, 1977, paragraphs 169 to 
173. 
77/ In 1978 the Latin American and Caribbean members of the Commission 
were: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, 
Suriname and Venezuela. 
78/ The Working Group has the same mëmbership as the Commission on 
Transnational Corporations. • 
79/ See Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report of the fourth 
session, 16-26 May 1978, Supplement N° 12, Part III, paragraphs 
12-15. 
80/ See the "Guatemala Appraisal" op. cit., paragraphs 172 and 173. 
/and the 
- 171 -
and the Caribbean, some new aspects of their experience are singled out 
below; these represent different options for relations between the 
transnational corporations and thè economies of the region. 
2' Towards new modalities in the links between transnational 
enterprises and the economies of the region 
There follows a study of some aspects of the increasing adaptation of 
transnational corporations to the present level of development of the 
countries of the region, stressing the concerns and policies linked with 
growing, balanced integration in world trade, national technological and 
scientific development, and the greater participation of local agents in the 
activities heavily dominated by the transnational corporations. 
One of the aspects of greatest interest to the countries of the 
region is the fact that the transnational corporations operating in 
manufacturing activities in the region often have a negative effect on the 
balance of payments. These enterprises influence imports by promoting the 
development of sectors with a high content of imported technology and imported 
inputs and goods. There are aslo the effects of the way in which prices 
are fixed in intra-company trade, which may have an adverse effect, although 
it is sometimes difficult to quantify the impact of this factor.81/ Furthermore 
the financing provided by the corporations .as direct investment in the strict 
sense is of limited importance, since increasingly they have taken up 
obtaining funds in the developing countries in which they invest, as well 
as in international financial markets in collaboration with those countries. 
Thus the financial contribution they make is limited in comparison with 
the payments abroad generated in the form of profits, interest, royalties 
and provision of technical assistance. The transnational corporations have 
not only generally been very reluctant to export but in some cases they have 
applied restrictive practices in this connexion.82/ Consequently, many 
81/ See for example UNCTAD Dominant positions of market powers of 
transnational corporations; use of the transfer pricing mechanism 
(TD/B/C.2/167), November 1977 and Intrafirm Transactions and their 
Impact on Trade and Development, UNCTAD, Seminar Programme, Report 
Series N° 2, May 1978. 
82/ See for example UNCTAD Recent Development in the control of restrictive 
business practices in Latin America (CTD/B/C.2/AC.6/17), June 1978. 
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Latin American countries have begun to wonder whether the transnational 
enterprises are contributing to increase their balance-of-payments deficit. 
For example, studies by the Ministry of Planning of Brazil have shown that 
many of the transnational enterprises in that country have trade and payments 
deficits, and this heavily influences the country's total deficits in view 
of the large volume of their activities.83/ Polices are being adopted with 
increasing frequency to encourage trasnational enterprises to export some 
of their output and to use increasing amounts of local (or possible Latin 
American) inputs and goods. In a number of countries, agreements are made 
with the transnational enterprises regarding minimum export levels, and the 
incentives and advantages granted by Governments are linked to the increase in 
the national content of the output of the enterprises. For example, the 
Port Programme 513 of Brazil calls for a minimum of 85% national content, 
and certificates of origin, based on a painstaking analysis, are a precondition 
for access to local credit, sales to government bodies, etc. Finally various 
governments of the region control and regulate the transfer prices of goods 
and also of services and technology, and the remittance of profits and capital 
through exchange mechanisms. They also regulate the use of local credit, 
in some cases imposing the condition that all or most of the financing of 
transnational enterprises should come from outside sources. The common 
rules of the Andean Pact countries are an outstanding although by no means 
unique case in the region of policies aimed at balance-of-payments equilibrium. 
The countries of the region are likewise concerned to develop national 
capacity for technological innovation and the capacity to penetrate 
international markets so as not to depend unilaterally on the transnationals 
in these fields. To this enda an effort is being made to ensure that direct 
foreign investment is not present as a package which cannot be broken down, 
and to negotiate separately those aspects which interest each country; for 
this purpose, technology is purchased without the foreign enterprises owning 
the plant in the country; technological components are purchased separately 
83/ Ministerio do Planejamento, Subsecretaría de Cooperagao Económica e 




from different enterprises; negotiations are undertaken for the marketing 
abroad of models, parts or components produced by national enterprises with 
the support of the distribution network of the transnational corporations; 
and the transnationals are induced to enter into partnership with local 
public or private capital, and even with a minority foreign holding, instead 
of having total ownership of the installations. Although the degree of 
control is not necessarily proportional to the share in the firm's capital 
and decision-making, machinery, it does at least allow national interests 
to become increasingly acquainted with aspects of production, marketing 
and financing, thus increasing local decision-making and managerial capacity. 
There is a tendency for Latin American countries to play a more active 
role in their relations with transnational corporations. The new modalities 
mentioned below are in some cases facilitated by the presence of state 
enterprises which, with their larger size and economic and financial capacity 
as well as government support, are usually in a better position than private, 
medium-sized or small local enterprises to negotiate on an equal footing with 
the transnationals. This is the case of state enterprises in various 
countries of the region, particularly those connected with basic export 
commodities (petroleum and mining) and the steel and petrochemical industries; 
and they have even set up companies jointly with local and' foreign private 
interests (as will be seen below). 
The creation of multinational enterprises by various countries of 
the region also helps to reduce the disadvantages of local private enterprise. 
In 1976, 200 such enterprises were identified., mainly based in Argentina, 
Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and Peru (80% of the total)* These 
multinational enterprises have operated in almost all the countries of the 
region.84/ Government bargaining power has also been increased by the 
competition in some markets of state firms of the socialist countries, as 
well as of medium-sized and small firms of the industrialized market-economy 
countries. 
84/ ' For further details see BID/INTAL, Las empresas conjuntas Latino-
americanas, Buenos Aires, 1977. 7 ^ : • 
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Naturally the use made of these new tendencies depends on the firmness 
with which each government defines and applies clear policies which take 
the new opportunities into account. Recent experience in Latin America and 
other areas of the world indicates than when circumstances demand, the 
transnational corporations possess a significant degree of flexibility and 
adaptation of their operations to local conditions. When their interests 
in the market of a given country or group of countries is very great, and 
they face a government exercising its bargaining power reasonably and firmly, 
they tend to alter significantly their traditional forms of operation, 
accepting conditions more favourable to the host countries in order to gain 
entry. Symptoms of this are the recent agreements between transnational 
corporations and socialist countries, and the appearence of a new modus operandi 
of the transnational corporations. The partial information available seems 
to indicate that corporations wishing to enter or expand in the market of a 
country or region tend to adopt a more flexible attitude and offer more 
favourable conditions in order to be able to penetrate oligopolistic markets, 
and in so doing usually push the already established corporations into 
likewise improving their operating conditions in order to face the new 
competition. 
New forms of co-operation have arisen from the negotiations between 
transnational corporations and developing countries, the major ones being -
(i) co-production and specialization agreements; 
(ii) sub-contracting; 
(iii) co-operation arrangements limited to technology and marketing; and 
(iv) joint ventures between foreign and national firms. 
These will be discussed briefly in the following paragraphs, 
(a) Co-production and specialization agreements 
These are undertaken between plants located in developed countries 
and plants situated in developing countries. Under co-production agreements, 
a plant of a foreign enterprise located abroad and a public or private national 
or regional enterprise, or a subsidiary of the foreign enterprise located 
in a developing country, share out the components or types and models of a 
specific good, each producing part and marketing it in such a way that 
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exports are made by both the developed and the developing country. In the 
case of specialization, which is similar to the above arrangements, the 
developing country becomes responsible for distributing at the world level 
the production of a model of the finished good rather than parts or components. 
These arrangements are different from what usually occurred in Latin 
America during the import-substitution process, when the enterprise or 
subsidiary of the developing country produced only for the domestic market. 
In the case of co-production and specialization, the developing country 
exports part of the goods produced while at the same time importing others. 
Arrangements like these have recently been made by FIAT and VOLKSWAGEN 
with Brazil, NISSAN with Mexico and PEUGEOT with Argentina. FIAT had to 
agree to undertake exports of parts and components as a requirement for 
producing in Brazil- NISSAN produces parts and components in Mexico which 
are sent to Japan, The VOLKSWAGEN "beetle" and PEUGEOT"404" are still being 
produced for export in Brazil and Argentina, respectively, after ceasing to be 
produced in the countries of origin, in view of continued world demand for 
them. These arrangements are positive; although they do not eliminate the 
countries' dependence on the transnational corporations in technology and 
marketing and are not a substitute for the creation of greater local capacity 
in those fields or for strategies for the export of advanced manufactures, 
they do represent a step in that direction, 
(b) Sub-contracting 1 
Under a sub-contracting agreement, a developing country firm undertakes 
on behalf of a developed country some stages of the production of a good, which 
is then transferred from the developed to the developing country at a 
certain stage of production to incorporate the stage in question and is then 
reexported. The stages located in the developing country usually make 
intensive use of unskilled labour. The technical specifications are fixed 
by the foreign enterprise, which also supplies technical assistance and 
equipment. The most important example in Latin America of such arrangements 
are the "maquila'1- industries in Mexico, involving clothing, electronics and 
other types of industry with a value added in the country of 468 million 
dollars in 1975 and gross exports of 1,020.6 million dollars in the same year. 
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These operations have been facilitated by tariff items 806-30 807-00 of the 
United States, whose basic for the customs tariff evaluation is fixed as 
the value added abroad rather than the total value of the importwhich 
makes it possible to displace partial activities of some production processes 
and make use of cheap labour. 
Sub-contracting bears some resemblance to co-production and specialization, 
but is different in that it is limited to isolated processes and does not 
involve the complete production of final products or parts and components. 
The advantages for countries with surplus labour are clear, since it 
generates employment and foreign exchange. However, such activities located 
in developing countries remain very vulnerable from the standpoint of 
the foreign corporation, which may at any moment decide to transfer them to 
another country. In addition, the investment in the developing countries 
is generally minimal, and in the great majority of cases only relatively 
unskilled labour is employed, at low wages. The effects in terms of the 
diffusion of technology and the promotion of other industries - i.e., external 
economies - are practically non-existent, since the semi-processed goods 
employed are totally imported from a developed country, for the sole purpose 
of building into them a labour-intensive process and then reexporting them. 
These limitations have meant that in Mexico an attempt is being made to 
ensure that these industries acquire other inputs in the country, and are 
not only located on the border, where they were initially set up (as twins 
of the parent companies located on the other side of the border), but 
in other, regions of the country as well, so as to integrate them.more 
successfully with the rest of local manufacturing industry, 
(c) Co-operation agreements limited to technology and marketing 
These arrangements are used to break down the direct investment 
"package" so that the developing country can acquire only the elements it 
does not possess, thus supporting efforts to create greater local capacity 
for decision and action in industry and technology. Technology itself can 
be broken down into its various parts or. components (design, construction 
and operation of the plant, improvement of products and production processes, 
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development of new products, research, etc.), and an effort is made to 
acquire each of these from the source of supply which is cheapest and best 
suited to local conditions, with a view to making better use of local 
production resources, narrowing the technological gap and producing goods 
better adapted to the specific use which will be made of them in the 
markets to which they are destined. The relatively less developed countries 
perhaps lean towards agreements under which the foreign firm sells the 
turn-key plant to the local public or private enterprise, initially trains 
technical personnel and a certain proportion of skilled workers, and provides 
advisory services during the first years of operation of the plant, until 
the latter can gradually do without its support. To diversify its sources 
of supply, the developing country must have a sound knowledge of the 
alternative sources of the desired elements and have the ability to analyse 
the different options in the light of its own needs, and to absorb, handle 
and disseminate the different types of technology. 
Marketing.agreements are less frequent; they are used in some cases, 
for example, between transnational enterprises and socialist countries, and 
are beginning to appear in Latin America. This co-operation limited to 
specific areas also helps to avoid or reduce certain drawbacks identified 
in the intra-firm transactions common in Latin America and throughout the 
world, through which the exports of the transnational enterprises are . 
carried out between affiliates of the same enterprise or between them and 
the parent company. When the same company is both purchaser and seller, 
it is hard to verify that the prices established truly correspond to the 
market value of the good, and that the developing country is really obtaining 
the income corresponding to the value added by.the activities of the 
enterprises in its territory and is paying proper prices for the inputs 
imported by the enterprise. 
Some recent cases illustrate new forms of transfer of technology and 
marketing of goods. In Brazil there are examples in petrochemicals, 
computers and aircraft manufacture. In one case of the design and manufacture 
of civilian aircraft, the foreign enterprise provides technical assistance 
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for the production of parts, assembly, quality control, etc., and has the 
right to export;, the Brazilian state enterprise can in turn export, possibly 
using the foreign firm's distribution network. In synthetic fibres, Mexico 
encouraged competition among foreign enterprises of different origins and 
in the choosing among them took into account not only the provision of 
technical assistance during the initial and future stages, but also the 
possibility of reserving the right to acquire the different technological 
components separately. In 1978, Ecuador and Venezuela imposed the following 
conditions on the transnational competing for markets allocated under 
the motor-vehicle sectoral programme: the vehicles and their components 
must comply with United States standards on pollution, fuel consumption and 
quality control; no payment shall be made for patents and licences, but 
only for technical assistance and material costs, and training will be 
undertaken so that production can begin with a minimum of 50% of local 
technical and administrative staff, to reach 90% after five years of 
operation. These conditions will affect not only exports within the 
Andean Pact but also exports to third markets, and targets have been fixed 
for the future. 
(d) Agreements between foreign and local enterprises for joint ventures 
These agreements tend to cover capital, technology and managerial 
capacity provided by one or more foreign enterprises and even from different 
developed countries, combined with local elements from the developing 
country. Agreements to establish joint companies are frequent between 
transnational corporations and governments between transnationals and 
state enterprises, and between transnationals and national or regional 
private enterprises. For example, the Brazilian public enterprise PETROQUISA 
set up COPENE (Petroquímica Nordeste), a firm combining local public and 
private capital with capital from a number of transnational enterprises 
from different industrialized countries, which also contributed contracts 
for licensing, management, etc. The advantages for the countries of the 
region are clear, since they have a real share in the firm's ownership, 
technology, administration and marketing the training of local managerial 
staff is promoted and the State has influence over basic areas of development. 
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The agreements also suits the transnational enterprises, since they are able 
to share risks with the State, and can use relatively cheaper resources, 
overcome administrative obstacles because of their direct co-operation with 
the public sector, etc. 
The use of these new kinds of links with transnational corporations 
described summarily above, largely depends on the political will of the 
governments and on the elements which make up its bargaining power vis-a-vis 
the corporations. Some of those elements primarily those connected with 
local circumstances, are discussed below. 
3. Elements in negotiating capacity 
(a) The transnational enterprises' interest in the regional market 
The negotiating capacity of the countries of the region depends, among 
other things, on the degree of interest of foreign enterprises in establishing 
plants there. It is therefore worth examining some of the factors which 
influence this interest. First of all, it should be noted that in the case 
of the transnational enterprises of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, the production of their 
subsidiaries located in foreign countries in 1971 was 1.75 times greater 
than the exports of those enterprises from their countries of origin. 
This indicates that the possibility of expansion, achievement of economies 
of scale in efforts to create technology, and increased profits, both for 
the transnationals themselves and for their countries of origin, depend to 
a very large extent on their possibilities of investing in external markets. 
In Latin American and the Caribbean, the amount produced with the direct 
and substantial participation of transnational enterprises is appreciably 
greater than the exports of those same enterprises to the region. 
To this should be added the growing competition between transnational 
enterprises all over the world and the fact that Latin America absorbs a 
very high proportion - greater than other areas - of total investment in the 
developing world and constitutes the most important area for many of the 
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most dynamic manufacturing activities. We will now review some factors 
which constitute solid reasons why the transnational enterprises are so 
interested in operating in countries of the region. 
As already noted, the competition between transnational enterprises 
of Various origins to win markets is increasingly intense and provides the 
countries of the region with an increasingly wide choice. The changes in t»;e 
relative economic power of the various industrialized centres which have 
been observed since the beginning of the 1960s are also reflected in the 
different rates of expansion of those countries' transnational enterprises. 
In relative terms, there has been a decline in the previous leadership of 
the United States, which still dominated world investment in 1967 with a 
figure of 54% of the total, and at the same time there has also been a 
decline in the position of the former colonial centres such as the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy and Belgium, which accounted for over a quarter 
of world investment (26%) in the same year. By 1976, the United States 
share had gone down to 48% and that of the second group of countries 
had gone down even more, to 17%. The winners in this competition have mainly 
been the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, which together increased 
their share from 4 to 14%, and a group of industrialized countries with 
medium-sized and small markets, such as Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland 
and others, which increased their share from 14 to 19%. In Latin America 
and the Caribbean the share of the United States in direct foreign investment 
dropped over the five-year period 1971-1975 from 66% to 59%, while that of 
the European countries and Japan rose from 34 to 41%. As in other cases, 
however, the regional situation conceals different individual types of 
evolution. In the period in question, for example, participation by European 
and Japanese firms increased in Colombia from 17 to 46%, in Venezuela from 
27 to 53%, in the CACM from 9 to 27%, and in Brazil from 62 to 67%.85/ 
85/ Ibid., see United Nations, Transnational Corporations in World 
Development: a Re-examination (E/C.10/38, March 1978, table 111-32). 
The data on Brazil were prepared on the basis of the Boletín do Banco 
Central do Brasil, which uses a different methodology from that 
employed in the CEPAL estimates. 
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Moreover3 Latin America absorb? a considerable part of world direct 
private investment. This means that there is a high degree of interest 
among transnational enterprises in.gaining an opportunity to produce in these 
markets. In 1975, 74% of world direct foreign investment by the industrialized 
countries was made in industrialized countries themselves and 26% in the 
developing countries (as against 31% in 1967). .Among the latter, the OPEC 
countries received 6% (with 2% for Venezuela), countries and territories 
offering tax exemptions, 3%;86/ while finally.Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Peru received 8%. Eleven countries of Latin America and the Caribbean accounted 
for approximately half the total invested by the industrialized countries in 
the three developing regions. The importance of Latin America for foreign 
investors is even more outstanding in manufacturing, although relative data are 
available only on United States investment in this field: thus, in the same 
year 1975, 19% of total United States investment all over the world corresponded 
to the developing countries, among which Latin America and the Caribbean 
accounted for the very high proportion of 15% of the world total. 
Most of the accumulated direct foreign investment in Latin America and 
the Caribbean at the end of ,1975 was in the countries with the biggest markets: 
24% in Brazil, 13% in.Mexico, 11% in Venezuela and 5% in Argentina, while 
the two "tax havens", Panama and Bermuda, accounted for .6% and. 10%, . 
respectively. The countries of the Andean Pact accounted for 20% in the same 
year while those of the Central American Common Market .received only 2.5%. 
The English-speaking countries and those of the Caribbean in general acquired 
growing importance for foreign investors, and their share in the total, for 
developing America (including Bermuda and the other "tax havens" listed above) 
increased from 17% in 1967 to 26% in 1975. 
Despite the stagnation of the world economy in the last few years, the 
average annual increase in direct investment in the region was much greater 
in 1972-1975 than in 1968-1971, rising from 6.7 to 12.0%. In the latter of 
these two periods, the biggest increases were in Brazil (15.6%), Mexico (18.3%), 
86/ ' Panama, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and thè 
Netherlands Antilles. 
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Ecuador (13.6%), Peru (18.9%), Uruguay (32.9%), Suriname (28.8%), and 
the Caribbean countries (32.4%).87/ 
The biggest possibilities of foreign investment in Latin America and 
the Caribbean at present are in certain sectors of manufacturing and finance. 
In the first case, this is the result of a long-term evolution whereby 
the sectors in which foreign direct investment is made in the region have 
changed considerably, with a big drop in the share of mining, petroleum 
and services and a big proportional increase in manufacturing. In the case 
of United States investment, for which data are available, between 1967 and 
1975 the share of investments in mining and smelting in the region dropped 
from 15 to 7% of the total, that of petroleum from 28 to 15%, and that of 
commerce from 11 to 10%. In contrast, the share of manufacturing in the 
same period rose from 31 to 39%. The processes of nationalization have had 
some influence on the drop in foreign investment in mining, petroleum and 
public services, while investments in manufacturing have been made mainly 
with a view to producing goods for domestic or sub-regional markets. Only 
recently have some investments begun to be made in production for export, 
such as those made by the United States in the so-called making-up industries 
in Mexico and in a few other countries of the region which have signed 
agreements on external marketing with transnational enterprises. 
Another very dynamic field for foreign investment is that of finances, 
whose share in total United States investment in the region came to 21% in 
1975, i.e., more than half as much as manufactures (35%). This is connected 
with the "tax havens" mentioned earlier and with the growing importance of 
transnational banks in the credits granted to countries of the region; thus, 
the share of private credit in total financing has almost doubled in the 
last ten years, increasing from one-third to two-thirds.88/ 
87/ See footnote 73. 
88/ See Carlos Massad and Roberto Zahler, Dos Estudios sobre Endeuda-
miento Externo, Cuadernos de la CEPAL, N° 19, 1977. 
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The relative importance of foreign enterprises in comparison with 
national public and private enterprises is generally greater in sectors of 
dynamic demand or more modern technology. Thus, out of the 2,800 biggest 
manufacturing enterprises in Brazil in 1975, foreign enterprises had a 
particularly high share of total sales in transport equipment (76%), metal 
products (71%), machinery and accessories (including electrical machinery) 
(67%), rubber products (66%) and chemicals (62%). In Mexico, according to 
the 1970 industrial census, the biggest shares of transnational enterprises 
in gross production were in the sectors of transport equipment (64%), 
rubber products (64%), chemicals (51%), basic metal industries (47%), and 
machinery and accessories (38%). A similar picture was to be seen in 
Argentina and Colombia. 
(b) National elements in negotiating capacity 
To return to the important elements affecting the interest of 
transnational enterprises in the region and the negotiating capacity of 
governménts, the outstanding points here are size of market, cost of labour, 
and the environmént. 1 
(i) Size of market. Aë regards consumer durables and some non-durable 
goods involving intermediate téchnology'(motor vehicles, electrical household 
appliances, synthetic fibres, etc.) purchased by the intermediate and upper 
strata, the Latin American market occupies an important place among the 
regions of the world because of the growth of those strata, while its 
potential becomes still greater as broad sectors of the currently 
underprivileged classes are incorporated into them. The region does not yet 
function as a single market, in spite of the increasing degree of effective 
integration achieved precisely in these sectors. At all events, four 
economic units are of a considerable size: Argentina, Brazil, the Andean Group 
and Mexico, The customs protection applied by Latin American countries has 
gone down, but it will probably continue to be higher than that of the 
developed countries, thus helping to ensure an important market for the 
domestic production of this type of goods, with the participation of 
transnational enterprises. For capital and intermediate goods, the effective 
Latin American market is already considerable and is expanding rapidly with 
the progress of those sectors currently being given high priority in 
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Latin American development strategies. These goods, too, are produced with 
the collaboration of transnational enterprises. As for non-durable consumer 
goods using simpler technology, the present market is already very large 
and will grow as the currently underprivileged part of the population is 
incorporated into this market. 
(ii) Cost of labour and comparative advantages. This cost is generally 
considerably lower in Latin American countries than in the developed countries, 
and because of the big gap separating the per capita income of these two types 
of countries, it will probably continue to be lower even though advanced 
income distribution policies are applied. Although care must be exercised 
in making comparisons, because of the differences in the origin and 
methodology of the information available, it can be said that for substantial 
sectors of manufacturing, including engineering.and textiles, the ratio of 
the cost of labour between Latin America and the developed countries is 
usually between 1:2 and 1:8. Of course the productivity is higher in the 
developed countries,, but even taking this into account there is in many cases 
a lower cost of labour in Latin America for the same productivity as in the 
developed countries. This explains the tendency for the transnational 
enterprises impelled by the vigorous competition between them, to move the 
production of certain goods or certain parts of production processes calling 
for high labour density to developing countries. This process is favoured 
by Latin American industrial development, which includes metalworking and 
chemical industries; the relatively high level of education and skill reached 
by the labour on the market, and the capacity for adapting technology. 
Hindrances and obstacles to the process are raised by the economic difficulties 
of the developed countries and uncertainty about the future of the world 
economy. 
The foregoing does not apply only to traditional industries. The 
comparative advantages thus "acquired" have improved considerably, thus 
reducing costs, increasing quality and creating an already significant capacity 
for innovation; these aspects explain the very rapid increase in the 
competitive export of manufactures of engineering goods and others of 
intermediate technology. The continuation of the process of industrial 
development which is taking place will also considerably increase in the 
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future the comparative advantages of Latin America for the production of 
capital goodss chemicals and metal products, many of which are already 
produced and exported on competitive terms in the region. 
(iii) The environment. The increase in investment requirements and 
costs in developed countries because of environmental protection policies 
applied with increasing rigour by their governments are increasing the 
interest of enterprises in developing certain sectors of their activity 
(for example, chemicals and metal production) in developing countries. The 
problems of environmental contamination are also of concern to the countries 
of the region, however, which cannot permit the development of these sectors 
under conditions which simply mean transferring these unfavourable effects 
to Latin America and are therefore tending to establish their own policies 
for protecting the environment. Because of their lower population density 
and the different priorities assigned by these countries to problems of the 
environment (such as the appropriate use of non-renewable natural resources, 
the expansion of renewable resources, etc.) compared with other problems 
such as those of unemployment, extreme poverty and shortage of housing, 
however, it may be assumed that the additional costs and investments needed 
to take care of these problems will be smaller in the countries of Latin 
America than in the developed countries. 
Government policies 
In the previous section, reference was made to the different elements 
making up the negotiating capacity of the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean which arise from the real interest of transnational enterprises 
in investing in the region and the various economic factors presumed to 
signify comparative advantages for foreign investors. In this last part, 
the picture of the region's negotiating capacity will be supplemented with 
reference to some aspects of government policy, including regulation of the 
presence and activities of transnational enterprises and the negotiation of 
individual agreements with them. 
Regulation of the presence and activities of transnational enterprises 
The scope of this regulation varies considerably from one country to 
another. In some cases there has been a liberalization of regulations, while 
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in others more trust is placed in the case-by-case negotiation of contracts 
and agreements with the transnational enterprises. In some countries, such 
as Mexico and the Andean Group countries, however, an important role is 
assigned to regulation. 
In the Andean Group, this path has been followed, by agreement among 
the five participating countries, through Decisiçn 24, as amended by 
Decisions 37, 37A and 103, which seek to secure some degree of harmonization 
of national policies in these matters. The participation of foreign 
enterprises in the benefits of the tariff liberalization programme of the 
Cartagena Agreement has been made subject to their conversion into joint 
enterprises (i.e., enterprises in which between 51 and 80% of the capital 
belongs to domestic investors) within a period of 15 years (20 in Bolivia and 
Ecuador) from 1 January 1974. Access to domestic credit has also been 
limited to short-term credit only (up to 3 years), and it has been laid down 
that authorization must be obtained for any new investment, reinvestment 
and contracts for the transfer of technology, while the reinvestment of profits 
and their remittance abroad have been limited. The regulation of the presence 
and activities of foreign enterprises in the manufacturing sector of the 
Andean Pact countries has been facilitated in the programmed sectors (metal 
products and machinery, petrochemicals and the motor industry, so far), where 
the governments of the Andean Group decide on the assignment of productive 
resources in the various countries and the transnational enterprises have 
to adopt their strategies to these decisions. It should be noted that in 
many of the Latin American countries certain areas have been set aside for 
domestic capital, and enterprises have been nationalized or turned into mixed 
enterprises, especially in mining and fuels. 
Fiscal policy is of great importance in the regulation of transnational 
enterprises, both as regards the income of the government (especially for 
basic export products) and as regards the work of orientation and stimulation 
of certain activities (such as export) and relatively under-developed 
regions, etc. As the transnational enterprises largely dominate the dynamic 
sectors of the economies of thé region, it is very important to carry out a 
continuous appraisal of their role (benefits and costs) within the context 
of the policies, programmes and plans of the government. 
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Once the policy has been decided and the laws have been promulgated, 
governments must establish the administrative machinery for putting these 
into effect, and this often highlights the need for co-ordination among the 
various government departments involved, such as Ministries of Industry, 
foreign trade, finance, economic planning, legal affairs, agriculture and 
mining, and the State enterprises. The effectiveness of the machinery for 
supervising the application of the laws and agreements negotiated (continuous 
administrative vigilance on the one hand and specific intervention on the 
other) will depend of course on there being a team of public servants 
capable of analysing,the economic, legal and management aspects of the 
activities of the transnational enterprises«89/ 
In planning the orderly development of the various sectors of the 
economy, governments obviously have to obtain various kinds of information. 
The possession, of data on the respective sector, on the transnational 
enterprises which are participating or could participate, and on concrete 
projects will enable them to take the initiative in selecting the best 
projects, determining if foreign inputs are needed, and selecting the possible 
investors (transnational enterprises or others). Taking the initiative 
instead of waiting passively for investment proposals may be an advantage 
in the negotiating process. At all events, it is desirable that governments 
should refrain from entering into any relationship with a transnational 
enterprise unless thay have sufficient information and unless they make sure 
that the agreements and/or legislation stipulate that they will receive an 
adequate flow of information on the enterprise's activities as long as the 
contract lasts. Access to pertinent information before starting negotiations 
strengthens a country's negotiating position and the subsequent receipt of 
a flow of data is essential in order to supervise and regulate the activity, 
while it may be of inestimable value when the time comes to renegotiate 
the contract. 
89/ See United Nations, Centre on Transnational Corporations, 
"Transnational enterprises: Key questions in the preparation and 
execution of technical co-operation programmes and projects in 
developing countries", New York, February 1978. 
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The efficiency with which the recipient governments deal with foreign 
investment and technology will depend basically on1their possession of 
adequate and timely knowledge regarding the transnational enterprises which 
might come into the country or are already operating in it and the maintenance 
of adequate supervision and control of their activities. 
The situation in this field in Latin America and the Caribbean suffers 
in some cases from certain shortcomings and difficulties which may be 
tentatively summarized as follows: 
(i) in most cases the government's information on foreign investment 
and technology and on the transnational enterprises is limited to that 
concerning the approval and registration of the investment project. This 
information contains only the basic data for the identification of the 
investor: the details of his external contribution (finance, technology, etc.) 
and the details of the recipient enterprise (identification, capital and 
associates, economic and accounting information, management, promotional 
benefits and contracts for the transfer of technology); there is usually 
little or no information about the investments and activities of the investor 
in other countries (especially Latin American countries) and about other 
potential investors who could undertake the project being nègotiated; 
(ii) generally speaking, there is no continuity of the information, 
nor is there adequate co-ordination between the bodies responsible, since they 
are different in each stage of thè process because they are subject to 
different higher administrative authorities and do not have a clear place 
in a globally and comprehensively prepared process; 
(iii) in some cases there are shortcomings in the systems of publication 
of data, while the reliability of the data themselves is not uniform. At the 
same time, there is little co-operation and systematic exchange of information 
among the countries of the region; 
(iv) in short, the administrative arrangements and information systems 
regarding transnational enterprises do not usually function as efficiently as 
they should, so that in many cases governments lack sufficient information for 
appraising, checking and supervising the commitments of foreign investors and 
their participation in the economic development of their respective countries. 
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(b) Negotiation of contracts and agreements with transnational enterprises 
Generally speaking, the developing countries have to deal with 
negotiators acting on behalf of the transnational enterprises who are 
extremely skillful and have long experience in negotiation techniques and 
the drawing up of contracts. It is therefore important that the developing 
countries should organize an effective negotiating group, including 
technical, legal and financial experts, while it goes without saying that 
meticulous prior preparation for the negotiations is called for. 
Once an agreement has been negotiated, a contract must be drawn up 
which adequately safeguards the interests of the host country. Such documents 
contain clauses which lay down their duration, the material and financial 
commitments of the transnational enterprise, time schedules for the planning 
and initiation of the project, and the amount and quality of production 
("performance guarantees"). They frequently also include provisions on the 
employment and training of nationals of the host country, preferential 
treatment for goods and services and exports of the latter, the use of 
national currency and foreign exchange, conditions regarding the transfer of 
technology, compensation and responsibility in respect of claims by third 
parties, and the so-called "standard clauses" on such points as notification, 
cases of force majeure, and assignments and transfers. 
Brazil makes quite frequent and increasing use of case-by-case 
negotiation, as in the already mentioned case of the motor industry, which 
has been authorized to produce for the domestic market, but with the 
obligation to export a certain proportion of its production. Mexico and 
Argentina have also made use of negotiation, especially in the same case 
of the motor industry. In Brazil, negotiations have been held with a view to 
the association of foreign and national capital in the steel, engineering, 
aluminium, chemicals, mining, atomic energy, oil, telecommunications and other 
industries. In the mining and fuels industries case-by-case negotiation 
between governments and foreign firms is a widely-used and important instrument 
in Latin America.90/ 
90/ See Benny Widyono, "Transnational corporations in export-oriented 
primary commodities", CEPAL Review, M° 5, Second Semester of 1978. 
See also La actividad bananera en el Istmo Centroamericano y las 
políticas recientes, CEPAL/MEX/77/20, November 1977. 
